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ABSTRACT 
This study first provides a descriptive evidence on the evolution of corporate governance in 
the UK over 2003-2015. This research reveals that the board size of UK boards was 
somewhat stable over the 2003-2015 but with a noticeable drop during the 2007 financial 
crisis. Proportion of non-executive independent directors has increased dramatically over the 
period of 2003-2015. This is in line with the UK corporate governance codes that recommend 
most board of directors should be non-executive independent directors. Additionally, CEO 
duality has also seen a dramatic decrease from 21% in 2003 to almost 7% in 2015. This also 
reflects the UK corporate governance’s approach to separate the roles of chairman and CEO. 
Another important observation regarding the evolution of UK boards is that women 
representation on corporate boards sharply increased over the study period, mostly post the 
publication of the Davies Report (2011).  
Additionally, this research examines whether the presence of female and foreign directors on 
the remuneration committee has an influence on say-on-pay voting and chief executive 
officer (CEO) remuneration. Based on panel data from the UK’s FTSE 350 firms between 
2003 and 2015, this study finds that the presence of women on the remuneration committee is 
associated with a reduction in shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay voting and leads to lower 
CEO cash in terms of bonus remuneration, but not CEO equity remuneration. Moreover, this 
research finds that the presence of foreign directors on remuneration committees is associated 
with more shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay voting and higher CEO remuneration, 
including cash, equity and bonus remuneration. 
This study offers theoretical and academic implications and provides empirical evidence that 
gender and nationality diversity of directors on a remuneration committee plays a significant 
role in shaping shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay voting and CEO pay. The results also 
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provide empirical support for previous studies which find that women are more effective 
monitors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003). Additionally, this research provides 
empirical support for previous studies that find that foreign directors are less effective 
monitors and lead to higher CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, this study provides practitioner and policy implications. First, the findings of 
this research contribute to the on-going debate regarding board diversity, say-on-pay voting 
and CEO pay literature. Specifically, this study has practical implications, in that recent 
recommendations for more women on boards, such as those of the Davies Reports, have been 
useful and effective. This study also supports recent recommendations by the Hampton-
Alexander Review (2016) for more representation of women on board sub-committees, such 
as the remuneration committee. Finally, the results of this research suggest that caution is 
needed when proposing an increase in foreign directors on board sub-committees, as their 
insufficient oversight can significantly exacerbate agency conflicts, rather than resolve them, 
potentially leading to higher CEO pay and a consequent increase in shareholders’ dissent on 
remuneration policy via the say-on-pay. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Corporate governance is a relatively new phenomenon in the business and economics 
literature, and its theories have been developed from various fields including finance, 
accounting, economics, law and management (Mallin, 2016). More specifically, the term 
corporate governance was not known officially until the mid-1970s, when the Federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States (US) first introduced 
corporate governance as an official term on their Federal Register (Cheffins, 2013; Ocasio 
and Joseph, 2005), whereas in the United Kingdom (UK), the term corporate governance was 
less frequently used before the 1990s , for example, corporate governance was first used in 
the UK newspaper, The Times, in 1985 (Cheffins, 2013).  
However, the development of corporate governance in the UK started in 1991, when a group 
of accountancy professionals, the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), established the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Mallin, 2016). The Cadbury Committee was established after a series of corporate scandals 
in the 1980s and 1990s due to lack of accountability (Cheffins, 1997). The main purpose of 
the Cadbury Committee was to suggest some recommendations to restore shareholders’ 
confidence in the market.  
Corporate governance issues were not widely discussed in the economics, finance and 
business literature until the late 1970s and the start of the 1980s. Although corporate 
governance has not been mentioned explicitly in the literature before the 1980s, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) did address the agency cost theory and the agency 
problem, which are the cornerstones of corporate governance literature (Cheffins, 2013). 
Additionally, during the 1970s and 1980s, most of the corporate governance research was 
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exclusively conducted in the US; however, by the 1990s, the situation changed (Cheffins, 
2013), as more research was conducted in the UK. By 2003, there was an ‘explosion’ of 
corporate governance research around the globe (Denis and McConnell, 2003).  
Corporate governance has been explained and defined in many different ways (for example, 
Cadbury Report, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Solomon, 2010). Corporate governance is 
defined as a ‘system by which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury Report, 
1992). A more specific definition by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is the following: 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the 
suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they 
make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad 
projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?  
Shleifer and Vishny’s definition assumes that the main objectives of any corporation are 
shareholder wealth maximisation and secure repayment of debts by debt holders (Goergen, 
2012). This definition, however, ignores other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, 
suppliers and government. The justification behind this assumption arises from the fact that 
shareholders are the ‘residual claimants’ of the corporation when it is dissolved, whereas 
stakeholders other than shareholders can walk away from the company without losing their 
benefits (Goergen, 2012). In other words, when a company becomes bankrupt, stakeholders’ 
claims will be met before the claims of the shareholders.  
In contrast, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) suggest a wider definition of corporate 
governance that includes all stakeholders, defining corporate governance as the following: 
A corporate governance system is the combination of mechanisms which ensure that 
the management (the agent) runs the firm for the benefit of one or several 
stakeholders (principles). Such stakeholders may cover shareholders, creditors, 
suppliers, clients, employees and other parties with whom the firm conducts its 
business. (Goergen and Renneboog, 2006) 
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The differences in corporate governance definitions and objectives are largely reflective of 
the country’s legal system (Goergen, 2012). The Anglo-American system, which is 
dominated by countries with a common law system, such as the UK and the US, prefers the 
shareholder model, whereas in countries dominated by civil law, they tend to use the 
stakeholder model, such as in Germany, France and Japan (Goergen, 2012). Recently the UK 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2016 thereafter) proposed a 
reform of corporate governance that could have given employees, customers and other key 
stakeholders more power in UK corporate boards. The Prime Minister Theresa May stated the 
following in the opening statement of the new consultation of the Green Paper:  
Good corporate governance is about having the right checks and balances within big 
business to strengthen decision making and accountability. This Green Paper 
therefore focuses on ensuring that executive pay is properly aligned to long term 
performance, giving greater voice to employees and consumers in the boardroom, and 
raising the bar for governance standards in the largest privately held companies. 
(May, 2016) 
The BEIS (2016) suggests creating a stakeholder advisory panel or designating one of the 
current non-executive directors to ensure that the claims of key stakeholders, especially those 
of the employees, are being satisfied at the board level or appointing a stakeholder 
representative to the board. This new consultation, in fact, marks a new era of corporate 
governance in the UK. 
Many countries around the world have introduced corporate governance codes. These codes 
are usually sets of principles regarding corporate governance that target companies publicly 
traded on stock exchange markets. The main motive of introducing any corporate governance 
code is a bid to foster better transparency and accountability and increase shareholder 
confidence levels (Mallin, 2016). The UK is recognised as one of the leading countries for 
corporate governance (Goergen, 2012), and has some distinguishing features including the 
following: 
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 A unitary board system, where executive and non-executive directors sit 
together and any decision is collectively taken by the whole board of directors. 
 A comply or explain approach, which suggests that in the case of no 
compliance, a firm should give proper justifications of non-compliance. This 
approach gives companies more flexibility to opt out of some of the 
provisions, as one size does not fit all.   
 A board which should include at least 50% of its members as independent 
non-executive directors. 
 The splitting of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman roles. 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016) 
The UK Corporate Governance Code has seen many developments since the Cadbury Report 
(1992). Since 2003, for example, the FRC has issued seven editions of the UK code, namely 
the Combined Code 2003, the Combined Code 2006, the Combined Code 2008, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2014 and the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
1.2 Motivation and Contribution of the Study 
This research is mainly motivated by reforms that have taken place in the UK since the 
Cadbury Report (1992). During this period, a number of corporate governance codes and 
voluntary practices were suggested to help improve the relationship between shareholders 
and managers and strengthen shareholders’ voting rights. These were as follows: no CEO 
duality and the establishment of a remuneration committee (Cadbury Report, 1992), 50% of 
directors should be independent non-executive directors (Higgs Report, 2003), the right of 
shareholders to vote on executive remuneration via the vote on the report of the remuneration 
committee (Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002), more engagement by 
 
 
5 
 
institutional investors with corporate boards (Stewardship Code, 2010) and more female 
representation on corporate boards (Davies Report, 2011). Thus, this research first aims to 
address the evolution of UK corporate governance characteristics. Additionally, this research 
attempts to address the impact of diversity in firms’ remuneration committees on say-on-pay 
voting and CEO remuneration.  
Recent financial crises and scandals have created public anger and unrest regarding CEO pay 
packages, which have led to calls for reform of executive pay. By 2015, the UK average 
remuneration for a blue-chip CEO was approximately £4.30 million which, after adjusting for 
inflation, was three times more than the average CEO pay in 1998 (Patrick, 2017). Such 
findings have motivated many countries to reform their corporate governance regimes, 
especially the policies concerning shareholder engagement on executive pay. The UK is no 
exception, and indeed, in 2002, it was the first country to introduce an advisory non-binding 
shareholder vote on executive pay. In 2013, the UK introduced a mandatory binding vote on 
pay polices (at least every three years). This voting approach is known as say-on-pay, a tool 
used by shareholders to express dissent about the recommendations made in remuneration 
reports (Mallin, 2016). Also, this approach aims ‘to enhance the activeness of executive pay 
by improving transparency and increasing shareholder involvement in its determination’ 
(Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016).  
Since 2002, many studies have investigated the antecedents of say-on-pay voting. Among 
these antecedents that most affect shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting are higher CEO 
remuneration, firm performance, firm size and shareholders’ investment horizons (e.g. Alissa, 
2015; Brunarski et al., 2015; Cai and Walking, 2011; Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon, 
2016; Conyon and Sadler 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2013; Kimbro and Xu, 2016; Stathopoulos 
and Voulgaris, 2016).  
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None of the previous studies has investigated the associations between the gender diversity of 
remuneration committees and say-on-pay voting. Thus, this study investigates whether the 
presence of women on remuneration committees is associated with the level of shareholder 
dissent via say-on-pay. This question is motivated by recent reforms for more female 
representation on UK corporate boards (e.g. Davies Report, 2011; Hampton-Alexander 
Review, 2016). The Davies Report (2011) set a target of 25% female representation on FTSE 
350 boards by 2015, and the Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) set a new target of 33% 
female representation by 2020, extending the scope to include executive directors and other 
senior top managers1. 
Previous studies that stated that foreign directors can act as a ‘double-edged sword’ served to 
encourage this research (e.g. Frijns et al., 2016; Masulis et al., 2012; Milliken and Martins, 
1996). From one perspective, foreign directors can be beneficial in helping companies gain 
knowledge about international markets and regulations (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016); however, 
these directors are found to be less effective monitors and can lead to higher CEO 
remuneration (Masulis et al., 2012). The UK has the highest number of foreign directors on 
its corporate boards (Conyon et al., 2016); therefore, this study also investigates the impact of 
foreign directors on remuneration committees on say-on-pay dissent voting.  
Unlike previous work exploring the say-on-pay approach, this study focuses on remuneration 
committees, which is important because most decisions related to executive remuneration 
involve the remuneration committee (Daily et al., 1998). A few previous studies have 
examined the characteristics of remuneration committees associated with CEO remuneration. 
For example, Conyon and Peck (1998) reported that the independence of remuneration 
committees in the UK has a limited effect on executive pay. Similarly, in the US, Daily et al. 
(1998) found no evidence that the independence of a remuneration committee affects CEO 
                                                          
1 Member of the executive committee 
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pay. However, a recent study by Bugeja et al. (2015) in the US found that the presence of 
women on firms’ remuneration committees had a negative impact on CEO remuneration.  
Furthermore, this study is motivated by previous literature that suggested that firms with 
more female directors on their remuneration committees are less likely to have higher CEO 
remuneration (Bugeja et al., 2015). In same vein, Masulis et al. (2012) found that a higher 
presence of foreign directors on remuneration committees led to higher CEO remuneration. 
Both studies estimated their models using US data, yet other studies have not investigated 
whether the presence of female and foreign directors on remuneration committees has an 
impact on CEO pay using UK data.  
There are several reasons that the UK has fairly different corporate governance attributes than 
the US and rest of the world. First, corporate governance guidance provides extensive details 
relating to executive remuneration (Goh and Gupta, 2016). Conyon et al. (2016) also added 
that the UK has one of the best disclosure requirements on executive remuneration, which 
generates high-quality executive remuneration data. Finally, the UK has the highest 
percentage of foreign directors among other countries (Conyon et al., 2016). Therefore, this 
gives an ideal environment to examine the relationship between the presence of female and 
foreign directors and CEO pay.   
1.3 Research Questions 
Approximately 25 years have passed since the introduction of the Cadbury Code which 
formed the basis of UK corporate governance and the subsequent developments leading to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code. The Code has gone through many amendments, most of 
which have been directed towards enhancing the role of the board of directors. Therefore, the 
overall aim of this research is to answer the following questions: 
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Main questions: 
1. How did the board of directors in the UK corporate governance context evolve 
during the period of 2003–2015?  
2. How are diverse remuneration committees related to say-on-pay voting and CEO 
remuneration?   
Giving the agency theory; 
Sub-Question 1: 
Does a higher proportion of female and foreign directors on firms’ remuneration 
committees have an impact on shareholders’ dissent-via-say-on-pay voting and CEO 
pay? 
            Whereas, according to the critical mass theory;  
Sub-Question 2: 
Do firms with only two or more women and foreign directors on their remuneration 
committees have an impact on shareholders’ dissent-via-say-on-pay voting and CEO 
pay? 
1.4 Summary of Research Hypotheses and Methodology 
This study tests eight hypotheses. The first hypothesis addresses the impact of female 
directors on remuneration committees on shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting. The 
second hypothesis relates to the relationship between the presence of female directors on 
firms’ remuneration committees and CEO pay. Similarly, Hypothesis 3 and 4 test the impact 
of two or more women on remuneration committees on say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO 
pay. The relationships between foreign directors on remuneration committees and say-on-pay 
voting and CEO pay are investigated in Hypotheses 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, Hypothesis 
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7 and 8 examine whether two or more foreign directors on remuneration committees have an 
influence on say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO pay. 
Following previous literature, this study uses two main statistical techniques: the ordinary 
least squares model (OLS) with logarithm-transferred dependent variables and the logistic 
model (logit). In addition, propensity score matching and the two-step system of generalised 
method of moments (GMM) are used for robustness tests and to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem. The next section briefly describes the findings of this research. 
1.5 Summary of Research Findings  
This study uses a large sample of the UK’s FTSE 350 non-financial firms from 2003 to 2015 
and makes several contributions to the extant literature on board diversity, say-on-pay voting 
and CEO pay. First, this study shows the importance of having women on remuneration 
committees. Specifically, the research shows that the presence of women on remuneration 
committees results in fewer shareholder dissent votes on remuneration reports and less CEO 
bonus remuneration. Second, the research suggests that firms with foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees have more shareholder opposition via say-on-pay voting and a 
higher level of CEO remuneration. These findings confirm those of Masulis et al. (2012), 
who posited that foreign directors are less effective monitors.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This research comprises seven chapters, and Figure 1.1 outlines the research structure. 
Chapter One explains the area of corporate governance in general and the board of directors 
specifically. In addition, the chapter covers the motivation for this research, the problem 
statement and the research objectives. Chapter Two highlights the development of corporate 
governance in the UK.  
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Chapter Three provides the literature review and is divided into two parts: (i) the theoretical 
framework of corporate governance and (ii) the previous empirical works on say-on-pay 
voting, board diversity, remuneration committees and the relationship between board of 
directors’ characteristics and firm performance. 
Chapter Four presents the development of the research hypotheses. Chapter Five illustrates 
the research methodology, or, more specifically, the research data collection and analysis 
methods. Chapter Six discusses and analyses the research findings, specifically those 
regarding the impact of female directors and foreign directors on say-on-pay voting and CEO 
pay.  
Chapter Seven summarises the overall results, provides concluding comments, highlights the 
limitations of the research and suggests areas for future study. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a brief background about corporate governance and then presented 
the motivations and contributions of the study. This research first objective is to address the 
evolution of UK corporate governance characteristics. Also, this study’s results complement 
previous studies on the antecedents of say-on-pay voting (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Conyon, 2016; 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016) by identifying, for the first time, that the presence of 
female and foreign directors on remuneration committees impacts say-on-pay voting. This 
study also complements prior studies on the relationship between a diverse remuneration 
committee and CEO pay (Bugeja et al., 2015; Masulis et al., 2012) by investigating, as the 
first attempt in the UK, the relationship between the presence of female and foreign directors 
on remuneration committees and CEO pay. Also, this chapter describes the research question 
of this study and gives a brief description of the research methodology and a brief summary 
of the research findings. This chapter concludes with presenting the structure of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER II: DEVELOPMENT OF UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980s, some UK companies have seen failures in their corporate governance 
schemes, such as Maxwell Communications and Polly Peck (Mallin, 2016). More 
specifically, the boards of these companies have failed to perform their roles effectively. In 
1992, the UK’s Cadbury Committee responded to these corporate governance failures by 
introducing the Code of Best Practice.  
Since that time, many developments have helped improve corporate governance in the UK. 
As explained by Mallin (2016), the changes in the UK codes were motivated by worldwide 
business failures and financial scandals. The aim of this chapter is to review the development 
of UK corporate governance and say-on-pay voting. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents a summary of the main 
developments in UK corporate governance; Section 3.3 discusses the role and structure of 
UK remuneration committees; Section 3.4 reports the developments of the say-on-pay voting 
in the UK and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Development of UK Corporate Governance  
UK corporate governance has undergone many reforms. This section presents the timeline of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code development. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of UK Corporate Governance Reforms (1992-2016) 
Year Name of Reform/Revision Purpose/Key Changes 
1992 Cadbury Report - Separation of Chair and CEO roles. 
- Requirement for at least two independent directors on board. 
- Board audit committee’s members should comprise independent non-executive 
directors. 
1995 Greenbury Report - Board remuneration committee’s members should be comprised of independent non-
executive directors. 
- Long-term performance related pay introduced. 
1998 Hampel Report  - Reviews implementation of Cadbury and Greenbury reports. 
1998 Combined Code - Combined Code introduced. 
- Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports’ recommendations should be combined in 
one document known as the Combined Code (1998). 
1999 Turnbull Report - Recommends boards to review the system of internal control and risk management. 
2001 Myners Report - Reviews and addresses investment decision by institutional investors 
2003 Higgs Report - Recommends firms to include at least 50% of their board’s directors from non-
executive independent directors. 
- Introduces annual internal board evaluation.  
2003 Tyson Report  - Reviews recruitment and development of non-executive directors. 
2003 Smith Report - Provides guidance on role and responsibilities of audit committee. 
- Focuses on independence of the external auditors and level of non-audit services 
provided. 
2003 Combined Code (2003) - Incorporated recommendations of Higgs, Tyson and Smiths reports into the Combined 
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Code (2003). 
2006 Combined Code (2006) - Updates the Combined Code. 
- Board chairman if considered to be independent, upon appointment as chairman, might 
sit, but not as chair, in the remuneration committee. 
2008 Combined Code (2008) - Updates the Combined Code. 
- No constraint on directors chairing more than one FTSE100 firm. 
- Board chairman is permitted to be a member of the audit committee if the chairman is 
believed to be independent upon appointment. 
2009 Walker Review - Independent review on the corporate governance of banks and other financial 
institutions. 
- Risk committee establishment for FTSE100 banks and life insurance firms. 
- Recommends external board evaluation. 
- Board’s chairman should be subject to annual re-election. 
2010 Stewardship Code  - Introduced to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional shareholders 
and their investee firms. 
2010 UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) - Combined Code is renamed as the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
- The chairman should review the training and development needs of each director. 
- The evaluation of the board should be externally facilitated at least every three years. 
2011 Davies Report - Reviews the status of women underrepresentation on boards of FTSE 350 firms. 
- FTSE 350 firms should be aiming for minimum of 25% women representation by 
2015.  
2012 UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) - Updates UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
- FTSE 350 firms should place the external audit contract out to tender. 
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-  Boards should give description of board’s policy on diversity (gender diversity), any 
target they want achieve for this purpose and progress toward achieving this target. 
- Stewardship Code (2010) updated. 
2014 UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) - Updates UK Corporate Governance Code (2012). 
- Remuneration polices should be linked with company long-term firm performance. 
- More amendments on risk management. 
2016 UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) - Updates UK Corporate Governance Code (2014). 
- Includes changes on audit committees’ guidance, the new Ethical Standard (2016) and 
the new Auditing Standards (2016) to fit with the European Union’s Regulation and 
Directive. 
2016 Hampton-Alexander Review  - Reviews women representation in senior leadership positions for FTSE 350 companies 
such as chair, senior independent non-executive and executive director 
- FTSE 350 firms should aim for a minimum of 33% of women representation on their 
corporate boards by 2020. 
- FTSE 100 firms should aim for a minimum of 33% of women representation on their 
executive committee by 2020. 
2016 Green Paper: Corporate Governance Reform  - Suggests three areas for consultation, these are executive pay; enhancing the employee, 
customer and supplier voice at board level; and introducing corporate governance 
codes in the largest privately-held companies. 
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2.2.1 The Cadbury Report (1992) 
In the 80s and 90s, the UK witnessed infamous corporate scandals, such as Polly Peck, BCCI 
and Maxwell (Mallin, 2016). As a result, the UK government responded to these corporate 
failures by forming a committee to look after the financial aspects of corporate governance 
and suggest recommendations to restore shareholders’ confidence. The committee was 
launched in May 1991, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, and included the FRC, the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and certain accountancy professions. The committee was officially 
known as the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and its 
recommendations became known as the Code of Best Practice.  
The main recommendations in the Code of Best Practice were as follows: 
 No one should have powers of decision over other members of the board. 
 The role of chairman and CEO should be separated and should not be held by the 
same person. 
 At least two members of the board should be independent non-executive directors 
(INEDs). 
 Firms should establish three key committees on their boards (audit, remuneration 
and nomination committees). 
 The majority of the board audit committee’s members should be from non-
executive independent directors.  
(Cadbury Report, 1992) 
2.2.2 The Greenbury Report (1995) 
The Greenbury Report was the result of public and shareholders’ concerns about directors’ 
high remuneration. At the beginning of 1995, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
responded to these concerns and established the Study Group, chaired by Sir Richard 
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Greenbury, to resolve concerns about increasing directors’ remuneration (Greenbury Report, 
1995). As stated in the Greenbury Report (1995), the main goal of the report was ‘to identify 
good practice in determining Directors’ remuneration and prepare a Code of such practice for 
use by UK PLCs’. 
The Greenbury Report (1995) developed various amendments to the Code of Best Practice in 
regard to directors’ remuneration. The most important amendments are listed below: 
 The majority of members on a remuneration committee should consist of non-
executive directors. 
 The members’ names on a remuneration committee should be disclosed each year 
in the company’s annual report. 
 The chairman of a remuneration committee should attend the annual general 
meeting (AGM) to answer shareholders’ concerns about directors’ remuneration.  
 Directors’ remuneration should be linked to directors’ long-term performance. 
(Greenbury Report, 1995) 
2.2.3 The Hampel Report and the Combined Code (1998) 
The purpose of issuing the Hampel Report on January 1998 was to review the 
implementation of both the Cadbury and the Greenbury Reports and determine whether their 
original goals were being achieved. The Hampel Report (1998) stated that Cadbury and 
Greenbury had achieved their goals and there was no need for further revision in the Code of 
Best Practice. The Combined Code (2008) suggested that the three previous reports, namely 
the Cadbury, the Greenbury, and the Hampel reports, should be combined into one document 
known as the Combined Code.  
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The Hampel Report (1998) further replied to criticisms made about the Cadbury and 
Greenbury reports, such as they were too strict, in that, shareholders would be only focussed 
on the ‘box-ticking’ approach, rather than the intrinsic principles of the Code (Arcot, 2010). 
The Hampel Report (1998) argued that adherence to detailed guidelines in the Code of Best 
Practice did not necessarily lead to better performance, but adherence to the principles of the 
Code was more important (Short, 1999).   
2.2.4 The Turnbull Report (1999) 
 The Turnbull Report (1999) was issued after the publication of the Combined Code (1998) to 
review the internal control system and risk management of companies. Specifically, this 
report states that the board should be the following: 
Responsible for the company’s system of internal control. It should set appropriate 
policies on internal control and seek regular assurance that will enable it to satisfy 
itself that the system is functioning effectively. The board must further ensure that the 
system of internal control is effective in managing risks in the manner which it has 
approved. (Turnbull Report, 1999) 
In addition, the Turnbull Report (1999) emphasised the importance of ensuring a good quality 
of financial reporting by stating the following: 
Effective financial controls, including the maintenance of proper accounting records, 
are an important element of internal control. They help ensure that the company is not 
unnecessarily exposed to avoidable financial risks and that financial information used 
within the business and for publication is reliable. They also contribute to the 
safeguarding of assets, including the prevention and detection of fraud.  
2.2.5 The Myners Report (2001, 2004 and 2008) 
In 2000, Her Majesty (HM) Treasury Office expressed its concern that institutional investors 
only invest in publicly listed companies and avoid investing in medium and small companies. 
In 2001, the Myners Report (2001) stated that investment decisions by institutional investors 
should be ‘rational, well-informed, subject to the correct incentives and as far as possible, 
undistorted’.  
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In 2004, the HM Treasury published a revision of the Myners Report’s progress achieved 
thus far by identifying the following deficits: 
 Institutional investors’ boards are still lacking the sufficient skills and expertise to 
fulfil their duties. 
 There is still a ‘lack of clarity of respective roles of trustees and their advisers’. 
 There is still a lack of investment time horizons and lack of shareholders 
engagement. 
 There is still poor disclosure quality identified in the implementation of the 
Myners Report (2001) principles.  
Therefore, the new update of the Myners Report (2004) advised institutional investors’ 
trustee boards to address the lacking areas identified by the review. Again, in 2008, the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) were asked by the UK government to further 
review the progress of the implementation of the Myners Report (2001) (Myners Report, 
2008). The NAPF’s review reported that institutional investors’ board trustees made excellent 
progress towards achieving the core principles of the Myners Report, especially in the areas 
of ‘improving trustee knowledge and understanding; strategic asset allocation; utilising expert 
advice; adopting appropriate benchmarks, transparency and reporting and, for larger schemes, 
activism and engagement’ (Myners Report, 2008). Nevertheless, the new update of the 
Myners Report (2008) identified other lacking areas, such as that trustees, especially fund 
managers, have been found to be reluctant to evaluate their performance, and advised 
institutional investors to make further improvement on these areas.  
2.2.6 The Higgs Report (2003) 
Another financial crisis occurred between 2000 and 2002. The advance of technology and 
Internet allowed dot.com companies to grow faster than ever and this growth was 
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accompanied by a huge demand on dot.com companies’ equities, which resulted in a large 
bubble in the stock markets (Kirkpatrick, 2009). As a result, in 2002, one of the dot.com 
companies, WorldCom, collapsed. During the period from 2001 to 2002, the world saw the 
collapse of Enron (Kirkpatrick, 2009). These events or crises created more concerns about the 
effectiveness of corporate governance codes. For example, the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN, 2009) issued a statement on the global financial crisis and its 
relationship with the current corporate governance practice. The ICGN (2009) reported a 
number of concerns related to corporate governance such as enhancing shareholder rights, 
strengthening boards and directors’ remuneration. In addition, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation Development (OECD, 2009) issued a report titled ‘The Corporate Governance 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis’. Their report concluded that ‘the financial crisis can be to 
an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance 
arrangements’ (OECD, 2009). 
As a result of the collapses of Enron and dot.com companies in the US, the UK decided to 
review its corporate governance structure and assigned Derek Higgs to review the status of 
the corporate governance in the UK (Dewing and Russell, 2003). According to Jones and 
Pollitt (2004), the focus of the review was related to non-executive directors (their 
effectiveness, independence, relationships with institutional investors and remunerations). 
Thus, the Higgs Review provided various recommendations on 20 January 2003.  
The most notable recommendations related to board evaluation (all directors should be 
evaluated at least once a year), board commitment (disclosure of number of meetings and 
directors’ attendance in the annual report), non-executive director tenure limit and 
professional development of directors (induction and training programmes) and stated that 
CEOs should not become the chairman of the same company, executive directors should not 
hold more than one directorship of the FTSE 100, nomination committee should be chaired 
 
 
21 
 
by non-executive directors and senior independent should be available to shareholders 
(Dewing and Russell, 2003; Mallin, 2016). 
However, the Higgs Review instigated heated debates from the CBI and the Institute of 
Directors, in that, some of the new recommendations were seen as unduly prescriptive 
(Dewing and Russell, 2003; Jones and Pollitt, 2004). This led the CBI to conduct a study 
taking the views of chairmen on the recommendations of the Higgs Review (Jones and 
Pollitt, 2004). Most of the surveyed chairmen of the FTSE 100 firms disagreed with certain 
recommendations, such as the new role of the senior independent director and chairmanship 
of the nomination committee by only non-executive directors and that CEOs should not 
become the chairman of the same company (Jones and Pollitt, 2004).          
2.2.7 The Tyson Report (2003) 
After the publication by the Higgs Review of the ‘Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors’ in January 2003 and ordered by the Department of Trade and Industry, a group 
headed by Professor Laura Tyson from the London Business School conducted a report titled, 
‘Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive Directors’. Their report concluded with 
three recommendations: 
 The selection process of non-executive directors should be rigorous and 
transparent. 
 Companies should invest more on evaluation and training of all board members.  
 The selection process of non-executive directors should consider greater diversity 
in the backgrounds, experience, age, gender, ethnicity and nationality, but with 
broader research and proper measurement.  
(Tyson Report, 2003) 
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2.2.8 The Smith Report (2003) 
Motivated by the collapses of Enron and dot.com companies in the US and within the period 
of the Higgs Review, the Smith Review was assigned by the FRC to review the current status 
of audit committees (Dewing and Russell, 2003). The Smith Review (2003) published its 
report simultaneously with the Higgs Review on 20 January 2003. The Smith Report 
recommended that at least three INEDs should be on an audit committee, with at least one of 
them holding recent and relevant financial experience. Additionally, the Smith Report (2003) 
recommended that the audit committees should have the charge of indorsing an external 
auditor to the board and to shareholders.  
2.2.9 The Combined Code (2003) 
The FRC reacted to critiques made about the Higgs Review (2003) and amended some of 
recommendations as follows: first, a chairman can chair the nomination committee; second, 
non-FTSE 350 firms should not follow the role of that at least half of the board should be 
from independent directors and third, no limit should be placed on the tenure of non-
executive directors (Jones and Pollitt, 2004). In addition, Mallin (2016) illustrated that as an 
alternative of affirming that no one of non-executive directors should sit on all board sub-
committees, the new combined code detailed that ‘undue reliance’ should not be put on a 
specific person.  
All these amendments to the Higgs Review were included in the Combined Code (2003), 
which was published on July 2003. Moreover, the Combined Code (2003) included the 
recommendations for both the Higgs and Smith Reviews (Dewing and Russell, 2003).  
2.2.10 The Combined Code (2006) 
The FRC published another edition of the Combined Code in June 2006. There were slight 
changes made to the Combined Code, including that a board chairman, if considered to be 
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independent upon appointment as chairman, might sit, but not as chair, on the remuneration 
committee; companies should facilitate a ‘vote withheld’ choice on proxy appointment forms 
to give shareholders the alternative to withhold their vote; and companies are recommended 
to disclose the information of proxies blocked on their website (Mallin, 2016). 
2.2.11 The Combined Code (2008) 
In 2007, the FRC conducted a review on the status of the Combined Code. This review 
indicated that the Combined Code had enough support and continuing achieving good results 
in governing listed firms (Mallin, 2016). However, the new edition of the Combined Code 
(2008) included two changes: first, there would be no constraints on directors chairing more 
than one FTSE 100 firms and second, a board’s chairman is permitted to be a member of the 
audit committee if the chairman is believed to be independent upon the appointment.   
2.2.12 The Walker Review (2009) 
The global financial crisis of 2007 came with devastating consequences to all levels of the 
world’s economy. Nordberg and McNulty (2013) stated that the recent global financial crisis 
was a continuation of insufficiency of corporate governance. The government of the UK, 
represented by the FRC, asked Sir David Walker to conduct an independent review on the 
corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. Some of the issues tackled by 
the Walker Review were mainly related to the banking industry but also touched other 
industries.  
The Walker Review mainly reviewed five areas: remuneration, risk, board composition, 
qualification and accountability and institutional shareholders. The key recommendations 
were summarised as follows:   
 FTSE 100 major banks and building societies should reveal the number of 
employees earning over £ 1 million. 
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 Remuneration committees’ remit should be improved, and its chair should be 
subject to re-election if the remuneration report fails to secure 75% support. 
 Boards of FTSE 100 banks and life insurance firms must establish a risk 
committee on their boards. 
 Boards’ chairs should be subject to annual re-election. 
 Non-executive directors should give more time commitment to the board. 
 There should be additional qualifications, training and development programme 
requirements for board of directors, especially financial qualifications. 
 External evaluation of the board and sub-committees should be done every two to 
three years. 
 A new Stewardship Code for institution investors should be issued.   
(Walker Review, 2009)  
2.2.13 The Stewardship Code (2010) 
The Stewardship Code is a set of principles released in 2010 by the FRC directed to 
institutional investors who hold voting rights in the UK’s publicly listed firms. The main goal 
of the Stewardship Code (2010) was to improve the engagement between institutional 
investors and their investee companies to enhance and protect shareholders’ interests. The 
main principles of the Stewardship Code (2010), as reported by the FRC (2010), that 
institutional investors were to adhere to are listed below: 
 Institutional investors should disclose their policies on how they will discharge 
their stewardship responsibilities. 
 Institutional investors should have a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest in relation to stewardship. This policy also should be publicly disclosed. 
 Institutional investors should monitor their investee companies. 
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 Institutional investors should establish clear guidelines on how and when they will 
escalate their activities as a method of protecting and enhancing shareholder 
value. 
 Institutional investors should be willing to act collectively with other investors 
where appropriate. 
 Institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of 
voting activity reports periodically on their stewardship and voting activities. 
The code adopts the same comply or explain approach used by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. Each year, institutional investors were meant to publish a report on their companies’ 
websites that disclosed a full explanation of how the principles of the Stewardship Code had 
been met and provide an explanation if some of the Stewardship Code’s principles had not 
been complied with. 
2.2.14 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
As the number of foreign investors and foreign companies listed in the UK stock exchange 
increased over the time, the FRC announced that the Combined Code would be changed to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code. The new name of the Code was considered to be clearer 
than the previous code name for foreign investors and companies (FRC, 2010). The new code 
of corporate governance was published on June 2010.  
The new code included four new main principles as compared to the Combined Code 2008, 
and these principles are summarised below: 
 The responsibility of the board’s chairman should be in leading the board.  
 The role of non-executive directors should be in challenging and developing 
strategy. 
 
 
26 
 
 The board of the company should have a balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company. 
 Board directors should assign sufficient time to discharge their responsibilities 
effectively. 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) 
In addition, there were a number of new provisions added to the new code, which were as 
follows: 
 The chairman should agree and regularly review the training and development 
needs of each director. 
 The evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 companies should be externally 
facilitated at least every three years, and any other connections between the 
facilitator and the company should be disclosed. 
 The annual report should include an explanation of the company’s business 
model. 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) 
 
2.2.15 Davies Reports (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) 
After many concerns about the slow progress of gender diversity in UK plc boards, the UK 
government assigned Lord Davies of Abersoch to commence an independent review of the 
current number and position of female directors on UK corporate boards. Specifically, the 
aim of the review was to find obstacles that prevented women from reaching the boardrooms 
and make recommendations for the government and FTSE 350 firms about what they should 
do to increase female representation on boardrooms (Davies Report, 2011). 
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Lord Davies (2011) stated that ‘although women tend to be very successful at university level 
and in their early careers level, in 2010 women represent only 12.5% and 7.8% of the total 
directors of FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies, respectively’. Moreover, he added the 
following: 
…during the course of this review some people told us that the only way we could 
make real change in increasing the number of women on boards was by introducing 
quotas. They said that other routes have already been tried, but women still remain a 
small minority on UK boards. Many other people told us that quotas would not be 
their preferred option as they did not want to see tokenism prevail. On balance the 
decision has been made not to recommend quotas. (Davies, 2011) 
The Davies Report was ready by February 2011 and included several recommendations to 
improve the inclusion of women on UK boards of FTSE 350 firms, which are listed below: 
 All chairmen of the FTSE 350 firms should set out a percentage of female 
representation on their boards that they aim to achieve by 2013 and 2015.  
 FTSE 100 firms should achieve at least 25% of female representation on their 
boards by 2015. 
 FTSE 350 firms should disclose in their annual reports the percentage of women 
on their boards, number of women in senior management positions and total 
number of women in their companies. 
 The FRC should revise the UK Corporate Governance Code to include a policy 
regarding gender diversity. This policy should include measurable objectives for 
implementing this policy. Also, this policy and its objectives should be disclosed 
in the annual report.  
 Chairmen of FTSE 350 companies should disclose all relevant information about 
their recruitment process and how it addresses diversity.  
 The steering committee of the Davies Report should meet every six months to 
discuss the progress in implementing these recommendations.   
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(Davies Report, 2011) 
Subsequent Davies Reports (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) reviewed progress of implementing 
the Davies Report (2011)’s recommendations on women representation on UK corporate 
boards. For example, the Davies Report (2015) has shown that FTSE 100 boards are ‘well on 
its way to achieving the 25% target’ by end of 2015 and more specifically, FTSE 100 boards 
have achieved 23.5% of women representation in 2015.     
2.2.16 The UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship Code (2012) 
The FRC conducted consultations and updates on audit committees, gender diversity and the 
Stewardship Code. These consultations and updates were incorporated into the new versions 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) and Stewardship Code (2012). Changes to the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) included the following: 
 FTSE 350 firms should place the external auditors’ contract out to tender at least 
every ten years.  
 Audit committees should supply shareholders with sufficient information on how 
the board of directors discharge their responsibilities and how they have evaluated 
the effectiveness of the external audit process. 
 FTSE 350 firms’ boards should give a full description of their gender diversity 
policy, their target and the progress achieved towards this policy. 
Changes made to the Stewardship Code (2012) included the following:  
 A full description of the specific responsibilities of asset managers and investment 
activities they have chosen to outsource. 
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 Institutional investors should explain more clearly how they manage conflicts of 
interest, the circumstances in which they will take part in collective engagement 
with their investee firms and the use they make of proxy voting agencies. 
 To provide greater assurance to their clients, asset managers are encouraged to 
have the processes that support their stewardship activities independently verified. 
2.2.17 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) 
After two years, the FRC, once again, announced a new update to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) on 17 September 2014. In this regard, the FRC suggested a number 
of recommendations in the new code:  
 FTSE 350 boards should place greater importance on ensuring that remuneration 
policies are geared towards the long-term success of their companies. 
 FTSE 350 boards should put in place measures that enable them to recover or 
withhold variable pay when appropriate to do so, and they should consider 
appropriate vesting and holding periods for deferred remuneration.  
 FTSE 350 boards should explain when publishing voting results on remuneration 
reports (say-on-pay) how they intend to engage with shareholders when a 
significant percentage of them have voted against the remuneration report. 
 FTSE 350 boards should robustly assess their principal risks and explain how they 
are being managed or mitigated. 
  FTSE 350 boards should state whether they believe they will be able to continue 
in operation and meet their liabilities, taking into account their current position 
and principal risks. 
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 FTSE 350 boards should monitor their risk management and internal control 
systems and, at least once a year, perform a review of their risk management and 
internal control systems’ effectiveness and report the results in the annual report. 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014) 
2.2.18 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) 
The new revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code was published in June 2016. The 
new code was amended to fit the new European Union’s regulations and directive. 
Specifically, the updated code included changes on audit committees’ guidance, the new 
Ethical Standard (2016) and the new Auditing Standards (2016). The changes regarding audit 
committees included the following: 
 The head of the internal audit, accompanied by the finance director and external 
audit partner, should be invited regularly to attend meetings of the audit 
committee. 
 The audit committee should provide clear disclosure about how they select 
external audit tenders. 
 The audit committee should plan regular meetings with shareholders. 
 The audit committee should explain how it assesses the effectiveness of the 
internal audit. 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016) 
2.2.19 Corporate Governance Reforms: Green Paper (2016) 
On 29 November 2016, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 
2016) created a consultation paper (or Green Paper) seeking views and opinions on how to 
improve the current corporate governance regime. The consultations were closed on 17 
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February 2017 and are currently under analysis2. The BEIS (2016) identified three areas for 
consultations: executive pay; enhancing the employee, customer and supplier voices on 
boards and strategies for implementing the corporate governance code in the largest privately 
held companies. Under each area, a range of recommendations were suggested, and the 
following sub-sections provide more details. 
i. Executive pay 
As reported in the BEIS (2016), the first area of the Green Paper asked for views on the 
following:  
 Strengthening shareholder voting rights. 
  Encouraging greater shareholder engagement with executive pay 
  Strengthening the role of remuneration committees, including improved 
engagement with shareholders and employees.  
 Further improving transparency on executive pay. 
 Improving the effectiveness of long-term pay incentives. 
Recommendations for strengthening shareholder voting rights included a shareholder binding 
vote on the annual remuneration report3 and requiring companies to set an upper threshold for 
total annual remuneration for each executive director. As for encouraging greater engagement 
with executive pay, recommendations included establishing shareholder committees to 
engage with the arrangement of executive pay and imposing mandatory disclosures of fund 
managers at the AGM. To further improve the role of remuneration committees, the BEIS 
(2016) proposed that remuneration committees must consult shareholders and other 
stakeholders before preparing their executive remuneration policies. As for executive pay 
                                                          
2 At time of writing this thesis. 
3 Currently, shareholders have a binding vote on remuneration policy (but not the annual remuneration 
report). 
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disclosure, the BEIS (2016) suggested that the annual remuneration report should contain pay 
ratios (comparing CEOs pay with that of other employees) and disclose bonus targets for 
each director.  
ii. Strengthening employee, customer and supplier voices  
Recommendations suggested by the BEIS (2016) for strengthening employee, customer and 
supplier voices included the establishment of a stakeholder advisory panel or designating a 
non-executive director to ensure that the opinions and views of the company stakeholders are 
heard by the board or appointing an individual stakeholder to represent other stakeholders on 
the board. In addition, the BEIS (2016) proposed new reporting requirements to enhance 
stakeholder engagement.  
iii. Corporate governance in the largest privately held companies 
Large privately held companies had less formal corporate governance than publicly listed 
companies. Therefore, the BEIS (2016) suggested that these companies should adhere to 
standards of corporate governance and apply financial reporting standards more reliably.     
2.2.20 The Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) 
The Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) is a continuation of the previous work of the Davies 
Reports to enhance the role of women in UK boardrooms. The Hampton-Alexander Review 
(2016) acknowledged that Davies Reports achieved their goal by stating that ‘the voluntary 
business-led framework to improve the number of women at the top of British business is 
working and it is time to extend the focus beyond the boardroom’. Thus, the main focus of 
the Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) was to improve female representation in senior 
leadership positions for FTSE 350 companies, such as chairs, senior non-executive 
independent directors and executive directors. There were several recommendations made by 
the Hampton-Alexander Review, which are summarised as follows: 
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 By 2020, all FTSE 350 firms should aim to have a minimum of 33% women on 
their corporate boards. 
 All FTSE 350 companies should increase the number of women in board roles 
including chairs, senior independent directors and executive directors. 
 All FTSE share companies should address gender imbalance at their corporate 
boards. 
 All FTSE 350 firms’ CEOs should address under-representation of women on the 
executive committee. 
 By 2020, all FTSE 100 companies should aim to have at least 33% women 
included across their executive teams. 
 At least once a year, the chair of the nomination committee should review the 
progress of increasing the number of women on the executive committee. 
 FTSE 350 firms should publish the details regarding the number of women on 
executive committees in their annual reports. 
 The FRC should amend the UK Corporate Governance Code to include the 
previous recommendations. 
 All institutional investors should assess disclosure and progress on gender balance 
on their executive teams for their FTSE 350 investee firms.  
 Institutional investors should also have a voting policy on gender balance.  
2.3 Structure and Role of the Remuneration Committee in the UK 
Most decisions related to directors’ remuneration are designed and monitored by the board’s 
remuneration committee (Daily et al., 1998). The UK Corporate Governance Codes (e.g., 
2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) have specified the basic structure and main duties of the 
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remuneration committee. This section discusses the structure and role of the remuneration 
committee in the UK corporate governance context.  
2.3.1 Remuneration committee structure 
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended, for the first time, that all publically listed 
companies should establish a remuneration committee to look after the arguments and design 
of executive directors’ remuneration packages. The UK Corporate Governance Codes (e.g. 
2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) recommended the size and composition of the remuneration 
committee by stating that ‘the board should establish a remuneration committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors’ (UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2016). Also, the codes reported that the board chairman can act 
as a member, but not as a chair, of the remuneration committee. In addition, the UK 
Corporate Governance Codes (e.g. 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) recommended that a 
remuneration committee should ‘also be responsible for appointing any consultants in respect 
of executive director remuneration’ (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016). 
2.3.2 Role of the remuneration committee 
The main role of the remuneration committee is to set fair executive directors’ remuneration 
schemes. More specifically, the UK Corporate Governance Codes (e.g. 2010, 2012, 2014 and 
2016) recommended that these remuneration packages ‘should be designed to promote the 
long-term success of the company’ and ‘performance-related elements should be transparent, 
stretching and rigorously applied’ (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016).The following 
summarises the basic responsibilities of the remuneration committee: 
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 Review and design the directors’ remuneration policy4 (at least every three years) 
for the executive director and other senior management and later submit it to 
shareholders for voting (binding vote). 
 Review and design the annual directors’ remuneration report5 that includes details 
of each directors’ pay (including chairman pay) and later seek approval from 
shareholders during the AGM (through a non-binding vote). 
 Review and determine the terms of employment and remuneration including 
recruitment and termination.  
 Review the remuneration committee’s performance. 
2.4 Developments of the Say-on-Pay Approach in the UK (2002, 2013 and 2016) 
After decades of excessive executive remuneration and rewards for failure, investors and 
policymakers have called for a reform of executive pay. Whilst the UK has seen many 
reforms relating to executive remuneration since the Cadbury Report (1992), including the 
establishment of the remuneration committee (Cadbury Report, 1992), the independence of 
the remuneration committee (Greenbury Report, 1995), the say-on-pay approach (Directors' 
Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002), the revised say-on-pay approach (Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act, 2013) and the new proposed reforms on the say-on-pay approach 
and the remuneration committee (BEIS, 2016), there remains a widespread public perception 
that executive directors and, in particular, CEOs are too generously remunerated.  
In 2002, the UK was the first country to introduce a legislation requiring all UK-quoted 
companies to grant their shareholders an advisory and non-binding vote on executive 
remuneration. After concerns emerged that an advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration 
report was not enough, the UK Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
                                                          
4 See more details about remuneration policy on “Developments of the Say-on-Pay” in the following section. 
5 See more details about remuneration report on “Developments of the Say-on-Pay” in the following section. 
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(DBEIS, 2013) created amendments to the remuneration report, recommending that the new 
remuneration report contain the following three items: a statement by the chair of the 
remuneration committee, a remuneration policy and a remuneration report (see Table 2.2 for 
description and requirements of remuneration policy and remuneration report). Remuneration 
policy is subject to a binding shareholder vote and should state the directors’ projected 
remuneration for the coming three years, whereas the remuneration report should provide 
details of the directors’ remuneration on an annual basis and be subject to an advisory 
shareholder vote (Mallin, 2016), see Table 2.3 for a typical example of shareholder voting. In 
2016, the UK again proposed new changes to reform the current corporate governance 
regime, including the say-on-pay approach and the remuneration committee (BEIS, 2016). 
The new proposed change for the say-on-pay approach was that all or part of the 
remuneration report should be subject to an annual binding shareholder vote. Furthermore, 
the reform proposals included several suggestions, such as a suggestion to establish a 
shareholder committee to engage with executive remuneration arrangements. Additionally, 
other suggestions related to the need for more disclosures in the remuneration policy and the 
annual remuneration report, such as reporting pay ratios and bonus targets.   
Over the last decade, the say-on-pay practice has been adopted across many countries, 
including Australia, Japan and Sweden in 2005, Germany in 2010, the US and Italy in 2011, 
Belgium and Canada in 2012 and France in 2014. Say-on-pay votes have pros and cons. 
Opponents believe that the say-on-pay approach may disrupt management and the board and 
undermines the board’s authority (Bainbridge, 2008; Deane, 2007). Furthermore, Bainbridge 
(2008) contended that shareholders ignore the say-on-pay practice, as it is non-binding. 
However, advocates of the say-on-pay approach argue that this practice may reduce agency 
costs between management and shareholders and, consequently, lead to better and more 
reasonable executive remuneration schemes (Davis, 2007). Thus, a say-on-pay vote works as 
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an external control, enabling shareholders to prevent or reduce excessive executive 
remuneration.  
Table 2.2 Description and Comparison of Remuneration Report and Policy 
 Remuneration report Remuneration policy 
Type of vote Mandatory and non-binding. Mandatory and binding. 
How often  Every year. Every three years if policy is kept 
unchanged, otherwise every year. 
Requirements  Total sum of remuneration for 
each director. 
 Full description of performance 
compared to metrics for annual 
and long-term incentives paid in 
the year. 
 Total pension entitlements. 
 Existing payments of the current 
year. 
 Full description of variable 
remuneration awarded in the 
year. 
 Total shareholdings of directors. 
 Graph comparing company 
performance and CEO 
remuneration. 
 Details about consultants who 
provide advice to the 
remuneration committee. 
 Payment policy table. 
 Information on employment 
contract. 
 Scenarios showing what 
directors would get paid for 
performance that is above, on 
and below target. 
 Information on changes which 
have taken place in company 
profits and dividends and in the 
company’s overall spending on 
remuneration. 
 The principles on which 
existing payment is made. 
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Table 2.3 Typical Example of Shareholder Voting (BP Plc, 2015) 
Resolution No. Resolution Narrative 
1 To adopt the report & accounts for the year ended 31 December 2014 
2 To approve the report on the implementation of the remuneration policy for the year ended 31 December 2014 
3 To re-elect as a director, R Dudley 
4 To re-elect as a director, B Gilvary 
5 To re-elect as a director, P Anderson 
6 To re-elect as a director, A Boeckmann 
7 To re-elect as a director, F Bowman 
8 To re-appoint Ernst & Young plc as auditors and to authorise the directors to determine their remuneration 
9 To authorise the Board to offer a scrip dividend 
10 To approve the 2015 Share Award Plan for employees below the board 
11 To authorise the Company to make political donations to political parties and political organisations and to incur political expenditure 
12 To approve a general authority to the directors to issue shares 
13 To approve a general authority to the directors to dis-apply pre-emption rights on the issue of shares for cash 
Resolution No. For Abstain Against For (%) Abstain (%) Against (%) Turnout (%) 
1 11,084,204,342 64,599,932 131,274,816 98.26% 0.57% 1.16% 61.77% 
2 9,741,702,808 305,297,190 1,234,333,436 86.35% 2.71% 10.94% 61.78% 
3 11,166,518,915 75,923,508 38,913,963 98.98% 0.67% 0.34% 61.78% 
4 11,102,909,767 67,999,919 110,405,051 98.42% 0.60% 0.98% 61.78% 
5 11,172,990,979 68,236,014 39,863,477 99.04% 0.60% 0.35% 61.78% 
6 11,170,893,155 68,844,821 41,349,369 99.02% 0.61% 0.37% 61.78% 
7 11,028,812,744 105,244,362 147,305,232 97.76% 0.93% 1.31% 61.78% 
8 11,148,502,893 89,909,077 42,956,282 98.82% 0.80% 0.38% 61.78% 
9 11,045,918,644 88,676,074 146,798,879 97.91% 0.79% 1.30% 61.78% 
10 10,678,342,999 182,432,559 420,562,062 94.65% 1.62% 3.73% 61.78% 
11 10,034,596,324 100,665,971 1,146,064,684 88.95% 0.89% 10.16% 61.78% 
12 10,937,109,025 102,243,636 241,950,782 96.95% 0.91% 2.14% 61.78% 
13 11,028,812,744 105,244,362 147,305,232 97.76% 0.93% 1.31% 61.78% 
Shareholder Voting at BP Plc Annual General Meeting, April 2015. Data source: Manifest.  
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2.5 Conclusion  
The main purpose of Chapter Two is to address the main stages of development of UK 
corporate governance and the say-on-pay approach. The evolution of UK corporate 
governance can be classified into three stages: the period after the 80s and 90s corporate 
scandals, the period after US corporate failures and the period after the global financial crisis 
of 2007.  
The first phase of corporate governance reforms witnessed the issuance of the first document 
of the corporate governance code in the UK, which was the Cadbury Report (1992). Followed 
by the Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998) and Combined Code (1998), 
respectively. The second phase saw the publication of  the Higgs Report (2003) and Smith 
Report (2003). Phase three included important changes such as the issuance of the Walker 
Review (2009), Stewardship Code (2010), Davies Report (2011) and, most recently, 
Hampton-Alexander Review (2016).  
In addition, this chapter reviewed the developments of the say-on-pay approach in the UK. 
The say-on-pay practice began in 2002 and gave shareholders a non-binding vote on 
directors’ remuneration reports. In 2013, the say-on-pay approach was further amended by 
giving shareholders a binding vote on remuneration policies. Moreover, the new 
consultations of the BEIS (2016) suggested that firms give shareholders a binding vote on 
their annual remuneration report or form a shareholder committee to improve engagement in 
setting executive directors’ remuneration packages. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the 
structure and role of the remuneration committee in the UK. The next chapter highlights the 
theoretical and empirical background of corporate governance.   
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CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW—THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter highlighted the evolution of corporate governance in the UK, including 
codes and guidance relating to the remuneration committee. Also, the previous chapter 
covered the background of the say-on-pay approach. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to 
review the theoretical and empirical background of the say-on-pay approach, CEO 
remuneration, board diversity and corporate governance literature (see Figure 3.1 for 
structure of the literature review). In the theoretical section, a number of underlying theories 
used in previous studies to address corporate governance issues such as the relationship 
between shareholder and management or the interaction among say-on-pay, CEO pay, board 
diversity and other board attributes are discussed. These theories include agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and critical mass theory. 
The second part of this chapter aims to present the most relevant literature related to 
shareholder say-on-pay practices, CEO remuneration, board diversity and other corporate 
governance characteristics. Finally, the third part of this chapter identifies some of the key 
gaps in research related to these topics. 
The current chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical background 
of corporate governance; Section 3.3 discusses the previous empirical literature; Section 3.4 
reports research gaps and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
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Figure 3.1 Structure of Literature Review 
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3.2 Theoretical Background of Corporate Governance 
Theories and philosophies associated with the development of corporate governance have 
derived mainly from other disciplines such as economics, finance, accounting and law 
(Mallin, 2016). The development of corporate governance theories are a reflection of or 
depend on a country’s culture, institutional factors and political and legal systems (Goergen, 
2012), and some of these theories may be more relevant to some countries than others 
(Mallin, 2016). As stated in Chapter One, there are essentially two models that explain the 
development of corporate governance in any legal system: the stockholder model (or agency 
model) and stakeholder model. In the Anglo-American legal context, such as the UK and the 
US, the agency model is the dominate framework for explaining corporate governance 
regime and business law, in general (Goergen, 2012; Mallin, 2016).  
This section addresses two main theories associated with this research, including agency 
theory and critical mass theory.  
3.2.1 Agency theory 
The agency theory is key in corporate governance, say-on-pay voting and CEO pay studies 
and is used as a means of addressing the relationship between management and shareholders. 
Cuomo et al. (2016) find that the agency theory is the most used theory in corporate 
governance studies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) produced one of the most important works 
that underpins the theory of agency. These researchers defined the agency theory as ‘a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent’ (Jenson and Meckling, 1976). This statement might lead one to 
think that the execution of such a contract for managing the wealth of investors is the same as 
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managing a sole-proprietorship company, where the owner is the sole manager of the 
company (Hart, 1995).  
However, agency relationships in public companies are complex (Tricker, 2009) due to 
separation of ownership and management, and it cannot be expected that the agent will be 
cautioned about the wealth of the principal in the same manner as that of the principal (Smith, 
1776). Thus, there are many ways in which the agent may abuse the contract between him 
and the principal, such as seeking his own interests to increase his salaries or bonuses, and the 
agent may not take the same precautions against certain risks as the principal would take 
(Mallin, 2016). Moreover, information asymmetry between the principal and agent is another 
problem of agency relationships, in that, the agent might benefit more from privileged access 
to information about company operations than the principal does, since the principal has no 
direct intervention in company operations. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) contended that the agency problem may worsen when there is not 
enough enforcement by the principal over the agent. Therefore, how can shareholders 
mitigate agency costs? There are many ways in which the shareholders can control the 
management of the company. One way is through establishing an incentive contract between 
management and shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These contracts could align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that 
incentive contracts could use different methods, such as shareholders ownership, share 
options and a threat of termination if net income is low. However, incentive contracts may 
involve other problems, such as increasing the probability of self-dealing for the managers, 
when these contracts are negotiated with poor corporate boards (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
For instance, some managers may assign themselves attractive incentives, such as receiving 
share options before the share price is likely to increase after good news. This problem has 
been empirically proven by Yermack (1997).  
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Another important effective way to reduce agency cost is through large shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) or shareholders activism (Solomon, 2010). The power of large 
shareholders or shareholders activism can be exercised through voting at AGMs. For 
example, shareholders in AGMs can vote to include more independent directors to the board 
or vote in favour of a takeover. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that the 
effectiveness of large shareholders depends on the level of legal protection where 
shareholders invest. Also, not all shareholders use their votes to influence management, 
especially individual investors.  
Another aspect of shareholder activism is the takeover mechanism. This mechanism 
represents another means of reducing agency costs (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). As explained 
by Solomon (2010), if shareholders are not satisfied with their management, they can vote at 
AGMs in favour of a takeover. Indeed, this option is an effective way to restrain 
management, as they may be afraid that their positions will be taken. Additionally, 
shareholder resolution, which happens when shareholders gather as a lobby against a matter 
they do not like, can be a way of aligning management interests with shareholder interests 
(Solomon, 2010).  
This research uses the agency theory to address research questions related to whether higher 
proportion of female directors on firms’ remuneration committees have an impact on CEO 
remuneration and shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay voting (sub-questions 1). Prior studies 
of say-on-pay, building on the agency model, have argued that shareholders’ dissent on the 
remuneration report is the result of high executive remuneration (e.g., Alissa, 2015; Conyon, 
2016; Conyon and Sadler, 2010). The board of directors plays an internal role in mitigating 
such conflicts between agents and principals by monitoring and by advising management, for 
example, on strategic decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Previous research has shown that female directors may be more independent (Adams, 2016) 
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and hence more effective monitors than male directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Therefore, this research proposes that the presence of female directors on remuneration 
committees can improve the role of monitoring, thereby helping to align CEO remuneration 
with shareholders expectation and improving shareholder satisfaction with say-on-pay voting. 
In addition, this research applies the agency theory to figure whether higher percentage of 
foreign directors on firms’ remuneration committees have an influence on CEO remuneration 
and shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay voting (also, sub-questions 1). Previous studies 
stated that foreign directors could act as a ‘double-edge sword’ (Masulis et al., 2012). From 
one side, they can be beneficial to gain information about international markets and 
regulations, however they are found to be less effective monitors (Masulis et al., 2012).  
3.2.2 Critical mass theory 
Kanter (1977) first developed the critical mass theory in the corporate governance context. 
The critical mass theory has been widely used in legislative and political literature (Torchia et 
al., 2011). Kanter (1977) argued that minorities within a large, more dominating group tend 
be marginalised or seen as tokens. Due to their lower numbers, minorities begin to seem 
untrustworthy to the large, more dominating group, which, in turn, reduces their power in 
decision making (Kanter; 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). However, this tokenism perception 
towards minorities diminishes when the number of minorities grows to a certain threshold 
(critical mass). At this point, the minorities are no longer seen as tokens, more trust is gained 
and their influence on decision making increases (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011).  
Several recent studies have investigated the relationship between women on boards and firm 
outcomes using the critical mass theory. Specifically, the existence of three or more female 
directors on boards increases firm outcomes, whereas the inclusion of only one or two 
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women does not have the same impact (e.g. Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Torchia et 
al., 2011). 
The monitoring role of directors (suggested by agency theory) may not be effective on the 
board if it represented by a minority group (e.g. Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Torchia 
et al., 2011). The minority group may be tokened or ignored on decision making (Torchia et 
al., 2011). Therefore, in addition to agency theory, this research uses critical mass theory. 
Specifically, research questions related to whether differentiating between firms with only 
one woman director on their remuneration committees and firms with two or more female 
directors can impact CEO remuneration and say-on-pay voting (sub-question 1). Also, this 
research utilises critical mass theory to investigate sub-question two which are related to 
whether differentiating between firms with only one foreign director on their remuneration 
committees and firms with two or more foreign directors can influence CEO pay say-on-pay 
voting.   
3.3 Empirical Background: Previous Literature  
This section addresses previous literature related to say-on-pay practices, CEO remuneration, 
board diversity (such as gender and nationality diversity) and board characteristics (such as 
board size, board independence and CEO duality).  
3.3.1 Say-on-pay  
Shareholder activism and the say-on-pay approach, specifically, have garnered attention from 
the public and academia (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015). Although studies on the say-on-
pay approach are relatively new, this approach has made critical changes in corporate boards 
(Goranova and Ryan, 2014). Executive remuneration was one of the most key issues 
questioned by shareholder activists.  
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Many previous studies have investigated the factors leading to and consequences of 
shareholder activism (see Table 3.1 for the summary of these papers). Most of these papers 
were researched using the US market. Moreover, previous research on shareholder activism 
used different measures for shareholder activism; however, hedge fund activism was the most 
common measure among this literature. 
There are many factors found to be related to shareholder activism, and firm size and 
performance and institutional ownership are among the most influential factors causing 
shareholders to intervene in their investee firms. Large firms are found to be more targeted by 
shareholder activism (e.g. Ertimur et al., 2011; Karpoff et al., 1996; Rehbein et al., 2004; 
Smith, 1996). One explanation may that shareholders found it difficult to monitor large firms 
(Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Another explanation may be that large firms are more visible and more likely to attract 
attention from the public; therefore, shareholder activists may interfere with their large 
investee firms as a means of attracting more public support (Rehbein et al., 2004; 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015). However, studies such as Brav et al. (2008) and Klein 
and Zur (2009), which used hedge funds to measure shareholder activism, found that hedge 
fund activists are less likely to interfere with large firms.  
Additionally, firms with good performance are negatively related to shareholder activism 
(e.g. Brav et al., 2008; Edmans et al., 2013; Ertimur et al., 2011; Karpoff et al., 1996). This 
idea is consistent with the agency theory, in that, shareholders tend to interfere when firms 
perform poorly. 
 However, other research, such as Bizjak and Marquettee (1998) and Ferri and Sandino 
(2009), found an insignificant association between firm performance and shareholder 
activism. Moreover, institutional ownership is another important factor related to shareholder 
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activism (e.g. Bizjak and Marquettee, 1998; Brav et al., 2008; Karpoff et al., 1996; Smith, 
1996).   
The say-on-pay approach is another form of shareholder activism. Specifically, this form 
targets executive remuneration. The UK was the first country to introduce a mandatory non-
binding shareholder vote on executive pay in late 2002 (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015; 
2016). The main purpose of the say-on-pay approach is to promote transparency and 
accountability linkage to executive remuneration (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015; 2016). 
This focus was derived because of subsequent concerns about ‘fat cat’ remuneration and 
compensation for failure (Ferri and Maber, 2013).  
Past research in shareholder activism has identified two strategies where shareholders might 
intervene in firm affairs; shareholders can use the exit strategy or the voice strategy 
(Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015). For example, the exit strategy encompasses selling part 
or all of the shares of the company, and the voice strategy is accomplished through 
campaigns, memorandum of objection, calling for meetings or at the AGM. The say-on-pay 
approach is an example of the voice strategy.  
Table 3.1 Previous Literature on Shareholder Activism 
 
Study Sample/Period/Measure Key results 
Bizjak and 
Marquettee (1998) 
- US 1987-1993 
- Poison pill 
proposals 
Shareholder activism is positively related to 
institutional ownership, but negatively related 
to executive and blockholder ownership. 
Brav et al., (2008) - US 2001-2006 
- Hedge fund 
activism 
Hedge fund activism is positively related to 
institutional ownership and governance score, 
but negatively related to firm size and 
performance, and dividends. 
Edmans et al., 
(2013) 
- US 2005-2010 
- Hedge fund 
Hedge fund activism is negatively related to 
liquidity, leverage, R&D and firm 
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activism performance. 
Ertimur et al., 
(2011) 
- US 1997-2007 
- Vote No 
Campaign 
Vote No Campaign is positively related to 
board independence, CEO remuneration and 
firm size, but negatively related to CEO 
power and firm performance. 
Ferri and Sandino 
(2009) 
- UK 2003-2004 
- Option expensing 
proposals 
Shareholder activism is positively related to 
CEOs with more stock option and leverage, 
but negatively related to institutional 
ownership and option expense. 
Karpoff et al., 
(1996) 
- US 1986-1990 
- Governance 
proposals 
Shareholder activism is positively related to 
firm size, leverage and institutional 
ownership, but negatively related to firm 
performance. 
Klein and Zur 
(2009) 
- US 1995-2005 
- Hedge fund 
activism 
Hedge fund activism is positively related to 
profitability and liquidity, but negatively 
related to leverage. 
Smith (1996) - US 1987-1993 
- CalPERS targets 
Shareholder activism is positively related to 
firm size and institutional ownership 
 
Many authors have reported pros and cons of the say-on-pay vote. In the view of opponents, 
say-on-pay votes may cause a disruption among management and the board and undermines 
the authority of the board (Bainbridge, 2008; Deane, 2007). Additionally, Kaplan (2008) and 
Bainbridge (2008) contended that shareholders ignore say-on-pay practice, as it is non-
binding. However, advocates of say-on-pay votes argue that this practice may reduce the 
agency costs between management and shareholders and, consequently, lead to better and 
reasonable executive remuneration schemes (Davis, 2007). Thus, say-on-pay votes work as 
an external control for shareholders to use to prevent or reduce excessive executive 
remuneration. 
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Previous research on say-on-pay voting has focused mainly on two streams of research (see 
Table 3.2 for summary). The first stream is the market reaction to say-on-pay voting, mainly 
researched using event study methodology (see Table 3.2, Panel A). The second stream of 
say-on-pay voting research investigated the antecedents of say-on-pay voting (see Table 3.2, 
Panel B).  
A number of studies have examined the impact of say-on-pay voting on firm share price 
(market reaction). The results from these studies, however, are not inconclusive. For instance, 
Ferri and Maber (2013) used data from the UK FTSE 350 over a period between 2003 and 
2008 and documents a positive stock market reaction to the say-on-pay proposal for firms 
with controversial CEO pay practices and, more specifically, with weak penalties for poor 
performance. This result is, in fact, coherent with the perception that shareholders perceive 
say-on-pay voting as a monitoring mechanism for their investee firms, especially those with 
poor performance.  
Similarly, in the US, Cai and Walking (2011) used an event study methodology and found 
that when say-on-pay regulation was passed by the House of Representatives in April 2010, 
the stock prices of firms with excessive CEO pay and firms with weak corporate governance 
responded positively to the proposal of say-on-pay voting.  
Similarly, but with boarder sets of governance legislation, Cuñat et al. (2012) investigated 
different types of governance proposals (including the say-on-pay proposal) and stock market 
prices using a data set from the US S&P 1500 and S&P 500 widely held firms from 1997 to 
2007. These researchers found that passing legislative proposals leads to significant positive 
abnormal stock returns.  
In contrast, Wayner and Wenk (2015) used a database of 225 Swiss companies and found a 
negative market reaction towards say-on-pay proposals. However, with a wider set of 
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corporate governance legislative proposals, including the say-on-pay proposal, Larcker et al. 
(2011) used 4,856 US firms from 2006 to 2008 and found no consistent reactions between 
different corporate governance legislative events and firms’ stock prices.  
Overall, it is clear that the results from this literature are mixed, but most of them support 
say-on-pay voting as having a positive reaction on firms’ share prices. Hence, this finding 
may also support the argument contending that say-on-pay voting improves monitoring and 
reduces agency costs (Davis, 2007).  
The second stream, research on the antecedents of say-on-pay voting, has investigated 
whether higher say-on-pay dissent voting can reduce or change controversial executive 
remuneration (see Table 3.2, Panel B). For instance, Conyon and Sadler (2010) used all the 
UK publicly listed firms in the manifest database from 2002 to 2007 and found that the 
average dissent voting on executive pay for UK firms is only 10%. Regarding the antecedents 
of say-on-pay voting, Conyon and Sadler (2010) found that firms with low firm performance 
(low return on assets) and high ownership concentration tended to have negative impacts on 
say-on-pay dissent voting. However, they also found limited evidence that high say-on-pay 
dissent voting can reduce executive remuneration the following year.  
Likewise, Carter and Zamora (2008), in the UK, used FTSE 350 firms from 2001 to 2006 to 
investigate the antecedents of say-on-pay voting and address the impact of shareholder say-
on-pay votes on executive compensation. Carter and Zamora (2008) reported that firms with 
high shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay votes are more likely to have higher executive 
remuneration and lower firm performance. However, in contrast to Conyon and Sadler, 
Carter and Zamora (2008) found evidence that firms react to the past high shareholder dissent 
voting by changing the extreme executive remuneration the following year.  
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Moreover, in the UK, Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) found that board independence and the 
number of non-executive directors on the boards of FTSE 350 firms over the period of 1998–
2012 have no impact on shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay. However, they did find 
evidence that higher CEO remuneration and lower firm performance (stock return) led to 
higher say-on-pay dissent voting. Remarkably, Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) reported that after 
the financial crisis of 2007, companies become more response to higher shareholder dissent 
voting (dissent >10%) than before the crisis by decreasing their CEOs remuneration.  
Additionally, Ferri and Maber (2013), in the UK, found that firms with higher shareholder 
dissent voting (≥20%) via say-on-pay voting responded by removing the controversial CEO 
remuneration the following year. Remarkably, these researchers reported that firms with 
lower shareholder dissent voting (≤10%) tended to shorten their notice period of directors’ 
remuneration reports to avoid high dissent voting.  
More recently, Alissa (2015) also examined the determinants of say-on-pay dissent voting 
and the impact of say-on-pay dissent voting on extreme executive remuneration in the UK 
FTSE 350 between 2002 and 2012. At first, Alissa (2015) did not find evidence that say-on-
pay votes reduce excessive CEO remuneration. However, when Alissa (2015) included the 
firm performance as a moderator in his equation, he found evidence that say-on-pay votes 
tended to reduce CEO high remuneration when firm performance was low. This finding, in 
fact, also supposed that shareholders tended to link executive remuneration with firm 
performance; thus, when firm performance is low, shareholders tend to put more pressure on 
executive payments.   
Also, recently in the UK, Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016) investigated the relationship 
between shareholder investment horizons (short-term investors vs. long-term investors) and 
say-on-pay voting patterns using data from FTSE 350 companies from 2003 to 2011. These 
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researchers found that long-term investors tended not to vote against CEO remuneration, 
whereas short-term investors were more likely to vote against CEO pay, especially when 
these remunerations were excessively high. This finding may imply that ‘the role of long-
term shareholders in facilitating effective monitoring and engagement prior to the publication 
of the proposals as opposed to colluding with managers’ (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016).  
In the US, a number of studies examined the antecedents of say-on-pay voting and 
investigated the impact of higher say-on-pay dissent voting on executive remuneration. These 
studies found the impact increased after the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which made non-
binding say-on-pay voting mandatory. For example, Cotter et al. (2013) used data from 1,497 
US firms in 2011 and found that firms with higher say-on-pay dissent voting reduced their 
high executive remuneration the following year. 
Likewise, Balsam et al. (2015), in the US, using data from 981 firms from 2009 to 2010, 
reported that firms with higher shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay votes reduced their 
CEOs remuneration and made them more performance-based the following year.  
Furthermore, Kimbro and Xu (2016) documented that firms with high say-on-pay dissent 
voting were more likely to have higher CEO remuneration, greater institutional ownership, 
larger firm size, higher stock price volatility, less CEO ownership and lower firm 
performance. In addition, Kimbro and Xu (2016) found that companies with higher 
shareholder dissent voting tended to reduce their excessive CEO remuneration, and the 
boards of these firms responded to say-on-pay votes by reducing the growth of executive 
remuneration the following year. Kimbro and Xu (2016) used a sample of 2,384 US firms 
from 2011 to 2012.  
Conyon (2016) also investigated the antecedents and implications of shareholder dissent via 
say-on-pay voting in the US from 2010 to 2012. Conyon (2016) revealed that higher CEO 
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remuneration, lower firm performance, larger board size, CEO duality, and greater 
institutional ownership were among the most antecedents of higher shareholder dissent 
voting. However, Conyon (2016) found that board independence had an influence on say-on-
pay voting. Furthermore, Conyon (2016) reported that firms were more likely to reduce their 
CEOs remuneration after high shareholder dissent voting.  
In contrast, Brunarski et al. (2015) found no evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
which made non-binding say-on-pay mandatory in the US, had no evidence of influence on 
executive CEO remuneration. However, this study possibly lacked the long-term effects of 
this legislation, as they only investigated this relationship in one period (2010).  
Regarding other countries, Correa and Lel (2016) addressed shareholder dissent via say-on-
pay voting using multinational data of companies from 38 countries over a period from 2001 
to 2012. Correa and Lel (2016) found that higher CEO pay and weak corporate governance 
practices played significant roles in shaping say-on-pay voting in these countries. Moreover, 
Correa and Lel (2016) reported that after adopting say-on-pay regulation, CEO remuneration 
decreased and CEO pay-performance sensitivity improved.   
Additionally, in the Italian context, where concentrated ownership is high, Belcredi et al. 
(2014) addressed the relationship between ownership characteristics and say-on-pay voting. 
These researchers found that widely held companies tended to have higher say-on-pay dissent 
voting, whereas firms with high concentrated ownership were less likely to have say-on-pay 
dissent voting. In line with most of the previous studies, Belcredi et al. (2014) found that 
firms with higher CEO remuneration tended to have higher shareholder dissent voting.  
In the Australian context, Kent et al. (2016) revealed that full adoption of Australian stock 
market recommendations on remuneration committee structure (size and independence) made 
companies less likely to have higher shareholder dissent voting. Finally, Troeger and Walz 
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(2016), in Germany, found that say-on-pay voting had no influence on total CEO 
remuneration.   
3.3.2 CEO and executive remuneration  
There is widespread concern over increasing levels of CEO remuneration. Public concern has 
increased since the gap between CEO pay and that of other employees has increased 
overtime. For example, the CEO and employees pay ratio gap was 47:1 in 1998 and 129:1 in 
2015 (Sadan, 2016). Extensive research has investigated the antecedents of CEO and other 
top executive manager remunerations. This section highlights previous research on the 
relationship between CEO and executive directors remuneration and corporate board 
characteristics and research on the impact of remuneration committee characteristics on 
executive directors pay.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Previous Literature on Say-on-Pay 
Study Sample Key Results 
Panel A: say-on-pay voting and firm stock market price 
Cai and Walking 
(2011) 
1,270 US firms 
(2007) 
 
- Significant positive stock market reaction for firms with high abnormal 
CEO remuneration. 
Cuñat et al. (2016) US S&P 1500 firms 
(2006-2010) 
- Adopting say-on-pay proposal leads to significant positive stock market 
value and long-term profitability.  
Cuñat et al., (2012) US S&P 1500 and 500 
widely held firms 
(1997-2007) 
- Passing governance proposals (including remuneration proposal) leads to 
significant positive abnormal stock returns. 
Ferri and Maber (2013) UK FTSE 350 firms 
(2002-2003) 
- Significant positive stock prices reaction, for firms with poor performance, 
after the announcement of say on pay. 
Larcker et al., (2011) 4,856 US firms 
(2006-2008) 
- No consistent findings between different types of corporate governance 
legislative events (including say-on-pay) and stock return.   
Wayner and Wenk 
(2015) 
225 Swiss firms 
(2006-2010) 
- Significant negative market reaction for firms after the announcement of say 
on pay. 
Panel B: antecedents and implications of say-on-pay dissent voting   
Alissa (2015) UK FTSE 350 firms 
 (2002-2012) 
- Excessive CEO remuneration is reduced by high dissent votes via say-on-
pay when firm performance is low. 
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Balsam et al., (2015) 981 US firms  
(2009-2010) 
- High say-on-pay dissent reduces CEO remuneration and made it more 
performance-based in the following year. 
Belcredi et al. (2014) 226 Italian firms 
(2012) 
- Widely held companies tend to have higher say-on-pay dissent voting and 
firms with high concentrated ownership are less likely to have say-on-pay 
dissent voting. 
- firms with higher CEO remuneration tend to have higher shareholder 
dissent voting 
Brunarrski et al., 
(2015) 
US S&P 1500 
2010 
- No support that say-on-pay legislation has an impact on excessive executive 
remuneration. 
Carter and Zamora 
(2008) 
UK FTSE 350 firms 
(2001-2006) 
- High say-on-pay dissent voting is positively associated with high executive 
remuneration and low firm performance. 
- High say-on-pay dissent voting can reduce executive remuneration in the 
following year. 
Conyon and Sadler 
(2010) 
All UK publicly listed firms 
in the Manifest database 
(2002-2007) 
- Higher executive pay, ownership concentration and firm performance are 
main determinants of say-on-pay voting.  
- No evidence that high say-on-pay dissent voting can reduce executive 
remuneration in the following year. 
Correa and Lel (2016) Multinational data of 38 
countries 
(2001-2012) 
- Higher CEO pay and weak corporate governance practice lead to higher 
say-on-pay voting.  
- Post adoption of say-on-pay regulation, CEO remuneration decreases and 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity improves.   
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Cotter et al., (2013) 1497 US firms 
 (2011) 
      -  Positive impact of high shareholder say-on-pay dissent on executive 
remuneration.  
Ferri and Maber (2013) UK FTSE 350 firms  
(2002-2005) 
- High shareholder dissent voting is positively related to the removal of 
controversial CEO remuneration. 
Gregory-Smith et al. 
(2013) 
UK FTSE 350 firms 
(1998-2012) 
- Higher CEO remuneration and lower firm performance (stock return) lead 
to higher say-on-pay dissent voting. 
- Board independence and number of non-executive directors have no impact 
on say-on-pay voting. 
- Post financial crisis, companies become more response to higher 
shareholder dissent voting than pre financial by decreasing their CEOs 
remuneration. 
Kent et al. (2016) 711 Australian firms 
(2008) 
- Adoption of Australian stock market recommendations on remuneration 
committee structure make companies less likely to have higher shareholder 
dissent voting 
Kimbro and Xu (2016) 2384-2235 US firms  
(2011 to 2012) 
- Say-on-pay high dissent voting reduces excessive CEO remuneration and 
boards respond by reducing the growth of executive remuneration.  
Stathopoulos and 
Voulgaris (2016) 
UK FTSE 350 firms 
(2003-2011) 
- Long-term investors tend not vote against CEO remuneration and short-
term investors are more likely to vote against CEO pay. 
Troeger and Walz 
(2016) 
Germany Dax 30 firms 
(2006-2014) 
- Say-on-pay has no influence on total CEO remuneration 
 
 
59 
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) developed the managerial power approach, which states that 
managers are more likely to gain power when board governance is weak, there is no 
shareholder with large ownership and there are fewer institutional investors. The structure of 
the board plays an important role in constraining managerial power in pay-setting processes 
(van Essen et al., 2015).  
CEO power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), board size and board independence are among 
the most researched corporate governance features in investigating the relationship between 
board characteristics and executive remuneration (see Table 3.3 for a summary of these 
studies). Core et al. (1999) used a sample of 205 US firms from 1982 to 1984 to investigate 
the relationship between board characteristics and CEO remuneration. These researchers 
found that firms with CEO duality, larger board size, greater board independence and a busy 
board had higher CEO remuneration.  
Recently, in the US, Armstrong and Ittner (2012) found that weakly governed boards (such as 
those with CEO duality, CEO tenure, larger board size and less board independence) were 
more likely to have higher executive remuneration. Similarly, van Essen et al. (2015) used a 
meta-analysis of 219 US studies that investigated the determinants of CEO remuneration and 
found that CEO duality, larger board size and greater board independence had positive 
influence on CEO pay. van Essen et al.’s (2015) findings confirm those of previous studies in 
the US, such as Core et al. (1999). In contrast, Ryan and Wiggins (2004), in the US, found 
that firms with larger board size and greater board independence tended to have lower CEO 
remuneration.   
Coles et al. (2014) investigated the reasons why not all independent directors were effective 
monitors and why their presence on boards may have led to higher CEO remuneration using a 
data set from US companies from 1996 to 2010. Coles et al. (2014) defined all independent 
 
 
60 
 
directors who had been selected by the CEO (when the CEO was present on the remuneration 
committee) as ‘co-opted’ directors. These researchers found that firms with higher co-opted 
directors tended to have higher CEO pay. This result is consistent with a previous finding by 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), who also found that involvement of CEOs in selecting 
independent directors can lead to higher CEO entrenchment.   
Additionally, ownership structure is found to be another important element in controlling 
executive directors’ remuneration (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Shareholders with large 
ownership stakes and institutional investors have more incentives to monitor executive 
directors effectively (van Essen et al., 2015). Many previous studies have shown that an 
effective ownership structure (e.g. higher concentrated ownership and higher institutional 
ownership) led to less CEO remuneration (e.g. Benz et al., 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2000; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; van Essen et al., 2015). For example, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000) used data from 51 of the largest US oil firms from 1977 to 1994 and 
found that firms with lower concentrated ownership had CEOs who were more likely to get 
higher ‘lack’ remuneration. Similarly, Benz et al. (2001) reported that companies with higher 
concentrated ownership had fewer options-based remuneration.  
Also, many studies have examined the governance-pay relationship in the UK. For example, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) investigated the impact of board characteristics on CEO 
remuneration using a sample from the UK FTSE 100 firms from 1991 to 1994. The 
researchers found that CEO duality and board independence had no effect on executive 
remuneration. Similarly, Ozkan (2007), in the UK, found that board size and board 
independence had positive impacts on executive remuneration.  
More recent studies have investigated the impact other corporate governance characteristics 
on CEO remuneration, such as gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Lucas-Pérez et 
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al., 2015) and board meeting frequency (Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). More specifically, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) used a sample of US firms from 1996 to 2003 and found that the presence 
of female directors on boards had no influence on CEO remuneration. Contrarily, Lucas-
Pérez et al. (2015) used data from a Spanish market from 2004 to 2009 and reported that 
more gender-diverse boards had less CEO remuneration. Hahn and Lasfer (2016) examined 
the relationship between lower meeting frequency and executive and chairman remuneration 
using 241 UK firms from 1999 to 2012. These researchers found that firms with a lower 
meeting frequency tended to distribute more executive and chairman remuneration.   
Many decisions related to executive remuneration are made by the remuneration committee 
(Daily et al., 1998). A few previous studies examined the characteristics of remuneration 
committees possibly associated with CEO remuneration (see Table 3.3.2 for a summary of 
these studies). For example, Conyon and Peck (1998) reported that the independence of 
remuneration committees in the UK had a limited effect on executive pay. Furthermore, in 
the UK, Gregory-Smith (2012) found no support for the relationship between the 
independence of the remuneration committee and CEO remuneration. Similarly, in the US, 
Daily et al. (1998) found no evidence that the independence of the remuneration committee 
affected CEO pay. 
Few studies have addressed the impact of diversity on remuneration committees on CEO pay 
(e.g. Bugeja et al., 2015; Masulis et al., 2012). First, Bugeja et al. (2015), in the US, 
investigated the relationship between the presence of women on remuneration committees 
and CEO remuneration. These researchers found that the presence of women on firms’ 
remuneration committees had a negative impact on CEO pay. Masulis et al. (2012) argued 
that not all types of diversity is beneficial and that foreign directors are less effective 
monitors. Specifically, Masulis et al. (2012) reported that the presence of foreign directors on 
remuneration committees led to higher CEO remuneration.  
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In addition, a number of studies have examined whether remuneration committee 
characteristics play a role in aligning firm performance with CEO remuneration (e.g. 
Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003). First, Vafeas (2003), in the US, revealed that 
firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on their remuneration committees 
were more likely to have better performance-CEO pay alignment. In the US, Newman and 
Mozes (1999) also reported that remuneration committee independence helped align firm 
performance with CEO pay. 
3.3.3 Gender diversity on boards 
‘Corporate boards perform better when they include the best people who come from a range 
of perspectives and backgrounds’ (Davies Report, 2011). The Davies Report (2011) 
elucidated that the importance of diversity on boards is not just a game of numbers, but rather 
goes beyond this perspective; it represents the richness of the board in terms of knowledge, 
experience and skills.  
Diversity on corporate boards has gained tremendous interest and attention from the public, 
policymakers and academics. There are different dimensions of diversity, which have gained 
particular interest in the literature; these dimensions include gender, age, ethnicity, education, 
board experience, professional experience and nationality.  
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Table 3.3 Board Characteristics and Executive Remuneration. 
Study Sample Key Results 
Panel A Board characteristics, ownership and executive remuneration 
Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) 
S&P 500 
(1996-2003) 
- Presence of women directors on boards have no influence on CEO remuneration. 
Armstrong and 
Ittner (2012) 
2110 US firms 
(2006-2007) 
- Firms with weak corporate governance (e.g. CEO duality, CEO tenure, lower board 
independence and busy board) have higher CEO remuneration. 
Conyon (1997) 100 UK firms 
(1988-1993) 
- CEO duality has no effect on executive remuneration. 
Conyon and Peck 
(1998) 
100 UK firms 
(1991-1994) 
- CEO duality and board independence have no impact on executive remuneration. 
Core et al. (1999) 205 US firms 
(1982-1984) 
- Firms with CEO duality, larger board size, higher board independence and busy board 
have higher CEO remuneration.  
Cyert et al. (2002) 1648 US firms 
(1992-1993) 
- Firms with CEO duality, larger board size have mixed result CEO remuneration. 
- Firms with higher board independence have less cash remuneration 
- Firms with higher CEO ownership have higher executive remuneration. 
Hahn and Lasfer 
(2016) 
241 UK firms 
(1999-2012) 
- Firms with lower board meeting frequency have higher CEO and chairman 
remuneration. 
Hartzell and Starks 
(2002) 
1914 US firms 
(1991-1997) 
- Firms with higher Institutional ownership have less executive remuneration. 
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Lucas-Pérez et al. 
(2015) 
120 Spanish firms 
(2004-2009) 
- Firms with higher gender diversity have less executive remuneration. 
Ozkan (2007) 414 UK firms 
(2003-2004) 
- Firms with larger board size, higher board independence and less institutional 
ownership have higher executive remuneration. 
Ryan and Wiggins 
(2004) 
1018 US firms 
(1995-1997) 
- Firms with fewer CEO tenure, larger board size and higher board independence have 
less executive remuneration.  
van Essen et al. 
(2015) 
US 
Meta-analysis 
- Firms with CEO duality, larger board size, and higher board independence have higher 
CEO remuneration. 
- Firms with higher Institutional ownership have less CEO remuneration. 
Panel B Remuneration committee characteristics and executive remuneration 
Anderson and 
Bizjak (2003) 
US large firms 
(1985-1994) 
- Remuneration committee independence  has no effect on CEO pay 
Bugeja et al. 
(2015) 
1554 US firms 
(2002-2009) 
- Firms with higher gender diverse remuneration committees have lower CEO 
remuneration.  
Conyon (1997) 100 UK firms 
(1988-1993) 
- Remuneration committee independence has no effect on CEO pay. 
Conyon and Peck 
(1998) 
100 UK firms 
(1991-1994) 
- Remuneration committee independence has limited effect on CEO pay. 
Daily et al. (1998) 200 US firms 
(1992-1994) 
- Remuneration committee independence has no effect on CEO pay. 
Gregory-Smith UK FTSE 350 firms - Remuneration committee independence has no effect on CEO pay. 
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(2012) (1996-2008) 
Masulis et al. 
(2012) 
S&P 1500 
(1998-2006) 
- presence of foreign directors on remuneration committees lead to higher CEO 
remuneration 
Newman and 
Mozes (1999) 
US large firms 
(1991-1993) 
- Remuneration committee independence align firm performance with CEO pay. 
Vafeas (2003) US large firms 
(1991-1997) 
- Remuneration committee independence align firm performance with CEO pay. 
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Table 3.4 Women on Boards Literature 
 
Study Sample Key Results 
Panel A Women directors’ characteristics on boardrooms 
Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) 
US S&P 500 firms 
(1996-2003) 
- Have better attendance. 
- More effective monitors. 
- Their firms have more CEO turnover. 
Hillman et al. (2002) US Fortune 1000 
firms 
(1993-1997) 
- Have more advanced education.  
- Come from non-business background. 
- Join multiple boards at faster rate than male directors. 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) 201 Norwegian firms 
(2003) 
- Firm with more female directors have better strategic board control. 
- Firms with more female directors are more likely to conduct board development activities. 
Ruigrok et al. (2007) 269 Swiz firms 
(2004) 
- Selected base on family ties. 
- Have less advanced education. 
- More independent. 
Singh et al. (2008) UK FTSE 100 firms 
(2001-2004) 
- Have international experience. 
- Younger than male. 
- More likely to possess an MBA degree. 
Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria (2004) 
US Fortune 1000 
firms 
(1999) 
- Male and female directors have relatively same tenure and education. 
- Have fewer directorships than male in other firms. 
- Have less powerful corporate title. 
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Panel B Gender diversity and risk-taking  
Adams and Ferreira 
(2004) 
1024 US firms 
(1998) 
Firms with higher stock price volatility tend to have fewer female directors on their boards. 
Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) 
US S&P 500 firms 
(1996-2003) 
Firms with more female directors have less stock price volatility. 
Faccio et al. (2016) Amadeus top 250,000 
firms 
(1999-2009) 
Firms with female CEOs tend to have lower leverage, less volatile earnings and higher chance 
of survival. 
Farag and Mallin (2016a) 892 Chinese firms 
(1999-2009) 
Female CEOs are not less risk-taking than male CEOs. 
Farrell and Hersch 
(2005) 
309 US large firms 
(1990-1999) 
Negative and significant relationship between risky firms and newly appointed female 
directors. 
Gregory-Smith et al., 
(2014) 
UK FTSE 350 
(1996-2011) 
No relationship between risky firms and newly appointed female directors. 
Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) 
116 US firms 
(1993-2005) 
Female executives are less likely to undertake M&A and issue new debt. 
Levi et al., (2014) US S&P 1500 firms 
(1997–2009) 
Firms with more female directors tend to make less M&A. 
Perryman et al., (2016) 2454 US firms 
(1992-2012) 
Firms with more gender diversity have lower risk. 
Sila et al., (2016) 1960 US firms No significant relationship between higher female directors on boards and equity risk. 
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(1996-2010) 
Panel C Gender diversity and firm performance  
Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) 
US S&P 500 
(1996-2003) 
Negative relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Ararat et al., (2015) Top 100 Turkish firms 
(2006) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2010) Norway large firms 
(1989-2002) 
Negative relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Bonn et al., (2004) 104 Australian and 
169 Japanese firms 
(1998) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) 
68 Spain firms 
(1995-200) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Carter et al., (2003) 638 US firms 
(1997) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Carter et al., (2010) 472-487 US firms 
(1998-2002) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Dezso and Ross (2012) S&P 1500 US firms  
(1992-2006) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance, 
but only when firm’s strategy is focused on innovation.   
Erhardt et al., (2003) 127 US large firms 
(1993 and 1998) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
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Farag and Mallin (2016b) 892 Chinese firms 
(1999-2009) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Haslam et al. (2010) UK FTSE 100 
(2001-2005) 
No significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance.  
Joecks et al., (2013) 151 German firms 
(2000-2005) 
Positive and significant relationship between firms with three and more female directors and 
firm performance. 
Liu et al., (2014) Chinese large firms 
(1999-2011) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Mallin and Farag (2017) UK FTSE 350 firms 
(2004-2013) 
Positive and significant relation between board gender diversity and firm performance 
Miller and Triana (2009) Fortune 500 firms 
(2002-2005) 
No significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Perryman et al. (2016) Fortune 500 US firms 
(1992-2012) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Reguera-Alvarado (2015) 125 Spain firms 
(2005-2009) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Rose (2007) Danish firms 
(1998-2001) 
No significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
Terjesen et al. (2016) 3,876 firms in 47 
countries 
(2010) 
Positive and significant relationship between higher gender diversity and firm performance. 
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There is substantial and growing interest among researchers, shareholder activists and 
policymakers about gender diversity at the corporate board level. Hence, firms are now under 
public pressure to enhance the representation of women at the board level (Sila et al., 2016). 
As previously stated, in the UK, the Davies Report (2011) recommended a target for FTSE 
350 firms for female representation at the board level of 25% by 20156. Since then, the 
number of women on corporate boards has seen a noticeable increase7. Despite this evidence, 
male directors still dominate corporate boards. For example, in 2015, women held only 
23.5% and 18% of total directorships in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms, respectively (Davies 
Review Annual Report, 2015). Moreover, many European countries, such as Norway, 
Belgium, France and Italy, have set legalisations mandating a certain percentage of female 
representation at the board level (Sila et al., 2016).   
Interestingly, more pressure to increase female representation at the board level has come 
from some of the leading institutional investors such as Calvert Investment Management, Inc. 
and Trillium Asset Management Corp. For instance, Calvert Investment Management, Inc 
rejected a non-binding proposal to re-elect key male directors for Sage Group plc in their 
annual meeting (dated 01 March 2016), and their rationale was ‘The board does not include at 
least one minority director after the election’ (Proxy Insight8, 2016).   
Empirically, the relationship between the presence of women on corporate boards and firm 
outcomes has been investigated widely by many studies. The aim of this sub-section is to 
summarise previous studies that show the benefits of female directors on boards. Also, this 
sub-section addresses studies that investigate the relationship between women on boards and 
firm performance. 
                                                          
6 Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) has recommended FTSE 350 firms set a target of 33% female 
representation on their corporate boards by 2020. 
7 See Chapter 6 for more results on female representation on UK boards from 2003 to 2015. 
8 An independent company that provides data on corporate governance, especially data related to 
shareholders voting on different resolutions. 
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i. Characteristics of female directors on corporate boards 
There is a considerable amount of literature that addresses the benefits and characteristics of 
female directors on corporate boards (see Table 3.4, Panel A for summary). For example, 
Hillman et al. (2002) used a sample from the US Fortune-1000 between 1993 and 1997 and 
found that female directors tended to hold more advanced education degrees than male 
directors. Moreover, female directors were more likely to come from non-business 
backgrounds and had interests in joining multiple boards at faster rates than their male 
counterparts (Hillman et al., 2002). 
Additionally, in the US, Adams and Ferreira (2009), including only female non-executive 
directors, found that female directors had better attendance rates and were more effective 
monitors than male directors. Further, these researchers found that firms with more female 
directors tended to have higher CEO turnovers. Likewise, Singh et al. (2008) reported that 
female directors in UK FTSE 100 companies were more likely to have more international 
experience, be younger and hold more Master’s of Business Administration (MBA) degrees 
than male directors.  
Nielsen and Huse (2010), in Norway, investigated the characteristics of firms with female 
directors on their boards and found that firms with more female directors were more likely to 
make better strategic decisions and use more board development activities, such as evaluation 
and training programs. However, Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) examined only female 
executive directors in a sample of the US Fortune-1000 in 1999 and found that female and 
male directors had relatively similar education levels, board experience and board tenure. 
However, the researchers found that female directors had fewer directorships than male 
directors in other listed firms. Moreover, Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) reported that 
female directors had a less powerful title and lower remuneration than male directors had. 
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Additionally, Ruigrok et al. (2007) used a data set of large Swiss firms and reported that 
female directors tended to have fewer advanced qualifications than male directors had. The 
researchers justified this finding by stating that those female directors were selected to the 
board based on family ties and connections, rather than their qualities. Peck et al. (2007) also 
found that female directors were more independent from management than their male 
counterparts were. 
ii. Board gender diversity and risk taking  
Another group of studies addressed the relationship between women on boards and different 
types of firm risk measures, including merger and acquisition, return volatility and leverage. 
These studies proved that female directors were more risk averse than male directors were 
(see Table 3.4, Panel B for a summary of these studies). For example, Adams and Ferreira 
(2004 and 2009), in the US, found that firms with more female directors in their boardrooms 
tended to have less stock volatility. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) used a sample of 309 
large US firms between 1990 and 1999 and found that a new appointment of female directors 
on boards was less likely to be in risky firms.   
In addition, studies that used merger and acquisition as a measure of risk taking found 
evidence that female directors were less likely to take risks. For example, Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) and Levi et al. (2014) reported that firms with more female directors tended to make 
fewer acquisitions. A recent study by Perryman et al. (2016) in the US also showed that firms 
with more gender diversity at top management levels had lower risk.  
In contrast, a number of studies found no evidence that female directors were more risk 
averse than male directors were. For example, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) found no evidence 
that female directors were less appointed in volatile firms using a data set of UK FTSE 350 
firms from 1996 to 2011. Similarly, Farag and Mallin (2016a) examined the relationship 
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between female CEOs and risk taking in a sample of 892 Chinese IPOs from 1999 to 2009 
and found that female CEOs were not more risk averse than were male CEOs. Equally, Sila et 
al. (2016), in the US, found no evidence that women on corporate boards were linked with 
firm equity risk. 
iii. Board gender diversity and firm performance 
One of the most explored areas in board diversity is the relationship between gender diversity 
and firm performance. The results from these studies revealed no specific answer to this 
relationship (see Table 3.4, Panel C). For example, Carter et al. (2003) presented the first 
empirical evidence investigating whether board diversity was associated with better firm 
performance. In Carter et al.’s (2003) study, they used data from 638 US publicly listed firms 
in 1997 and found that there was a significant positive relationship between the percentage of 
women on boards and firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Another study by Carter 
et al. (2010), in the US, found a positive association between female representation on boards 
and firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003) examined the relationship between diversity and firm 
performance in two different years (1993 and 1998) using 127 large US firms. The 
researcher’s findings revealed a positive relationship between diversity, including gender 
diversity, and firm performance. Additionally, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) used data 
from 68 listed firms in Spain between 1995 and 2000 and found that the relationship between 
gender diversity and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) was positive. Furthermore, Miller and 
Triana (2009) found a positive, but not significant, relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance, as measured by return on investment (ROI) and return on sales (ROS). 
These researchers used data from US Fortune 500 firms between 2002 and 2005.    
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More recent studies showed more positive results of gender diversity on firm performance. 
For example, Dezso and Ross (2012) used data from US S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2006 
and revealed a positive association between gender diversity and firm performance, but only 
when the firm’s strategy was focused on innovation. Additionally, Liu et al. (2014), in China, 
used data from large listed firms between 1999 and 2011 to investigate the relationship 
between female representation at the board level and firm performance (ROA and ROS) and 
found a positive and significant relationship between these two variables. Similarly, in China, 
Farag and Mallin (2016b) reported a positive bi-directional relationship between financial 
performance and gender diversity. 
Other recent studies by Perryman et al. (2016) and Reguera-Alvarado (2015), in the US and 
Spain, respectively, showed that the increasing number of women on boards is associated 
with better firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. In addition, Terjesen et al. (2016) 
conducted a global study in 2010 of 47 countries and concluded that firms with more female 
directors tend to have better firm performance. Finally, Mallin and Farag (2017) used a large 
sample from the UK FTSE 350 firms and found that firms with more women on their boards 
tended to have better performance.  
On the contrary, a study by Adams and Ferreira (2009), where they tested the association 
between the number of female directors on a board and firm performance, found that in 
weakly governed firms, the presence of female directors had a positive impact on firm 
performance, whereas in strongly governed firms, ‘enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom 
could ultimately decrease shareholder value’.  
Additionally, Bøhren and Strøm (2010) found that imposing a mandatory quota on 
Norwegian firms from 1989 to 2002 resulted in a negative relationship between the 
percentage of female directors and firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and 
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ROS. Another study by Rose (2007) regarding Danish firms from 1998 to 2001 found no 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Equally, in the UK, Haslam et 
al. (2010) use data from FTSE 100 firms from 2001 to 2005) and found a negative 
association between firm performance and gender diversity, as measured by Tobin’s Q, and 
no relationship when measured by ROA and ROE. 
3.3.4 Foreign directors on boards (nationality diversity) 
In contrast to gender diversity, research in the area of corporate governance gives less 
attention to nationality diversity despite its importance. Nationality diversity at the board 
level signifies the number of foreign directors on boards. Previous research has shown that 
foreign directors on boards can serve as a ‘double-edged sword’ (e.g. Frijns et al., 2016; 
Masulis et al., 2012; Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
From the perspective of the resource dependence theory, foreign directors on corporate 
boards are favourable and beneficial. Some scholars believe that foreign directors can be 
beneficial in helping companies gain knowledge about international markets and regulations 
(Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Yet, other scholars believe that foreign directors are less effective 
monitors (Masulis et al., 2012) and that miscommunications and conflicts may increase with 
the presence of foreign directors on boards (Frijns et al., 2016; Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
Whether foreign directors are beneficial or not, few scholars have highlighted this issue 
empirically. Among those that have, Masulis et al. (2012) examined the costs and benefits of 
foreign directors using a sample of US S&P 1500 companies from 1998 to 2006. First, 
Masulis et al. (2012) found that foreign directors were beneficial in an advisory role, 
specifically they found that firms with more foreign directors ‘make better cross-border 
acquisitions’. However, the researchers also found that foreign directors lacked sufficient 
oversight on executive directors. In this regard, Masulis et al. (2012) revealed that firms with 
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a higher percentage of foreign directors on their boards exhibited more financial 
misreporting, higher CEO remuneration, less CEO turnover and lower firm performance. 
Similarly, Frijns et al. (2016) investigated the impact of foreign directors on firm 
performance using data from a sample of large UK companies between 2002 and 2014. Frijns 
et al. (2016) argued that firms with more foreign directors tended to have more coordination 
problems, slower communications and more confusion among their directors. Frijns et al. 
(2016)’s findings indicated that the presence of foreign directors on boards led to lower firm 
performance. Additionally, Mallin and Farag (2017) examined the relationship between the 
presence of foreign directors on UK FTSE 350 boards and firm performance from 2004 to 
2013 and found that firms with a higher proportion of foreign directors were more likely to 
have lower firm performance.   
Contrarily, Estélyi and Nisar (2016), using a sample from the UK, found that the presence of 
foreign directors on boards led to better firm performance. However, the research also 
showed a positive association between the presence of foreign directors on boards and CEO 
remuneration.  In addition, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) investigated the determinants of diverse 
nationality on boards and found that firms with more foreign directors tended to have more 
product market heterogeneity, less CEO power, greater institutional ownership, more 
independent directors and higher stock price volatility.  
Staples (2007) addressed the antecedents of foreign directors in 80 international firms and 
found that mergers and acquisitions played an important role in increasing nationality 
diversity. Moreover, van Veen and Marsman (2008) analysed the factors involved in 
improving nationality diversity in Europe and found that nationality diversity was affected by 
the firm’s international activities, firm size and mergers and acquisition activities. 
Additionally, van Veen and Elbertsen (2008) investigated the influence of corporate 
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governance regimes on nationality diversity in three European countries, the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands, in 2005 and found a strong effect between governance regimes and 
nationality diversity. 
3.3.5 Other board characteristics  
Although many studies have investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
(more specifically, board characteristics) and firm performance, no specific answer to this 
relationship has been provided. Whereas some researchers such as Cheng (2008), Duchin 
(2010) and Jackling and Johl (2009) found a positive association between corporate 
governance and firm performance, others such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and Yermack (1996) found no significant relationship.  
Most of the board characteristics studied in the previously mentioned literature were related 
to board size, board composition and CEO duality. The studies reviewed these characteristics 
either individually or in combination. The subsequent paragraphs review these studies. 
i. Board size 
The relationship between board size and firm performance is one of the fundamental issues 
discussed in the corporate governance literature. The board of directors mainly performs two 
functions: monitoring and advising (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005). The 
monitoring function involves monitoring, disciplining and removing ineffective management 
teams (Guest, 2009) and providing performance assessments of the company and CEO 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). The advising function includes facilitating advice to the 
CEO and accessing important information and resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The size 
of a board is an important factor in the board’s ability to function effectively (Coles et al., 
2008). There is disagreement as to what size the board should be. Some studies view larger 
boards as problematic (e.g. Guest, 2009; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 
 
 
78 
 
1996), whereas some view larger boards as beneficial (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999; Lehn et al., 
2009).  
The debate on the association between larger boards and firm performance is closely related 
to discussions in previous studies relating to group decision making in the areas of economics 
and social psychology (Cheng, 2008). For example, in the field of economics, Sah and 
Stiglitz (1987, 1991) argued that in larger groups, inaccuracies of decision making among 
individuals might increase, communication among individuals is costly, individual 
capabilities in handling information differ and final decisions must be of majority agreement. 
As a result, the probability of rejecting risky projects increases, as the decision has to be 
considered as good by a majority of the group members (Cheng, 2008). An example provided 
by Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), from the field of social psychology, supported the 
previous argument, in that, the final decision is a compromise of many decisions.   
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that the norms of most ‘boardrooms are dysfunctional’, as 
only a minority of directors criticise CEOs’ decisions or give less ‘candid discussion’ about 
firm performance. Similarly, Jensen (1993) pointed out that in boardrooms, politeness and 
courtesy are more common than truth and frankness. As a result, many problems associated 
with larger board sizes might arise, such as coordination and communication, free-rider 
problem and less ability to control the CEO (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). For example, coordination and communication problems with 
larger boards are related to difficulties in arranging board meetings and slower and less 
efficient decision making for a final conclusion (Jensen, 1993). Similarly, the probability of 
free-rider problems increase with larger boards, as directors are less willing to exercise their 
diligence (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Furthermore, ‘large boards are more captive to the 
CEO, making the CEO more powerful in decision making’ (Cheng, 2008). Additionally, 
Yermack (1996) stated that a CEO incentive scheme and the threat of dismissal works less 
 
 
79 
 
efficiently with large boards. In response to these problems, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
recommended that the optimal board size should be between eight and nine directors, and 
Jensen (1993) recommended the board size should be between seven and eight directors.   
Nevertheless, some researchers see large boards an advantage (Dalton et al., 1999; Lehn et 
al., 2009). These advantages relate to greater collective information (Dalton et al., 1999) and 
more independent directors (Lehn et al., 2009). For example, Dalton et al. (1999) argued that 
large boards might increase a company’s external resources; however, this increase is 
conditional on the number of independent directors, which must also be increased.  
Regarding the empirical literature, the results concerning the relationship between board size 
and firm performance are mixed, but overall results of this literature support the view that 
larger board size negatively impacts firm performance (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006; Cheng, 2008; 
Coles et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Guest, 2009; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Yermack, 
1996). For example, Yermack (1996) used data from 452 large US firms between 1984 and 
1991 and found a significant negative relationship between large board size and firm 
performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1998), in Finland, used 
data from a sample of 879 small and mid-sized firms and also found a negative relationship 
between large board size and firm performance. Additionally, in the UK, Guest (2009) used 
an unbalanced sample of 2,746 firms between 1981 and 2002 and reported a negative 
relationship between larger board size and firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q). 
However, variation in the results of previous studies may be because certain sizes of boards 
might be optimal under certain circumstances (Raheja, 2005) and one size does not fit all 
(Coles et al., 2008). For example, Coles et al. (2008), in the US, found evidence that large 
boards are optimal for complex firms (firms with a large scope of operations, large firm size 
and more leverage) and small boards are optimal for simple firms (firms with a small scope 
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of operations, small firm size and less leverage). Additionally, Aggarwal et al. (2012) stated 
that larger boards are more beneficial for non-profit organisations, and Dalton et al. (1999) 
found that larger boards are desirable when boards are dominated by independent directors. 
Guest (2009) stated that ‘the relationship between board size and performance may differ not 
just by firm-specific characteristics but also by national institutional characteristics’. Other 
studies contended that what are believed to be good corporate governance practices might not 
work under certain circumstances (Dowell et al., 2011; Essen et al., 2013; Mangena et al., 
2012; Minichilli et al., 2015).  For instance, Dowell et al. (2011) argued that a one-size-fits-
all practice for governance is ineffective and that larger board size is not useful during 
unstable economic conditions. In the context of the US, these researchers found that larger 
boards increased the level of financial distress during a financial crisis. However, Mangena et 
al. (2012), in Zimbabwe, and Essen et al. (2013), in Europe, believed that a larger board size 
was better during times of uncertainty and found that larger board size had a significant and 
positive impact on firm performance during times of financial crisis.      
ii. Board independence  
Globally, there is agreement of corporate governance codes in that each include requirements 
to include independent directors on a given board (Jackling and Johl, 2009). For example, in 
the US, independent directors must compose a majority of the board (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein et al., 2007), whereas in UK FTSE 350 firms, ‘at least half of the board, excluding 
the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be 
independent’ (e.g. the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016; the 
Combined Code of 2003, 2006 and 2008).  
Dalton et al. (1998) stated that ‘A preference for outsider-dominated boards is largely 
grounded in agency theory’. The agency theory is based on the assumption that there is a 
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conflict of interest between management and owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and this 
conflict can be minimised by appointing non-executive directors to monitor executive 
directors’ behaviours, through compensation schemes or both (Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
Additionally, to pursue the monitoring function effectively, non-executive directors should be 
fully independent (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Accordingly, the agency theory advocates that an 
effective board should be composed of mostly independent directors (Dalton et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, the resource dependence theory suggests that non-executive directors may help 
their firms access strategic outside resources through their past experiences and networks 
and, consequently, improve firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998).   
However, the assumption often is that executive directors are good keepers of the company 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1994) and not likely to misuse company resources (Dalton et al., 
1998; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Moreover, non-executive directors work on a part-time 
basis in the firm, which might limit their information and knowledge about the company’s 
daily operations and, consequently, may affect firm performance negatively (Bozec, 2005).  
Bhagat and Black (2002) addressed different reasons why independent directors may not be 
effective. First, the researchers acknowledged that compensation of managers might not be 
sufficient. Second, the researchers argued that directors are sometimes independent but not 
accountable enough. Third, the researchers claimed that some directors perceived to be 
independent are, in fact, not independent from management. Moreover, Bhagat and Black 
(2002) provided other reasons why independent directors are not efficient, such as extended 
tenures of service, old age and concerns about the interests of other businesses.   
Several studies have investigated empirically the relationship between board independence 
and firm performance in the literature (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Carter et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2001; Dalton et al., 
1998; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). However, the results from this 
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literature are inconclusive. Consistent with the agency theory, Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
used data from 266 US firms from 1970 to 1980 and found a significant positive relationship 
between an increase in the number of independent directors and firm performance. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) similarly found a significant reaction between stock prices and 
the appointment of independent directors in the US. Millstein and MacAvory (1998), using a 
sample of 154 large public US firms between 1991 and 1995, found that active and 
independent boards had a positive and significant impact on firm performance.    
However, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Coles et al. (2001) investigated the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance in the US and found a negative 
association between these variables.  Furthermore, another stream of research found that no 
significant relationship existed between the number of independent directors and firm 
performance. For example, in the UK, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) used data from 250 
firms traded in 1994 and reported that the number of independent directors had no impact on 
firm performance, as measured by market-to-book (MB) ratio. Similarly, Dalton et al. (2008) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 54 empirical studies on board composition and firm 
performance and found no relationship between them.  
Other recent studies have proposed that the effectiveness of corporate governance, more 
specifically the monitoring function of the agency theory, may not work effectively under 
certain conditions and, rather, may be contingent on many organisational, environmental and 
economical characteristics (Aguilera and Desender, 2012; Boyd, 1995; Dowell et al., 2011; 
Desender et al., 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Minichilli et al., 
2015), which may explain the variations in results described in the previous paragraph. For 
example, Gupta et al. (2012) argued that corporate governance outcome is contingent on the 
industry context, whereas Chen et al. (2011) argued that effective governance is contingent 
on national economic development. Desender et al. (2013) and Minichilli et al. (2015) 
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contended that effective governance is contingent on ownership structure, and Daily and 
Dalton (1994) found that firms that went bankrupt usually had fewer independent directors. 
Furthermore, Dowell et al. (2011) contended that there is no one-size-fits-all scheme, and 
board independence is only valuable during financially distressed periods. Dowell et al. 
(2011) used data from 227 US public Internet firms to test the relationship between board 
characteristics (including board independence) and firm survival during the collapse of the 
Internet bubble between 2000 and 2002 and reported that board independence had a 
significant role in reducing firms’ financial distress, but only during times when financial 
distress was high.  
iii. CEO Duality 
Another vital corporate governance characteristic is CEO duality. CEO duality has been 
attributed to many corporate failures in the last decade (Jackling and Johl, 2009). Many 
governments around the world have adopted codes for CEO duality. For example, the UK 
code clearly states that ‘The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by 
the same individual’ (e.g., the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010, 2012, 2014 and 
2016; the Combined Code of 2003, 2006 and 2008). However, the essence of this statement is 
not compulsory; under any circumstances, any company might not comply with this 
statement and give explanations for its noncompliance. In the US, there is no such code for 
CEO duality.     
Theoretically, two main theories have dominated the literature in addressing the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance: the agency theory and the stewardship theory. 
Under the agency theory perspective, the assumption is that duality leads to less board 
monitoring and more CEO power (Dalton et al., 1998; Dayton, 1984; Finkelstein et al., 1994; 
Jensen, 1993); therefore, the board should be separated from the management to improve its 
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monitoring role and reduce agency costs and CEO entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
If the functions of chairman and CEO are not separated, firm performance might be affected 
adversely (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Additionally, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported that non-duality of CEO and chairman increases the 
likelihood of board independence and better monitoring of the executive team. Also, 
separating the role of CEO and chairman might enable the board to terminate poorly 
performing CEOs (Jensen, 1993; Monks and Minow, 2004). 
However, the stewardship theory assumes that CEOs are far from being ‘an opportunistic 
shirker’ and are good enough to do their work as steward of the company’s assets (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). Additionally, CEO duality may lead to less conflict in decision making 
(Davis et al., 1997) and help the board make faster decisions (Essen et al., 2013). Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) stated that CEO duality enables a board to reduce the remuneration of top 
management, and it also increases accountability when a company performs poorly (Bozec, 
2005).  
A number of empirical studies have used both theories to address the relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance (e.g. Adams et al., 2005; Dahya et al., 2009; Daily and 
Dalton, 1994; Dalton et al., 1999; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Rechner and Dalton, 1989). 
Yet, the results from these studies vary. Initially, Rechner and Dalton (1989) investigated the 
impact of CEO duality on firm performance and found that no relationship existed; however, 
later, Rechner and Dalton (1991) used the same sample and period but with different 
measures of firm performance (ROI, ROE and profit margin). In the second study, the 
researchers found a negative effect occurring between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Daily and Dalton (1994) also found that duality had a negative effect on firm performance. 
Likewise, Worrell et al. (1997) reported that firms that consolidate the roles of CEO and 
chairman showed a negative relationship with their financial performance. Furthermore, 
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Adams et al. (2005) found that a CEO who performed dual roles had more power and could 
influence the decisions of other members of the board, leading them to report that CEO 
duality has a negative impact on corporate performance.  
Nevertheless, a considerable number of other empirical studies have found a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. For example, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) used the stewardship theory as an alternative to the agency theory to explain the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. In doing so, the researchers found 
that companies with CEO duality have better performance. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
revealed a positive association when the CEO and chairman roles were consolidated in 
Australia. In the US, Dey et al. (2011) found that negative firm performance was associated 
with firms that separate the CEO and chairman roles due to regulatory and governance 
pressures. Furthermore, in the UK, Dahya et al. (2009) found no absolute improvement in 
firm performance when firms changed board structures from duality to non-duality because 
of Cadbury Committee Report pressures. Yang and Zhao (2014) revealed that firms with the 
duality structure outperformed firms with non-duality when competitive environments 
changed.  
Still, other empirical studies on CEO duality have reported neither a positive nor negative 
effect on firm performance. For example, Brickley et al. (1997) argued that the decision to 
combine or separate the roles of CEO and chairman carries both potential costs and benefits, 
and they found that the costs of separating the roles were higher than the benefits of duality 
for most large firms. Baliga et al. (1996) found that changes in duality had no effect on firm 
performance, as did Dalton et al. (1998), who used a meta-analysis of 31 studies on duality 
and corporate performance. Similarly, Bozec (2005) reported no correlation between duality 
and firm performance in Canada. 
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A new stream of research has argued that the relationship between governance practices and 
firm performance, including CEO duality, is not consistently beneficial but contingent on 
other factors, such as firm, organisational and economic characteristics (Aguilera and 
Desender, 2012; Boyd, 1995; Desender et al., 2013; Dowell et al., 2011; Essen et al., 2013; 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Minichilli et al., 2015). There is clear evidence that CEO 
duality can be favourable under particular conditions, such as low munificence and high 
uncertainty (Boyd, 1995; Dowell et al., 2011; Essen et al., 2013; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994; Harris and Helfat 1998). For example, by using data from 192 US firms, Boyd (1995) 
found a positive and significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
when the surrounding environments were classified by low munificence and high uncertainty. 
Also, Dowell et al. (2011) provided different reasons why CEO power is beneficial during 
times of financial crisis. First, reactions to sudden changes are well managed under CEO 
duality. Second, CEOs with great power may have more incentive to avoid the ‘stigma of 
failure’. Finally, concentrated CEO power could result in extreme decisions, which the 
researchers argued was beneficial during financial crisis.  
3.4 Research Gaps 
Most of the previous studies discussed regarding say-on-pay voting focused on the 
antecedents and implications of the approach. The studies on the antecedents of say-on-pay 
voting found higher CEO remuneration, greater firm performance, larger firm size, weaker 
corporate governance and heterogeneity of institutional investors among the factors most 
influential on say-on-pay dissent voting (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Cai and Walking, 2011; Carter 
and Zamora, 2009; Conyon, 2016; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2013; Kimbro 
and Xu, 2016; Sauerward et al., 2016; Stathopoulos and Voulgris, 2016).  Additionally, the 
studies concerning the implications of say-on-pay voting supported the idea that high say-on-
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pay dissent voting was effective in reducing future CEO remuneration (e.g. Alissa, 2015; 
Balsam et al., 2015; Ferri and Maber, 2013; Kimbro and Xu 2016). 
Regarding board diversity, studies have focused mainly on board characteristics and the 
benefits of diversity, the relationship between diversity and risk taking and the relationship 
between diversity and firm performance. However, the influence of diversity on say-on-pay 
voting is still unexplored. The presence of female directors on a board might bring different 
skills and knowledge to the table (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hillman et al., 1997; Nielsen 
and Huse, 2010; Singh et al., 2008). Female directors are also believed to be tough monitors 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and more independent from the management (Peck et al., 2007). 
This independence may enable female directors to evaluate and monitor the arrangement of 
executive remuneration carefully and enable the board to produce decisions that lead to less 
extreme executive remuneration.  
Additionally, none of the previous studies examined the impact of nationality diversity or 
foreign directors on say-on-pay voting. Foreign directors are found to be useful in the 
advisory role, especially for companies that operate or have plans to expand internationally. 
Although, foreign directors might be less effective in the monitoring role, which may lead to 
excessive CEO remuneration, thereby upsetting the shareholders. These factors create another 
research gap that this study can investigate. 
Research on the relationship between say-on-pay voting and board characteristics has mainly 
been conducted at the board level, not the committee level. However, many decisions related 
to executive remuneration are made by the remuneration committee (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Daily et al., 1998). Thus, it is important to focus on the remuneration committee level, 
rather than the board level, when it comes to executive remuneration. Kent et al. (2016) made 
the first attempt to examine some characteristics of the remuneration committee and say-on-
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pay voting in Australia. Specifically, Kent et al. (2016) investigated the impact of 
remuneration committee size and independence on shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay 
votes and found mixed results. Following a few previous studies (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Daily et al., 1998), this research focuses on the remuneration committees and 
investigates whether the presence of female and foreign directors has an impact on 
shareholder dissent voting via the say-on-pay approach.  
On the relationship between remuneration committee characteristics and CEO pay 
prospective, Bugeja et al. (2015) made the first attempt to address the issue of female 
directors on remuneration committees and their impact on CEO remuneration in the US. 
Specifically, Bugeja et al. (2015) found that the presence of women on firms’ remuneration 
committees had a negative effect on CEO remuneration. Also, in the US, Masulis et al. 
(2012) was the first study to investigate whether a larger presence of foreign directors on 
remuneration committees led to higher CEO remuneration. Therefore, following Bugeja et al. 
(2015) and Masulis et al. (2012), this research examines the relationship between the 
presence of female and foreign directors on remuneration committees and CEO remuneration 
in the UK.    
Although previous studies have investigated the links among the presence of a remuneration 
committee, the proportion of independent directors on the remuneration committee and 
executive remuneration (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998), there are other 
important remuneration committee characteristics that have yet to be explored, such as 
diversity.  
In summary, this research is different from previous research in many ways. First, this study 
is the first to examine how a diverse remuneration committee, in terms of the inclusion of 
female and foreign directors, can impact shareholder dissent voting via the say-on-pay 
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approach. Additionally, this study investigates whether the presence of female and foreign 
directors on firms’ remuneration committees has an effect on CEO pay in the UK. 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter is devoted to the literature review and is divided into two parts: the theoretical 
framework of corporate governance and the empirical work addressing previous studies in the 
area of say-on-pay voting, CEO remuneration, board diversity and board characteristics. The 
theoretical framework section covers the most significant theories in corporate governance 
literature, such as the agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, critical mass 
theory and the resource dependence theory.  
The empirical portion identifies and discusses previous studies that address the determinants 
and implications of say-on-pay voting. These studies found that higher CEO pay, poor firm 
performance, larger firm size and weak boardroom governance are the most prominent 
antecedents that impact say-on-pay dissent voting. Also, this chapter reports literature related 
to CEO remuneration, board diversity and other board characteristics. A common feature 
about these studies is a variation in results. The next chapter highlights the research 
hypotheses.         
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has highlighted the theoretical framework of corporate governance and 
the literature on say-on-pay, CEO remuneration and remuneration committee, board gender 
diversity, foreign directors and board characteristics. Addressing the theoretical and empirical 
literature helps to identify research gap and to pave the way for research hypotheses 
development. Therefore, this chapter aims to develop different hypotheses addressing the 
impact of women and foreign directors on CEO pay and say-on-pay dissent voting (see 
Figure 4.1 for the summary of hypotheses development). Higher women representation on 
remuneration committees is expected to lower CEO pay and say-on-pay dissent voting, 
whereas a higher presence of foreign directors on UK remuneration committees is assumed to 
lead to higher CEO pay and higher shareholder dissatisfaction via say-on-pay. 
Figure 4.1 Hypotheses Development Structure 
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4.2 CEO Pay, Say-on-Pay and Women Directors on Remuneration Committees 
The agency model addresses conflicts that may arise between management (agent) and 
shareholders (principals), where the agent may misuse the delegation given to them by the 
principals to make some decisions in their own self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Prior studies of say-on-pay, building on the agency model, have argued that shareholders’ 
dissent on the remuneration report is the result of high executive remuneration (e.g., Alissa, 
2015; Conyon, 2016; Conyon and Sadler, 2010). The board of directors plays an internal role 
in mitigating such conflicts between agents and principals by monitoring and by advising 
management for example on strategic decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al. (2003) argue that gender diverse boards can 
enhance the monitoring role of the board. Previous studies have shown many reasons why 
women directors can be more effective monitors. For example, women on boards are more 
likely to be independent directors than male directors, and are thus more effective monitors 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003). In addition, Pan and Sparks (2012) contend 
that women directors are firmer than male directors when it comes to implementing moral 
standards on the board. Furthermore, women directors are more likely to consider dubious 
business transactions unethical (Franke et al., 1997). Cumming et al. (2015) also find that 
women directors are less likely to commit fraud. Women directors are also stronger when it 
comes to implementing their fiduciary duties (Post and Byron, 2015). Additionally, women 
directors have been found to come to meetings better prepared than their male counterparts 
(Huse and Solberg, 2006) and to change the boardroom dynamics (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2003). Firms with more women on board encourage more effective board 
communication between the board and its stakeholders (Terjesen et al., 2009). Konrad et al. 
(2008) find that women directors are better listeners than male directors, more likely to raise 
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tough questions on remuneration matters and more willing ‘to put someone’s welfare before 
their own’ and thus, gender-diverse boards suffer less from groupthink (Chen et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, a few recent studies show that women can increase the effectiveness of board 
sub-committees. Among them, Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that firms with more women on 
audit committees exhibit higher earnings quality which increases investor confidence in 
firms’ financial statements. Moreover, a recent study by Bugejia et al. (2015) finds that 
women on remuneration committees in the US lead to lower CEO pay and reduce excess 
CEO compensation. 
Given that gender differences may be associated with more efficient monitoring due to 
different mind-sets, experiences, skills, knowledge and values, this research assumes that the 
presence of women on remuneration committees helps to decrease the chances of extremely 
high executive remuneration in order to align the interests of shareholders and managers. 
Shareholders are then more likely to be satisfied and hence they are more likely to vote in 
favour of remuneration reports via say-on-pay. Accordingly, the following two hypotheses 
are presented: 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the presence of women on the remuneration committee, the lower 
the proportion of shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay. 
Hypothesis 2. The greater the presence of women on the remuneration committee, the lower 
the CEO pay. 
Several studies on board diversity based on the critical mass theory contend that until women 
in a group reach a certain threshold, they are more likely to be marginalised (e.g. Joecks et 
al., 2013; Kanter, 1977; Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). In particular, they argue 
that a single female director on a board largely dominated by male directors tends not to be 
trusted and is more likely to be viewed as a token (Torchia et al., 2011) and her influence on 
 
 
93 
 
board decision-making tends to be limited (Liu et al., 2014). Coherently, several recent 
studies show, for example, that only having three or more women directors on boards 
increases firm outcomes as only one or two are not sufficient (e.g. Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et 
al., 2014; Torchia et al., 2011).  
Given that, this study also assumes that the presence of only one woman in a remuneration 
committee largely dominated by male directors may have no impact on say-on-pay dissent 
voting, but rather it suggests that when two or more9 women directors sit on the remuneration 
committee, the more acceptable to shareholders the remuneration policy and then the lower 
the shareholders dissent votes via say-on-pay. Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
suggested: 
Hypothesis 3. Firms with two or more women on their remuneration committees have a 
negative impact on shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay. 
Hypothesis 4. Firms with two or more women on their remuneration committees have a 
negative impact on CEO pay. 
4.3 CEO Pay, Say-on-Pay and Foreign Directors on Remuneration Committees 
Previous studies on say-on-pay have mainly used the agency model to address that the 
shareholders’ dissent on the remuneration report is the result of high executive remuneration 
(Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2015; 2016). The agency model addresses conflicts that may 
arise between management (agent) and shareholders (principals) when the agent may misuse 
the delegation given to them by the principals to make decisions in their own self-interest 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The board of directors plays an internal role in mitigating such 
                                                          
9 Since no previous studies have used critical mass theory on board sub-committees, this research suggests 
that the critical mass (threshold) is 2 given size of the remuneration committee (mean of 4, see chapter 6).  
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conflicts between agents and principals by monitoring and advising management on strategic 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The presence of foreign directors on corporate boards also has pros and cons (Frijns et al., 
2016; Masulis et al., 2012; Milliken and Martins, 1996). Foreign directors can provide their 
firms with valuable international expertise, which may benefit the firm; for example, if the 
firm has plans for expansion abroad (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). However, Milliken and 
Martins (1996) argued that nationality diversity may lead to less effective communication and 
more misunderstanding between directors and therefore more conflicts among directors. 
Moreover, Masulis et al. (2012) have also shown that foreign directors on a corporate board 
are less effective in monitoring executive directors, leading to negative firm performance and 
excessive CEO remuneration. Specifically, Masulis et al. (2012) have provided several reason 
why foreign directors may lack effective monitoring. First reason is due to the geographic 
distance between the directors’ home country and the local firms’ headquarters. Second 
justification is that foreign directors have less access information about local companies (such 
as company’s current operation and performance). Final reason is that foreign directors are 
less familiar with local country accounting rules and regulations. Hahn and Lasfer (2016) also 
argued that foreign directors seeing their roles as ‘more advisory than monitoring’.  
Therefore, this study assumes that the appointment of foreign directors to a board’s 
remuneration committee can signal ineffective monitoring and higher CEO remuneration. 
Ultimately, this might result in decreased satisfaction among the firm’s shareholders; hence, 
they might vote against the firm’s remuneration report. Thus, the following two hypotheses 
are proposed:  
Hypothesis 5. The greater the presence of foreign directors on UK remuneration committees, 
the higher the proportion of shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay. 
 
 
95 
 
Hypothesis 6. The greater the presence of foreign directors on UK remuneration committees, 
the higher the CEO pay. 
Several board diversity studies based on the critical mass theory have argued that minority 
groups are more likely to be marginalised by the dominant group, not trusted and viewed as a 
token (Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). However, as the size of minorities grows to a 
certain threshold, they will gain more trust and will have increased influence on decision 
making (Kanter, 1977). Studies based on the critical mass theory have mainly addressed 
gender diversity; more specifically, they have investigated whether having three or more 
women directors on boards increases firm outcomes, as only one or two is insufficient (e.g. 
Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Torchia et al., 2011). Therefore, this research assumes 
that the presence of only one foreign director in a remuneration committee largely dominated 
by local directors may have no impact on say-on-pay dissent voting; however, it is suggested 
that when two or more foreign directors sit on the remuneration committee, the less 
acceptable the remuneration policy will be to shareholders, resulting in more shareholder 
dissent votes via say-on-pay. Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 7. Firms with two or more foreign directors on their remuneration committees 
are associated with higher shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay. 
Hypothesis 8. Firms with two or more foreign directors on their remuneration committees 
are associated with higher CEO pay. 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted the development of research hypotheses. In total eight 
hypotheses have been constructed to meet the main objectives of this research. The first 
hypothesis relates to the relationship between the presence of female directors on firms’ 
remuneration committees and CEO pay. The second hypothesis addresses the impact of 
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female directors on remuneration committees on shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting. 
Similarly, Hypothesis 3 tests the impact of two or more women on remuneration committees 
on say-on-pay dissent voting. The relationships between foreign directors on remuneration 
committees and CEO pay and say-on-pay voting are investigated in Hypotheses 4 and 5, 
respectively. Finally, Hypothesis 6 examines whether two or more foreign directors on 
remuneration committees have an influence on say-on-pay dissent voting. 
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CHAPTER V: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted this study’s research hypotheses. This chapter’s main 
purpose is to explore the research methodology implemented. First, the chapter highlights the 
study’s general research design and philosophy. Next, the chapter provides a full description 
of the data and study period. The chapter’s third section is devoted to defining the dependent 
and independent variables investigated, while the final section describes the statistical 
techniques used in this study.   
5.2 Research Design and Philosophy 
A research design is a plan for collecting, measuring and analysing data (Gray, 2014). There 
are mainly three types of research designs: quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods. 
Distinguishing between quantitative and qualitative is based on the kind of information used 
to address a phenomenon; quantitative research uses mainly numbers and figures (numeric 
information), whereas qualitative research relies on words, sentences and narratives (non-
numeric information; Blumberg et al., 2014). However, this distinction is extremely narrow. 
Thus, determining which research design is more appropriate is dependent on associations to 
philosophical assumptions (Creswell, 2014). Qualitative research primarily follows 
interpretivism (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), whereas quantitative research follows positivism 
(Saunders et al., 2012). The basic difference between interpretivism and positivism is that the 
positivist researcher sees the world as external and objective, whereas the interpretivist 
researcher believes the world is socially constructed and subjective (Gray, 2014). In 
interpretivism, the researcher focuses on meanings (opinion-seeking), as opposed to 
positivism, in which the researcher focuses on facts (truth-seeking). Additionally, positivism 
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follows a deductive approach (testing theory); however, interpretivism follows the inductive 
approach (generation of theory; Bryman, 2012).  
This research uses the quantitative approach for several reasons. First, this research utilises 
secondary panel data collected from well-known databases; therefore, it is more appropriate 
to use a quantitative approach. For example, most of the data required for answering the 
research questions involve voting, the characteristics of the board and financial information, 
and it is difficult to obtain these data using a qualitative approach. Second, this research uses 
longitudinal data from 2003 to 2015; therefore, it is impracticable to use a qualitative 
approach. Furthermore, as shown in chapter three, most of the previous research in this area 
of corporate governance used a quantitative methodology (also, see Boyd et al., 2017).  
5.3 Data and Sample Period     
This research uses unbalanced panel data from the UK’s FTSE 350 non-financial firms over 
the period spanning 2003–2015. Panel data is defined as a pool of cross-sectional 
observations performed over different time periods (Baltagi, 2001). Using panel data has 
many benefits, such as controlling for individual heterogeneity, being more informative, 
having less collinearity between variables and enjoying a greater degree of freedom (Baltagi, 
2001). Boyd et al. (2017) find that 58% of corporate governance research10 in 2015 used 
panel data. The UK FTSE 350 index includes the largest companies in the UK and represents 
approximately 97% of the UK’s market capitalisation. This study excludes financial firms 
(including banks, investment, insurance, real estate and financial institution firms) due to 
many reasons. First, financial firms are heavily regulated and have different financial 
reporting formats. Financial firms also have different governance arrangements (Goh and 
Gupta, 2016). Furthermore, financial firms are known for their high executive remuneration, 
                                                          
10 Research published in the Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR).  
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which may skew the results (Bugeja et al., 2015). Table 5.1 shows the summary of sample 
size by year and industry.   
A significant reason for choosing the period 2003 - 2015 is that the availability of shareholder 
voting data on say-on-pay began in the financial year ending in 2003. This period also 
witnessed many reforms in the UK corporate governance regime, such as the Higgs Report 
(2003), the Walker Review (2009), the Stewardship Code (2010) and the Davies Report 
(2011), as well as a major financial crisis in 2007.  
After excluding financial firms and firms with missing voting data, this study’s final sample 
comprised 2,935 firm-year observations. This study uses multiple data sources. Boyd et al. 
(2017) report that 75% of papers published in the CGIR utilised multiple data databases. Data 
on shareholder voting on directors’ remuneration were obtained from Manifest Information 
Services Ltd. Data on remuneration committee characteristics (such as the number of women, 
nationality of directors, size of committee and proportion of independent directors), CEO 
compensation and other board characteristics were collected from the BoardEx database. 
Institutional ownership data were obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, 
whereas financial data (such as total assets, sales, return on assets and stock returns) came 
from Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
5.4 Models and Research Variables of the Study 
This section illustrates models used for the empirical study and identifies the study’s 
dependent and independent variables. Table5.2summarises the research variables the current 
study used. The proceeding sub-sections provide more details about the models and research 
variables. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Sample Size by Year and Industry 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total  
Initial sample-FTSE 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 4550 
Financial firms and 
missing data 
172 142 122 115 118 112 111 112 112 121 118 123 137 1615 
Net sample by year 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 213 2935 
Basic Materials  12 12 15 15 16 18 19 20 26 27 24 22 19 244 
Industrials  52 62 69 69 68 70 69 64 63 62 64 60 58 830 
Health Care 8 9 11 13 12 12 12 11 10 11 12 14 14 149 
Oil and Gas 12 12 15 16 15 15 16 16 16 13 13 13 11 183 
Consumer Services 50 62 63 69 71 72 70 73 70 66 69 69 66 870 
Consumer Goods 22 24 24 25 23 24 25 24 22 22 24 26 26 311 
Technology 11 14 16 15 15 15 16 16 16 14 13 10 6 177 
Telecommunications 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 6 7 7 6 6 6 58 
Utilities 10 11 12 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 113 
Net sample by industry 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 213 2935 
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Table 5.2 Summary of Research Variables 
Sr Variable Definition Source Model 
Say-on-Pay Variables 
1 Log dissent  Total number of shareholders against 
votes on the remuneration report 
divided by the total number of votes 
cast (transferred using ln (
Dissentit
1−Dissentit
)). 
Manifest  1 
2 Dissent > 10% An indicator variable of 1 if the dissent 
voting is greater than 10%, 0 
otherwise. 
Manifest 1 
CEO Pay Variables 
3 Log total CEO pay Natural logarithm of total CEO 
remuneration which includes cash, and 
equity linked remuneration. 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
4 Log CEO cash pay Natural logarithm of CEO’s salary, 
bonus and other annual cash 
compensation.  
BoardEx 2 
5 Log CEO equity Natural logarithm of CEO’s equity 
linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). 
BoardEx 2 
6 Log CEO bonus Natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus 
remuneration.  
BoardEx 2 
Main Variables 
7 Women % Total number of women directors over 
the remuneration committee size.  
BoardEx 1 & 2 
8 Foreign directors % Total number of foreign directors over 
the remuneration committee size. 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
9 Women = 1 An indicator variable of 1 if a 
remuneration committee has only one 
woman, 0 otherwise.  
BoardEx 1 
10 Women ≥ 2 An indicator variable of 1 if a 
remuneration committee has two or 
more women, 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 1 
11 Foreign director = 1 An indicator variable of 1 if a 
remuneration committee has only one 
foreign director, 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 1 
12 Foreign directors ≥ 2 An indicator variable of 1 if a 
remuneration committee has two or 
more foreign directors, 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 1 
Control Variables  
13 Institutional 
ownership % 
Percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors holding more 
than 3% of the firm’s equity. 
Eikon 1 & 2 
14 Board size Total number of directors on the board. BoardEx 1 & 2 
15 Remuneration 
committee size 
Total number of directors on the 
remuneration committee. 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
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16 Board independence 
% 
Fraction of non-executive independent 
directors. 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
17 Remuneration 
committee 
independence % 
Fraction of independent, non-executive 
directors on the remuneration 
committee. 
 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
18 CEO duality An indicator variable of 1 if the CEO is 
both the CEO and a chair of the firm, 0 
otherwise. 
BoardEx 1 & 2 
19 Log CEO tenure  Natural logarithm of number of years a 
CEO serve on board. 
BoardEx 2 
20 Log total sales Natural log of firms’ total returns. DataStream 1 & 2 
21 Foreign sales % Percentage of total sales that come 
from a foreign country’s operation. 
DataStream 2 
22 Return on assets 
(ROA) 
An accounting measure of firm 
performance and measured as firms’ 
income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. 
DataStream 1 & 2 
23 Stock return % A market measure of firm performance 
and defined as is stock price 
appreciation plus dividends. 
DataStream 1 & 2 
24 Market to book value 
(MBV) 
Average equity market value divided 
by total book value of equity. 
DataStream 1 & 2 
25 Leverage % Total debt to total assets.  
 
DataStream 1 & 2 
26 Price volatility % Stock’s average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year. 
DataStream 1 & 2 
Time and industry controls 
27 Post 2007 An indictor to account for the impact 
of financial crisis.  
 
 1 & 2 
28 Post 2010 An indictor to account for the impact 
of Stewardship Code. 
 
 1 & 2 
29 Post 2011 An indictor to account for the impact 
of Davies Report (2011).  
 
 1 & 2 
30 Post 2013 An indictor to account for the impact 
of say-on-pay mandatory and binding 
voting 
 1 & 2 
31 Year dummies An indictor to control macroeconomic 
shocks over study period. 
 
 1 & 2 
32 Industry dummies An indictor to control inter-industry 
specific effects 
DataStream 1 & 2 
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5.4.1 Models  
This study uses the following panel data model to investigate the impact of women and 
foreign directors on remuneration committees regarding say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO 
remuneration. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3−17𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3−17𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2)                                                                                                
5.4.2 Definitions of dependent variables 
The dependent variable in model (1) is shareholder dissent via say-on-pay (Dissent), which is 
measured as the total number of shareholders’ against votes on the remuneration report 
divided by the total number of votes cast (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). As stated by Conyon 
(2016), the OLS estimator alone is inappropriate, as it only predicts probabilities outside the 
range of zero to one. Conyon (2016) has suggested a logistic transformation to Dissent in the 
above model and then estimating using OLS. Thus, Dissent in model (1) has been transferred 
to: 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ln (
Dissentit
1−Dissentit
). An alternative way to overcome the problem is to use 
the logistic model of the generalised linear model. Therefore, this study uses another measure 
for the shareholder dissent vote and follows the method of Gregory-Smith et al. (2014), using 
a 10% dissent cut-off. Thus, this study defines Dissent on model (1) as an indicator variable 
of 1 if the dissent voting is greater than 10% (Dissent > 10%), and the indicator variable is 0 
if otherwise. 
In model (2), the dependent variable is CEO remuneration (CEO pay). This study measures 
CEO pay using different measures, following Bugeja et al. (2015) and Masulis et al. (2012). 
The first measure is the log total CEO pay, which is the natural logarithm of total CEO 
remuneration, including cash, and equity-linked remuneration. Log CEO cash pay is the 
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second measure of CEO pay and is defined as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s salary, 
bonuses and other annual cash compensation. The third measure of CEO pay is log CEO 
equity, which is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s equity-linked remuneration (restricted 
stock and options granted). The final measure of CEO pay is log CEO bonus pay, which is 
the natural logarithm of the CEO’s bonus remuneration. 
5.4.3 The main independent variables  
The main independent variable in models (1) and (2) is the presence of women and foreign 
directors on remuneration committees, which is measured as follows:  
 Women is defined as the proportion of the total number of women directors over the 
remuneration committee size.  
 Foreign directors is measured as the proportion of the total number of foreign 
directors over the remuneration committee size.  
In model (1), this study also measures firms with one woman or one foreign director on their 
remuneration committees and firms with two or more women or foreign directors. Hence, the 
following additional measures are suggested:  
 Women = 1 is an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has only one 
woman, and the indicator variable is 0 if otherwise.  
 Women ≥ 2 is an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has two or more 
women, and the indicator variable is 0 if otherwise.  
 Foreign director = 1 is an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has 
only one foreign director, and the indicator variable is 0 if otherwise. 
 Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has 
two or more foreign directors, and the indicator variable is 0 if otherwise. 
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5.4.4 Control variables  
Based on previous say-on-pay and CEO-pay literature, models (1) and (2) include different 
control variables. These variables include corporate governance and firm characteristics, 
which are summarised as follows: 
 Log CEO pay is a natural log of the total remuneration, which is the sum of cash 
remuneration and equity-linked pay. Previous studies have found that higher CEO 
remuneration leads to higher say-on-pay dissention (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Carter and 
Zamora, 2008; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014; Ferri and 
Maber, 2013). This variable is used as another explanatory variable in model (1).  
 Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
holding more than 3% of the firm’s equity. Ownership structure is found to be another 
important element in controlling executive directors’ remuneration (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003). Shareholders with large ownership stakes and institutional investors 
have more incentives to monitor executive directors effectively (van Essen et al., 
2015). Many previous studies have shown that an effective ownership structure (e.g. 
higher concentrated ownership and higher institutional ownership) led to less CEO 
remuneration (e.g. Benz et al., 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; van Essen et al., 2015). For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) 
used data from 51 of the largest US oil firms from 1977 to 1994 and found that firms 
with lower concentrated ownership had CEOs who were more likely to get higher 
‘lack’ remuneration. Similarly, Benz et al. (2001) reported that companies with higher 
concentrated ownership had fewer options-based remuneration. As for say-on-pay 
literature, it is expected that the greater institutional ownership, the more shareholders 
will dissent on say-on-pay (Conyon, 2016). Additionally, previous CEO-pay literature 
reported that firms with more institutional ownership are less likely to have higher 
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CEO remuneration (e.g. Hartzell and Starks, 2002; Ozkan, 2007; van Essen et al., 
2015). 
 Board size is the total number of directors on the board. Large boards are subject to 
more coordination problems (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), which shareholders may 
view negatively (Conyon, 2016; Sauerwald et al., 2016). Firms with larger board sizes 
also tend to have higher CEO remuneration (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; van 
Essen et al., 2015). Specifically, in the US, Armstrong and Ittner (2012) found that 
firms with larger board size were more likely to have higher executive remuneration. 
Similarly, van Essen et al. (2015) used a meta-analysis of 219 US studies that 
investigated the determinants of CEO remuneration and found that larger board size 
had positive influence on CEO pay. In contrast, Ryan and Wiggins (2004), in the US, 
found that firms with larger board size tended to have lower CEO remuneration.   
 Remuneration committee size is the total number of directors on the remuneration 
committee. 
 Board independence is the fraction of non-executive independent directors. Boards 
with more independent directors are perceived to be more able to monitor self-
interested CEOs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, shareholders may view 
independent boards positively, as such boards provide more effective monitoring 
(Conyon, 2016; Sauerwald et al., 2016). On the other hand, Coles et al. (2014) 
investigated the reasons why not all independent directors were effective monitors 
and why their presence on boards may have led to higher CEO remuneration using a 
data set from US companies from 1996 to 2010. Coles et al. (2014) defined all 
independent directors who had been selected by the CEO (when the CEO was present 
on the remuneration committee) as ‘co-opted’ directors. These researchers found that 
firms with higher co-opted directors tended to have higher CEO pay. This result is 
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consistent with a previous finding by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), who also 
found that involvement of CEOs in selecting independent directors can lead to higher 
CEO entrenchment.   
 Remuneration committee independence is the fraction of independent, non-executive 
directors on the remuneration committee. Many decisions related to executive 
remuneration are made by the remuneration committee (Daily et al., 1998). A few 
previous studies examined the characteristics of remuneration committees possibly 
associated with CEO remuneration. For example, Conyon and Peck (1998) reported 
that the independence of remuneration committees in the UK had a limited effect on 
executive pay. Furthermore, in the UK, Gregory-Smith (2012) found no support for 
the relationship between the independence of the remuneration committee and CEO 
remuneration. Similarly, in the US, Daily et al. (1998) found no evidence that the 
independence of the remuneration committee affected CEO pay. 
 CEO duality is an indicator variable of 1 if the CEO is both the CEO and a chair of 
the firm, and the indicator variable is 0 if otherwise. Prior say-on-pay literature has 
found that CEO duality leads to more shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting 
(Conyon, 2016). Core et al. (1999) argued that CEO duality increases the CEO power 
over executive remuneration determination. Previous CEO-pay studies have found 
that firms with CEO duality tend to have higher CEO remuneration (Armstrong and 
Ittner, 2012; Core et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 2002; van Essen et al., 2015). However, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) found that CEO duality has no influence on CEO 
remuneration.  
 Log total sales is a natural log of firms’ total returns. This variable has been used to 
proxy firm size (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2013). 
Larger firms are more visible than small firms and, thus, are more subject to be 
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targeted by shareholders (Cai and Walkling, 2011). Furthermore, firm size reveals the 
complexity of large firms’ activities and operation (Goh and Gupta, 2016; Murphy, 
1999). Therefore, firm size is found to be one of the most important determinants of 
CEO remuneration (Conyon, 1997). This may suggest that large companies are more 
likely to pay their CEOs more (Core et al., 1999), as the labour market for talented 
and experienced CEOs is extremely competitive (Conyon et al., 2016).  
 Return on assets (ROA) is an accounting measure of firm performance and is 
measured as firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
Previous studies have found that shareholders are more likely to vote against say-on-
pay when firm performance is low (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Conyon, 2016; Ferri and Maber, 
2013). However, prior CEO-pay studies have found that firms with higher 
performance pay their CEOs more (Masulis et al., 2012; van Essen et al., 2015). 
 Stock return is a market measure of firm performance and is defined as stock price 
appreciation plus dividends. It is expected that less stock return leads to more 
shareholder dissent via say-on-pay (Conyon, 2016).  
 Market to book value (MBV) is average equity market value divided by total book 
value of equity. This measure is used to control for future expected financial 
performance (Sauerwald et al., 2016). 
 Leverage is defined as the proportion of total debt to total assets. Leverage ratio is 
used as a proxy for firm risk. Harris and Raviv (1979) addressed that firm leverage 
affect the determination of executive remuneration. Also, Jensen (1986) reported that 
higher leverage might lead firm not perform well.  
 Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year. Masulis et al. (2012) have used stock price volatility as a 
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proxy for firm risk. Masulis et al. (2012) argued that a CEO may demand higher 
remunerations for taking extra firm risk.  
In addition, the following two control variables are used for model (2), based on prior studies: 
 Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm for the number of years a CEO served on a 
board. Prior literature has used CEO tenure to control for CEO power, suggesting the 
longer the CEO stayed on the board, the higher power the CEO may have over CEO 
pay determinations (Armstrong and Ittner, 2012; Bugeja, et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007). 
Also, Hill and Phan (1991) argued that CEOs’ longer tenure may lead them to 
exercise more control over the remuneration setting process in line with their 
preferences. Accordingly, CEOs respect, confidence, and vision is acquired consistent 
with the managerial power view of imposing more influence over the level and 
structure of their pay packages.  
 Foreign sales are defined as the percentage of total sales that come from a foreign 
country’s operation (Masulis et al., 2012). Specifically, Masulis et al. (2012) have 
used this measure, as companies with foreign operations may require talented and 
experienced CEOs. Thus, these CEOs may require higher remunerations ‘for 
managing more complex and geographically dispersed operations’. Masulis et al. 
(2012) found a significant and positive relationship between foreign sales and CEO 
pay.  
5.4.5 Time and industry control variables  
Finally, models (1) and (2) also contain different time events and industry control dummy 
variables: 
 Post-2007 is an indictor to account for the impact of the 2007 financial crisis.  
 
 
110 
 
 Post-2010 is an indictor to account for the impact of the Stewardship Code. The UK 
Stewardship Code was published in 2010, aiming to enhance institutional investors’ 
engagement with their investee companies. Thus, it is expected that the higher the 
shareholder engagement, the higher say-on-pay dissent voting and the lower the CEO 
pay.  
 Post-2011 is an indictor to account for the impact of the Davies Report (2011), which 
addressed women being under-represented on UK corporate boards. After the 
publication of the Davies Report (2011), the number of women in boardrooms has 
seen a dramatic increase.11  
 Post-2013 accounts for the impact of say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. From 
2002-2012, UK shareholders had an advisory vote on the director remuneration 
report; however, in 2013, the UK introduced a binding vote on executive 
remuneration policy.   
 Year dummies is set to control macroeconomic shocks over the study period (Conyon, 
2016).  
 Industry dummies is set to control inter-industry specific effects in say-on-pay voting 
and CEO pay (Armstrong and Ittner, 2012; Conyon, 2016; Conyon and Sadler, 2010).  
5.5 Statistical Techniques of the Study 
This section aims to illustrate the statistical techniques used in models (1) and (2). In model 
(1), two statistical techniques are used: ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic model (logit). 
In addition, propensity score matching is used to control the endogeneity of self-selection and 
causality problems in model (1), whereas the OLS model with logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable is used as a main estimation for model (2). Also, propensity score 
                                                          
11 See Chapter Six for results. 
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matching and two-step GMM are used to control for the endogeneity problem in model (2). 
The following sub-sections explain the specifications of these statistical techniques.     
5.5.1 OLS and logit models 
OLS is a liner probability model where the dependent variable is mainly continuous. The 
OLS model is simple to estimate but has some drawbacks (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2016). The OLS model’s main limitation is that it predicts probabilities outside 
the range between zero and one (error term in the OLS is not normally distributed), which is 
perceived as an inappropriate estimation (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008; Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge, 2016), and the partial impact of any independent variable is 
constant (Wooldridge, 2016).  
These OLS drawbacks can be overcome using different treatments. First, Greene (2008) has 
recommended using a logistic transformation of variables and then estimating using OLS. 
Using the robustness of standard errors after running the OLS model is another ideal solution 
for the non-normality problem (Baltagi, 2008; Wooldridge, 2016). In addition, the OLS 
limitations can be resolved using a binary outcome model (Baltagi, 2008; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2010; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2016). The logit model is one of the binary 
outcome models, which uses a binomial as the family function (Conyon, 2016), and the 
dependent variable is categorical (binary 0 or 1). The logit model does not require the error 
term to be normally distributed (Ohlson, 1980). Moreover, Boyd et al. (2017) report that there 
is an increasing numbers of corporate governance research employed logit or probit models.  
5.5.2 Propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching is one of the techniques used to deal with the endogeneity problem 
researchers face. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) were the first to develop propensity score 
matching. Li (2013) reported that the main purpose of using propensity score matching is to 
 
 
112 
 
mitigate the self-selection problem or bias related to different density weights with the OLS 
and logit models. Li (2013) defined a propensity score as ‘the probability of study 
participants receiving a treatment based on observed characteristics’. According to Greene 
(2008), ‘individuals with similar propensity scores are paired and the average treatment effect 
is then estimated by differences in outcomes’.  
In this research context, the identification strategy for propensity score matching is to find 
firms with identical characteristics, such as firm size, the number of women directors on the 
board and corporate governance characteristics and then compare the impacts of firms with 
women and firms without women on their remuneration committees regarding the firms’ say-
on-pay and CEO pay.  
5.5.3 Two-system GMM model   
Two-step generalised method of moments (two-system GMM, hereafter) is designed for 
panel analysis and, as reported by Roodman (2009), is ideal under the following 
circumstances: (1) when there is a large number of observations but a short time period; (2) 
when there is ‘a linear functional relationship’; (3) when the dependent variable is dynamic; 
(4) when the ‘independent variables are not strictly exogenous, meaning they are correlated 
with past and possibly current realizations of the error’; (5) when there are ‘ﬁxed individual 
effects’; and finally, (6) when there is ‘heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals but not across them’. Two-system GMM has been used in CEO-pay studies to 
address potential endogeneity problems (e.g. Gregory-Smith, 2012; Schultz et al. 2010). 
Therefore, this study also uses two-system GMM for model (2) to control for endogeneity 
problems.     
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5.6 Data winsorising and statistical software  
This study uses 98% winsorisation technique to avoid the possibility that this research results 
might affect by extreme observations and outliers. More specifically, the set of variables 
which are under 1% are set to the 1% level and those above 99% are set to the 99% level.  
As for statistical software package, this research uses Stata 14 software. Stata is generally the 
main statistical software used by academicians and researchers to store, manage, manipulate, 
and analyse panel data.  
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter details the study’s research methodology. The chapter opened by explaining the 
study’s research design and the philosophy implemented. Specifically, this research follows 
positivism and uses a quantitative research approach due to the nature and availability of the 
data required. Second, this chapter described the study’s data and sample period; FTSE 350 
non-financial companies over a period of 12 years (2003-2015) were used in this study. Thus, 
different types of data were collected, including say-on-pay voting data, CEO remuneration 
data, corporate governance data and firm characteristics data. Say-on-pay data were collected 
from the Manifest database; CEO remuneration and corporate governance characteristics 
were collected from BoardEx; firm characteristics were obtained from DataStream; and 
institutional ownership data were collected from Eikon. 
Third, this chapter reported the two models investigated in this study; the first model 
examines the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and the 
impact on say-on-pay dissent voting, whereas the second model addresses the relationship 
between the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and CEO 
pay. Fourth, this chapter explained the measurement of the dependent, independent and 
control variables. The main dependent variables in this study are say-on-pay dissent voting in 
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model (1) and CEO remuneration in model (2), while the main independent variable in 
models (1) and (2) is the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees. In both models, there were different control variables, including corporate 
governance and firm characteristics. 
Finally, this chapter illustrates the statistical techniques used in this research. Model (1) is 
addressed using the OLS model with logistic-transferred dependent variables and the logit 
model, whereas model (2) investigated using the OLS model with logistic-transferred 
dependent variables. Propensity score matching and two-system GMM are used to control for 
endogeneity problems.     
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CHAPTER VI: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter explained the research methodology, data and variables used in this 
research. This chapter aims to analyse and discuss the research findings. First, this chapter 
discusses descriptive statistics and trends of UK boards since 2003 (e.g. board size, board 
independence, CEO duality and board diversity), CEO remuneration and say-on-pay. This 
chapter’s second section discusses correlation analyses, which includes testing all research 
variables for autocorrelation and multi-collinearity problems. The final part of this chapter 
includes an analysis and discussion of empirical results.     
6.2 Time Series and Industry Analysis of UK Board Characteristics 
This section presents the evolution of board of directors’ characteristics by year and by 
industry for the UK’s FTSE350 firms from 2003 to 2015. Table 6.1 shows the summary of 
the time series descriptive statistics of each board characteristic. This section is organised by 
discussing the development of each board characteristic separately. 
6.2.1 Board size  
The UK Corporate Governance Codes (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) state that ‘The board 
should be of sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and that changes 
to the board’s composition and that of its committees can be managed without undue 
disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy’. Table 6.1 shows that the average 
board size for the entire sample period is 9.06 board members, where 18 was the maximum 
board size and five was the minimum board size recorded during the sample period. 
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Table 6.1 Time Series Descriptive Statistics of Board Characteristics for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms from 2003 to 2015 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Board Size          
Mean  9.33 9.15 9.16 9.09 9 8.93 8.8 8.89 9.06 9.14 9.16 9.1 9.09 9.06 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
SD 2.61 2.42 2.47 2.5 2.42 2.41 2.39 2.34 2.41 2.34 2.24 2.2 2.01 2.37 
Min 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Max 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 16 17 17 15 18 
N 177 207 227 234 231 237 238 237 237 228 231 226 211 2921 
Executive Directors %          
Mean  42 40.9 38.7 37.7 37 36 35.5 34.6 33.4 32.4 30.3 29.2 28.6 35 
Median 42.9 40 38.5 37.5 37.5 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 28.6 28.6 25 33.3 
SD 11.4 12 10.9 11.4 11.1 11.4 11.3 10.5 10.9 10 10.2 10.8 10.1 11.6 
Min 15.4 14.3 11.1 11.1 11.1 9.09 7.14 9.09 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 83.3 83.3 66.7 69.2 66.7 71.4 64.7 64.7 66.7 60 60 62.5 57.1 83.3 
N 177 207 227 234 231 237 238 237 237 228 231 226 211 2921 
Non-executive non-independent directors %          
Mean  9.51 8.89 9.41 9.49 9.19 9.19 8.61 8.65 9.61 8.2 8.6 9.19 9.48 9.07 
Median 0 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 8.33 8.33 9.09 8.01 7.69 7.69 9.09 9.09 
SD 12.2 10.6 9.91 10.3 10.1 10.1 9.81 10 11.4 10 10.8 11.9 11.3 10.6 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 55.6 50 46.2 50 50 50 44.4 44.4 60 50 50 54.5 54.5 60 
N 177 207 227 234 231 237 238 237 237 228 231 226 211 2921 
Non-executive independent directors %          
Mean  48.2 49.9 51.6 52.6 53.6 54.5 55.7 56.5 56.8 59.1 60.8 61.4 61.6 55.7 
Median 50 50 50 53.8 54.5 55.6 55.6 57.1 57.1 60 60.8 62.5 62.5 57.1 
SD 13.7 12.5 12.4 13.6 12.6 12.9 12.6 13.1 14 12.3 11.9 13.3 12.8 13.5 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 81.8 80 80 88.9 81.8 90.9 92.9 90.9 91.7 92.3 92.3 92.9 91.7 92.9 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
CEO duality           
Mean  0.213 0.207 0.189 0.145 0.134 0.126 0.134 0.113 0.113 0.109 0.069 0.0925 0.0708 0.13 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6.1 Continued  
SD 0.411 0.406 0.392 0.353 0.341 0.333 0.341 0.318 0.318 0.313 0.254 0.29 0.257 0.337 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Institutional ownership %           
Mean  32.2 33.2 35.4 35.2 36.4 37.6 38.7 38.1 38.5 36.1 33.8 32.8 33.2 35.6 
Median 30 34 33 32.8 35.1 39 37.2 37.4 37.9 35.2 32.1 31.2 30.8 34.1 
SD 21 19.7 20.7 19.9 20.5 20.6 21 21.4 22.2 20.7 21.1 19.4 19.8 20.7 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 92.7 85.6 93.6 90.3 99 98 99 97 96.3 92.4 99 87.6 93.9 99 
N 173 203 224 231 230 236 238 238 238 229 232 227 208 2907 
Women on board %           
Mean  5.2 5.46 6.19 7.13 7.77 7.66 7.62 8.62 10.4 13.1 15.8 18.9 20.8 10.4 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 6.9 7.14 9.09 11.1 12.5 14.3 20 22.2 10 
SD 7.98 8.04 8.46 8.92 9.94 9.22 8.68 8.88 9.29 9.97 9.19 9.46 9.39 10.3 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 37.5 37.5 42.9 50 57.1 50 37.5 37.5 37.5 44.4 37.5 44.4 50 57.1 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 238 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Foreign director on board %           
Mean  19.3 18.6 17.9 18.3 19.2 19.5 19.8 20.9 23 24.3 25.4 26.9 27.4 21.6 
Median 12.5 11.1 11.1 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 14.3 15.4 17.4 20 22.2 22.2 14.3 
SD 20.9 21.3 20.8 21.3 21.6 22 22.2 22.3 22.9 23.4 23.3 23.9 24.9 22.6 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 88.9 75 85.7 85.7 87.5 87.5 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 90.9 92.3 92.3 92.3 
N 177 207 227 234 231 237 238 237 237 228 231 226 211 2921 
 
Note that Board size is total number of directors in the board. Executive directors is proportion of executive directors in the board. Non-executive non-
independent directors is proportion of non-executive non-independent directors in the board. Non-executive independent directors is proportion of 
independent non-executive directors in the board. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Institutional 
ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Women on board is proportion of women 
directors from total number of directors in the board. Foreign directors is proportion of non-British directors from total number of directors in the board.   
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Figure 6.1 Board Size for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
  
Figure 6.2 Board Size by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.3 Board Size for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
 
Figure 6.1 presents the evolution of board size from 2003 to 2015. The board size was 
slightly higher before the financial crisis of 2007 and decreased below nine until 2010. This 
might explain that higher board size is not preferable during a financial crisis (e.g. Essen et 
al., 2013). However, board size starts to recover and stabilise thereafter.  
Figure 6.2 describes board size by industry. Telecommunications, oil and gas and utilities 
industries have the highest board size (10.35, 9.88 and 9.74, respectively); the technology 
industry has the lowest board size, at 7.97 board members. Figure 6.3 compares board size 
between FTSE 100 firms and FTSE 250 firms. It is clear that FTSE 100 firms have larger 
board size than FTSE 250 companies.  
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6.2.2 Board independence  
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4 compare the percentages of executive directors, non-executive non-
independent directors and non-executive independent directors for FTSE 350 firms from 
2003 to 2015. The proportion of executive directors decreased from 42% in 2003 to 28.6% by 
2015. However, the percentage of non-executive non-independent directors gradually 
increased throughout the study period (from 48.2% in 2003 to 61.6% by 2015). This may 
indicate the UK boards have become more independent and that firms are complying with the 
UK Corporate Governance Codes more than ever. The UK Corporate Governance Codes 
(2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) state that ‘Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to 
be independent. A smaller company should have at least two independent non-executive 
directors’. 
Figure 6.5 shows the percentages of executive directors, non-executive non-independent 
directors and non-executive independent directors among different industries. All industries 
have similar proportions of executive directors, non-executive non-independent directors and 
non-executive independent directors. This may also indicate that all industries tend to comply 
with the UK Corporate Governance Codes.  
Figure 6.6 compares proportions of executive directors, non-executive non-independent 
directors and non-executive independent directors for FTSE 100 firms and FTSE 250 firms. 
FTSE 100 firms tend to have higher proportion of non-executive independent directors and 
lower proportion of executive directors than FTSE 250 firms. Nonetheless, both FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 firms have at least 50% of their board of directors defined as independent non-
executive directors.   
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Figure 6.4 Board Independence for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015)
 
Figure 6.5 Board Independence by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
 
 
 
122 
 
Figure 6.6 Board Independence for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
 
6.2.3 CEO duality 
The UK Corporate Governance Codes (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) describe that ‘The roles 
of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual. The division 
of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be clearly established, set 
out in writing and agreed by the board’.  
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.7 report CEO duality from 2003 to 2015 for FTSE 350 non-financial 
firms. There has been a dramatic decrease in the percentage of CEO duality. For example, the 
average CEO duality stood at 21.3% in 2003, whereas in 2015, CEO duality was only 7.08%. 
This is a clear indication that UK firms are complying with the code provision that states the 
roles of chairman and CEO should be separated.   
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Figure 6.8 presents CEO duality for different industries. Throughout the study period, the 
utilities industry had the lowest proportion of CEO duality (0.88%), followed by the health 
care industry (5.40%). In contrast, telecommunications, oil and gas and the basic materials 
industries had the highest percentage of CEO duality (38.6%, 26.23% and 24.59%, 
respectively). Figure 6.9 shows CEO duality for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms over the 
period of 2003-2015. FTSE 250 companies tend to have higher proportion of CEO duality 
(about 14%) than FTSE 100 companies (only 10.86%).  
Figure 6.7 CEO Duality for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
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Figure 6.8 CEO Duality by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
 
Figure 6.9 CEO Duality for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
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6.2.4 Institutional ownership 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.10 show the proportion of institutional ownership that holds 3% or 
more of company shares for the FTSE 350 non-financial firms from 2003 to 2015. The period 
between 2003 to 2011 witnessed a small climb in the percentage of institutional ownership 
(from almost 32% in 2003 to about 38% in 2011). However, after 2011, the number of 
institutional investors slightly dropped to 33% by 2015. This may suggest the UK quoted 
companies have become more widely held.   
Figure 6.11 shows the compression of institutional ownership in different industries. The oil 
and gas and telecommunications industries have the highest percentages of institutional 
ownership (46.39% and 40.12%, respectively), whereas the industrials and utilities industries 
have the lowest proportions of institutional ownership (25.5% and 26.75%, respectively). 
Figure 6.12 reports that FTSE 250 companies have higher percentage of institutional 
ownership than FTSE 100 companies. 
Figure 6.10 Institutional Ownership for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
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Figure 6.11 Institutional Ownership by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
 
Figure 6.12 Institutional Ownership for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
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6.2.5 Women directors on boards 
Another important element of the UK boards’ reforms was how to increase the number of 
women in FTSE 350 firms. The Davies Report (2011) recommended a target of 25% 
representation of women on the FTSE 100 boards by 2015. The subsequent Davies Reports 
(2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) reviewed the 25% implementation of women by 2015. 
The UK Corporate Governance Codes (2012, 2014 and 2016) have stressed the importance of 
gender diversity during the appointment of new board of directors: ‘the search for board 
candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective criteria 
and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including gender’.  
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.13 present the average percentage of women in FTSE 350 non-
financial firms from 2003 to 2015. Women representation on UK corporate boards was below 
8% before the 2007 financial crisis. For example, the average percentage of women directors 
in 2003 was only 5.2%. However, after the financial crisis and after the publication of the 
Davies Reports (2011), the proportion of women directors witnessed a sharp increase, from 
7.77% in 2007 to 20.8% by 2015. 
Figure 6.14 shows women representation by industry. Women directors are more 
concentrated in the telecommunications and basic materials industries (11.69% and 11.13%, 
respectively). In contrast, the technology and utilities industries have the lowest 
representation of women directors (9.60% and 9.64%, respectively). Figure 6.15 presents 
women representation by FTSE index category (FTSE 100 and FTSE 250). FTSE 100 firms 
has the highest percentage of women directors (13.93%) than FTSE 250 firms (8.72%).   
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Figure 6.13 Women (%) for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
 
Figure 6.14 Women (%) by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.15 Women (%) for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
 
6.2.6 Foreign directors on UK boards 
The UK has one of the highest numbers of foreign directors in the world (Conyon et al., 
2016). Table 6.1 and Figure 6.16 illustrate the average percentage of foreign directors 
throughout the study period (2003-2015) for FTSE 350 non-financial firms. The average 
proportion of foreign directors on UK boards was at 19.3% in 2003; however, foreign 
directors decreased to 17.9% in 2005. After 2005, the average percentage of foreign directors 
in the UK saw some recovery until 2009, when the number increased dramatically to 27.4% 
by 2015.  
Figure 6.17 and 6.18 show the percentage of foreign directors in the UK’s FTSE 350 non-
financial firms by each industry and by FTSE category, respectively. All industries have 
somewhat similar percentages of foreign directors (ranking from 21.07% for the utilities 
industry to 22.57% for telecommunications industry). It is clear that FTSE 100 firms have 
higher proportion of foreign directors than FTSE 250 firms do.  
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Figure 6.16 Foreign Directors (%) for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
     
Figure 6.17 Foreign Directors (%) by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.18 Foreign Directors (%) for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
 
6.3 Time Series and Industry Analysis of Remuneration Committee Characteristics 
This section reports remuneration characteristics by year, by industry and by FTSE category 
for the UK’s FTSE350 firms from 2003 to 2015. Table 6.2 shows the summary of the time 
series descriptive statistics of remuneration characteristics, including remuneration committee 
size, remuneration committee independence and percentages of women and foreign directors 
on remuneration committees.  
6.3.1 Remuneration committee size 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.19 report the average percentage of remuneration committee size 
throughout the study period (2003-2015) for FTSE 350 non-financial firms. Figure 6.19 
presents that the average remuneration committee size has slightly increased overtime, from 
3.87 members in 2003 to about 4 members by 2015.  
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Table 6.2 Time Series Descriptive Statistics of Remuneration Committee Characteristics for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms from 2003 
to 2015 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Remuneration Committee Size          
Mean  3.87 3.68 3.72 3.76 3.9 3.88 3.87 3.97 3.96 4.07 4.19 4.17 4.09 3.93 
Median 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
SD 1.09 0.973 1.06 1.04 1.03 0.988 0.961 1.01 1 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.12 1.05 
Min 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Max 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
N 178 207 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 231 226 211 2930 
Remuneration Committee Independence %          
Mean  93.1 94.9 95.7 95.3 93.7 93.7 93.9 94 93 95.5 95 93.9 95.1 94.4 
Median 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SD 0.149 0.136 0.119 0.123 0.131 0.129 0.131 0.134 0.147 0.115 0.122 0.136 0.124 0.131 
Min 25 25 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 25 25 25 33.3 33.3 25 33.3 25 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 177 208 228 234 231 237 238 237 236 228 232 227 212 2925 
Women on Remuneration Committee %           
Mean  7.97 8 9.22 11.2 11.6 11.2 11.2 12.3 13.5 18.3 22.6 26.2 29.8 14.9 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 25 25 33.3 0 
SD 13.8 14.6 15.1 15.8 16.3 15.9 15.3 15.5 15.7 17.1 17 17.5 17.5 17.3 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 75 75 75 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Foreign director on Remuneration Committee %           
Mean  20.2 18.3 18.6 17.2 18.7 19.1 19.2 20.2 23.4 24.2 24.8 26.1 27 21.3 
Median 8.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 25 16.7 
SD 24.8 24.8 24.9 24 25.1 26 25.2 25.3 26.6 26.4 26.5 28 28.4 26 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 178 207 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 231 226 211 2930 
 
Note that remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive 
directors in the remuneration committee. Women on remuneration committee is proportion of women directors from total remuneration committee size. Foreign directors on remuneration 
committee is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size.   
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Figure 6.20 shows the variation of remuneration committee size among different industries. 
The consumer goods industry has the highest remuneration committee size (4.32 members), 
whereas the basic materials industry has the lowest remuneration committee size (3.74 
members). FTSE 100 firms tend to have higher remuneration committee size than FTSE 250 
firms do (see Figure 6.21). 
Figure 6.19 Remuneration Committee Size for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-
2015) 
 
Figure 6.20 Remuneration Committee Size by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial 
Firms 
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Figure 6.21 Remuneration Committee Size for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial 
Firms 
 
6.3.2 Remuneration committee independence 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.22 compare the percentages of non-executive non-independent 
directors and non-executive independent directors for FTSE 350 firms’ remuneration 
committees from 2003 to 2015. The percentage of non-executive independent directors on 
remuneration committees was somewhat stable over the study period (94.4% on average). 
Whereas, the percentage of non-executive non-independent directors on remuneration 
committees remained below 30% throughout the study period. 
Figure 6.23 shows the percentages of non-executive non-independent directors and non-
executive independent directors among different industries. The telecommunication industry 
has the highest proportion of remuneration committee independence (about 99%), whereas 
the health care industry has the lowest proportion of remuneration committee independence 
(about 92%).  
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Figure 6.24 compares the proportion of non-executive non-independent directors and non-
executive independent directors for FTSE 100 firms and FTSE 250 firms. FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 firms’ remuneration committees tend to have similar proportion of non-executive 
non-independent directors non-executive independent directors. 
Figure 6.22 Remuneration Committee Independence for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
(2003-2015) 
 
Figure 6.23 Remuneration Committee Independence by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-
Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.24 Remuneration Committee Independence for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-
Financial Firms 
 
6.3.3 Women on remuneration committees  
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.25 present the average proportion of women in FTSE 350 non-
financial firms’ remuneration committees from 2003 to 2015. Women representation on 
remuneration committees was below 15% pre the 2007 financial crisis. For instance, the 
average proportion of women directors on remuneration committees in 2003 was only 7.97%. 
However, post the publication of the Davies Reports (2011), the proportion of women 
directors have seen a dramatic increase, from 11.6% in 2007 to 29.8% by 2015. 
Figures 6.26 and 6.27 show women representation on remuneration committees by industry 
and FTSE index category. Women directors are more found in the utilities and consumer 
services industries (21.08% and 19.03%, respectively). In contrary, the basic materials and oil 
and gas industries have the lowest proportion of women directors (7.83% and 10.33%, 
respectively). FTSE 100 firms’ remuneration committees tend to have higher percentage of 
women directors (18.32%) than FTSE 250 firms do (13.29%).   
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Figure 6.25 Women on Remuneration Committees for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
(2003-2015) 
 
Figure 6.26 Women on Remuneration Committees by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-
Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.27 Women on Remuneration Committees for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-
Financial Firms 
 
6.3.4 Foreign directors on remuneration committees  
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.28 show the average percentage of foreign directors on remuneration 
committees throughout the study period (2003-2015) for FTSE 350 non-financial firms. The 
average proportion of foreign directors on UK remuneration committees was at 20.2% in 
2003; however, foreign directors on remuneration committees decreased to level below 18% 
in 2006. After 2006, the average proportion of foreign directors on remuneration committees 
witnessed some recovery until 2010, when the number increased sharply to about 27% by 
2015.  
Figures 6.29 and 6.30 show the proportion of foreign directors in the UK’s FTSE 350 non-
financial firms’ remuneration committees by industry and by FTSE category. Remuneration 
committees of the basic materials industry has the highest proportion of foreign directors 
(about 45%) and remuneration committees of the utilities industry have the lowest proportion 
of foreign directors (10.74%). It is clear that FTSE 100 firms’ remuneration committees have 
higher proportion of foreign directors than FTSE 250 firms’ remuneration committees.  
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Figure 6.28 Foreign Directors on Remuneration Committees for FTSE 350 Non-
Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
 
Figure 6.29 Foreign Directors on Remuneration Committees by Industry for FTSE 350 
Non-Financial Firms 
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Figure 6.30 Foreign Directors on Remuneration Committees for FTSE 100 and FTSE 
250 Non-Financial Firms 
 
6.4 Time Series and Industry Analysis of CEO Pay and Say-on-Pay 
This section illustrates the time series trend of CEO remuneration and say-on-pay voting by 
year and by industry for the UK’s FTSE350 firms from 2003 to 2015. Table 6.3 presents the 
summary of the time series descriptive statistics of say-on-pay voting and CEO remuneration.  
6.4.1 CEO pay  
Recent financial crises and scandals have created public anger and unrest regarding CEO pay 
packages, which has led to calls for executive pay reform. According to the High Pay Centre, 
CEO pay for the FTSE 100 firms has increased from an average of £1 million in 1998 to £4.3 
million. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.31 confirm these results. 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.31 show the variation between different types of CEO remuneration 
(including total remuneration, cash, equity and bonus) for FTSE 350 firms over the period 
2003-2015. Figure 6.31 shows that the study sample’s firms prefer to use equity remuneration 
to compensate their CEOs. This may support the agency theory perspective that CEOs’ 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders by providing them with long-term equity 
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remuneration. Although total CEO remuneration decreased somewhat after the recent 
financial crisis, overall it has increased from about £1.82 million in 2003 to £3.18 million in 
2013 (and decreased to £2.88 in 2015). During the study period, the variability is more 
noticeable in equity remuneration compared to other types of CEO remuneration. In contrast, 
CEO cash remuneration (including salary, bonuses and other cash remuneration) was more 
stable during the period. 
Additionally, Figure 6.32 illustrates the variability of different types of CEO remuneration in 
different industries for FTSE 350 firms from 2003 to 2015. All industries in the sample 
favour equity-based CEO pay rather than cash remuneration. Furthermore, on average, all 
industries have similar CEO remuneration; however, the telecommunications industry has the 
highest average CEO remuneration (about £2.7 million), and the utilities industry has the 
lowest CEO remuneration, at about £2.5 million. Moreover, both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
have somewhat similar CEO remuneration (see Figure 6.33). 
Figure 6.31 CEO pay (£000s) for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
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Figure 6.32 CEO pay (£000s) by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
 
Figure 6.33 CEO pay (£000s) for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Non-Financial Firms 
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Table 6.3 Time Series Descriptive Statistics of CEO Pay and Say-on-Pay (2003-2015) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Say-on-Pay For voting           
mean  89.4 92.7 92.9 92.5 93.7 90.4 90.6 90.5 89.8 91.3 92.1 91.8 91.5 91.5 
Median 93.2 96.2 96 95.8 97 95.7 95.9 95.2 94 94.8 96.4 96.5 95.9 95.7 
SD 10.5 9.96 9.54 9.05 8.48 12.5 12.6 11.9 12.1 9.93 10.5 11.2 10.8 10.8 
Min 47.6 38 44 48 60.8 38.8 30.3 40.2 29.9 18.6 47 45.4 39.1 18.6 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.9 99.9 99.9 100 100 100 100 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Say-on-Pay Against voting          
mean  6.26 4.56 4.16 4.57 3.54 6.15 6.71 6.74 7.63 6.51 5.7 5.87 6.51 5.77 
Median 2.79 1.8 1.95 2.14 1.4 1.98 2.2 2.96 3.5 3.28 1.68 2.06 2.52 2.2 
SD 8.42 8.21 6.93 7.16 6.18 9.92 10.7 9.76 11 8.79 9.15 9.17 9.52 9.03 
Min 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0 
Max 49.2 59 48.5 51 37.4 59.3 60.7 47.9 61 73 52.3 51.2 57 73 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Say-on-Pay Abstain voting          
mean  4.31 2.7 2.95 2.93 2.77 3.44 2.66 2.73 2.59 2.15 2.23 2.34 2 2.73 
Median 2.94 1.49 1.23 1.39 1.08 1.44 1.11 1 1.21 1.03 0.78 0.91 0.815 1.15 
SD 4.54 4.02 4.61 4.45 4.53 5.38 4.16 4.59 4.48 3.06 4.11 4.39 3.77 4.38 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 22.6 28.2 29.7 32.5 28.6 36.6 31.3 29.9 44.1 22.9 29.2 38.1 33 44.1 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Say-on-Pay Dissent voting          
mean  6.67 4.79 4.43 4.78 3.73 6.57 7.06 7.1 7.89 6.73 5.91 6.16 6.73 6.04 
Median 2.89 1.83 1.95 2.19 1.44 2.01 2.22 3.02 3.52 3.31 1.69 2.09 2.54 2.25 
SD 9.07 8.71 7.69 7.49 6.53 10.7 11.5 10.5 11.4 9.24 9.44 9.71 9.93 9.57 
Min 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.010 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0 
Max 50.8 60.8 52.4 51.5 38 59.4 66.7 51.6 67 79.7 52.7 51.7 59.3 79.7 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
Total CEO Pay (in £ thousands)          
mean  1816 1755 2124 2352 2540 2045 2808 2791 2922 2803 3181 2987 2878 2557 
Median 939 973 1120 1416 1450 1238 1756 1876 1911 2017 2211 2010 2088 1619 
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Table 6.3 Continued  
SD 2549 2742 4152 3004 3855 2309 3144 2905 4954 2882 4674 3984 3148 3543 
Min 100 53 140 59 150 124 58 65 118 149 145 150 150 53 
Max 21855 27547 55246 21595 43126 22303 25112 25301 67170 26487 56808 42103 32874 67170 
N 178 206 228 235 232 236 238 238 238 229 232 226 212 2928 
CEO Cash Pay (in £ thousands)          
mean  746 761 820 915 1010 962 1025 1116 1094 1098 1181 1163 1210 1013 
Median 581 610 666 718 836 762 814 925 918 899 944 940 990 824 
SD 550 511 554 625 694 715 706 764 738 720 814 763 768 710 
Min 5 14 140 59 150 27 45 65 11 18 18 17 150 5 
Max 3758 3662 3445 5150 4169 5430 4510 4861 5354 5859 5265 4740 5428 5859 
N 178 208 228 235 232 238 239 238 238 229 232 227 212 2934 
CEO Bonus Pay (in £ thousands)          
mean  300 305 338 420 487 399 470 547 507 501 563 564 627 455 
Median 185 197 223 300 363 264 317 414 364 353 440 422 535 318 
SD 380 348 395 505 549 544 536 595 604 590 628 629 495 543 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2808 2280 2529 5000 3751 4726 3523 4660 5137 5637 4545 4376 1977 5637 
N 177 208 228 235 231 236 234 235 231 224 227 213 31 2710 
CEO Equity Pay (in £ thousands)          
mean  1314 1149 1582 1688 1749 1198 2016 2013 2231 2055 2429 2197 1932 1821 
Median 516 459 647 784 693 537 1090 1136 1101 1285 1450 1272 1232 933 
SD 2416 2531 4330 2840 3748 1914 2774 2549 5114 2731 4651 3845 2737 3401 
Min 3 2 4 1 1 0 0 5 3 6 0 1 1 0 
Max 21330 25153 54710 19342 42406 17967 20602 21568 65220 25815 54310 39271 28166 65220 
N 145 177 188 200 203 212 210 198 195 190 191 187 183 2479 
 
Note that total CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural logarithm of 
CEO’s salary, bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. 
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6.4.2 Say-on-pay voting patterns 
Say-on-pay voting was introduced in the UK in 2002 and implemented at the end of the 2003 
financial year. The purpose of say-on-pay is not to limit CEO remuneration but to engage 
shareholders in the arrangement of the remuneration report (Alissa, 2015). Therefore, 
shareholders have three voting options on the annual remuneration reports published by 
remuneration committees: vote in favour (for), vote against or abstain from voting.  
Table 6.3 shows the summary of the three votes for the FTSE 350 non-financial firms from 
2003 to 2015. During the sample period, on average, 91.5% of shareholders tended to vote in 
favour of the annual remuneration report, while only 6% and 3%, respectively, were likely to 
vote against or to abstain. Figure 6.34 shows the average say-on-pay dissent voting on the 
annual remuneration reports for FTSE 350 companies over the period 2003-2015. Say-on-pay 
dissent voting is calculated as the total number of against votes divided by the total number of 
for, against and abstain votes. The summary by year reveals that the level of shareholders’ 
dissent on the remuneration report continued to be low throughout the sample period (6.04% 
on average). The dissent level was slightly higher than average in 2003 (about 6.3% on 
average); however, it went down to a level below 5% until 2007 (where it stood at a bottom 
point of 3.54%). Again, in 2008, the dissent level showed an apparent increase until 2011, 
where the shareholder dissent voting was at the peak point of 7.63%. This may indicate that 
the recent financial crisis and corporate governance reforms (such as the Stewardship Code 
[2010] and the Davies Report [2011]) gave shareholders more motivation to engage with 
annual remuneration reports. Shareholder dissent voting saw another dramatic decrease until 
2013 (where it stood at 5.7%). In 2013, shareholder dissent voting recovered somewhat to 
reach 6.51% in 2015. This may be the result of the new amendments in the say-on-pay 
voting, which gave shareholders a binding vote on the remuneration policy report.    
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Figure 6.35 reports the overall summary of the shareholder dissent voting across different 
industries for the FTSE 350 non-financial companies from 2003 to 2015. The 
telecommunication industry has the highest percentage of shareholders’ dissent votes on the 
annual remuneration report (6.33% on average), whereas the utility industries have the lowest 
percentage of dissent votes (5.91% on average). All other industries have almost similar 
shareholder dissent voting. 
Figure 6.36 compares shareholder dissent voting between FTSE 100 firms and FTSE 250 
firms. It is obvious that FTSE 100 firms are more likely to have higher shareholder dissent 
voting than FTSE 250 firms do. 
Figure 6.34 Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms (2003-2015) 
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Figure 6.35 Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting by Industry for FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms 
 
 
Figure 6.36 Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting by for FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 Non-Financial 
Firms 
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6.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis  
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, it is essential to discuss descriptive statistics as 
the initial step to assess similarities and differences between research variables. Descriptive 
statistics include measures for central tendency (mean and median) and measures for 
variability (standard deviation). Furthermore, this section includes an analysis for correlation 
and multi-collinearity. These are explained in detail in the proceeding sub-sections.   
6.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.4 presents descriptive statistics for the different variables used in this study. On 
average, 6.04% (2.2% median) of investors tended to vote against the remuneration reports 
over the sample period. This is consistent with previous studies in the UK, such as those of 
Alissa (2015) and Conyon and Sadler (2010). Furthermore, 17.5% of firms received more 
than 10% shareholders’ dissent on say-on-pay during the sample period. The overall average 
of CEO total remuneration is about £2.6 million with a median of £1.62 million.   
In terms of remuneration committee and board characteristics, women directors represented 
14.9% of the total number of directors on the remuneration committee, and foreign directors 
on the remuneration committee constituted 21.3%; whereas, at the board level, women 
directors had a mean of 10.4% for the entire period, and foreign directors had a mean of 
21.6%.  
Regarding remuneration committees, firms with one woman accounted for 37% of the total 
sample, whereas firms with two or more women accounted for only 11%. Firms with one 
foreign director formed 25.8% of the total number of directors on the remuneration 
committee, whereas firms with two or more foreign directors represented 24.6%. The 
remuneration committee size is approximately four members, whereas the board size is about 
nine members.  
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Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Empirical Study 
 Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N 
Say-on-Pay         
Dissent % 6.04 2.25 9.5 0 79.7 2.87 12.5 2934 
Dissent > 10% 0.175 0 0.38 0 1 1.71 3.92 2934 
CEO Remuneration         
Total CEO pay (in £ thousands) 2557 1619 3543 53 67170 7.37 94.8 2928 
CEO cash pay (in £ thousands) 1013 824 710 5 5859 2.17 10.1 2934 
CEO equity pay (in £ thousands) 1821 933 3401 0 65220 8.59 118 2479 
CEO bonus pay (in £ thousands) 455 318 543 0 5637 3.33 20.7 2710 
Women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and boards     
Women % 14.9 0 17.3 0 75 0.827 2.89 2934 
Women = 1 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 0.549 1.3 2934 
Women ≥ 2 0.11 0 0.32 0 1 2.46 7.04 2934 
Women on board % 10.40 10 10.29 0 57.14 0.746 3 2934 
Foreign directors % 21.3 16.7 26 0 100 1.1 3.46 2930 
Foreign director = 1 0.258 0 0.437 0 1 1.11 2.23 2934 
Foreign directors ≥ 2 0.246 0 0.431 0 1 1.18 2.39 2934 
Foreign directors on board % 21.6 14.3 22.6 0 92.3 1.38 4.47 2921 
Control variables          
Institutional ownership % 35.6 34.1 20.7 0 99.7 0.365 2.62 2907 
Board size 9.06 9 2.37 5 18 0.869 3.67 2921 
Remuneration committee size 3.93 4 1.05 2 9 0.862 4.1 2930 
Board independence % 55.7 57.1 13.5 0 92.9 -0.576 4.32 2934 
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
94.4 100 13.1 25 100 -2.58 9.87 2925 
CEO duality 0.13 0 0.337 0 1 2.2 5.83 2934 
CEO tenure  5.23 3.8 5.25 1 39.4 2.12 9.1 2925 
Log total sales 14.2 14.1 1.52 8.41 19.7 0.35 3.47 2914 
Foreign sales %  49.5 55.3 36.1 0 100 -0.136 1.51 2717 
MBV 3.73 2.61 11.6 -114 198 5.71 118 2896 
Stock return % 15.9 11.7 46 -96.7 410 2 14.2 2929 
ROA % 6.4 5.8 8.6 -67 79 -0.115 16.1 2922 
Leverage % 23.1 22.3 16.8 0 96.4 0.584 3.11 2921 
Price volatility % 27.8 26.3 8.87 11.5 62.4 0.905 3.82 2542 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit 
dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is 
proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women=1 is an indicator of 1 if a remuneration committee has one 
woman. Women≥2 is an indicator of 1 if a remuneration committee has two or more women. Women on board is proportion of women 
from total board size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked 
remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural logarithm of CEO’s salary, bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log CEO equity is 
the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the 
natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors 
holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. 
CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of 
number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Stock returns is stock 
price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt 
to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year.   
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The average percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board and the 
remuneration committee is approximately 56% and 94%, respectively. Additionally, 13% of 
the firms tended to combine the posts of CEO and Chair. CEOs, on average, tended to stay on 
corporate boards for five years, and institutional investors held 36% of the firms’ ownership. 
Skewness and kurtosis of variables should be within the range of ±1.96 to ±3 for normal 
distribution (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, most of the research variables used in this 
study are not within this recommended range; hence, the variables are non-normally 
distributed. Wooldridge (2016: 107) states that non-normality of data ‘is not a serious 
problem with large sample size’. There are also many ways to overcome or at least minimise 
the non-normality concern. First, Greene (2008) has recommended using the logistic 
transformation of variables or logistic regression (logit model). Furthermore, Wooldridge 
(2016) suggested using the robustness of standard errors after the regression model. 
Previous studies in say-on-pay literature have used the logit model to resolve this problem 
(e.g. Conyon, 2016; Kimbro and Xu, 2016; Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016). Conyon 
(2016) has also suggested using logistic transformation for shareholder dissent voting. 
Additionally, most executive remuneration literature has used logistic transformation for 
CEO pay (e.g. Core et al., 1999 and Conyon et al., 2016). Therefore, this study uses the three 
options suggested by prior studies, including using logistic transformation for the OLS 
model, using the logit model for some regressions and using robust standard errors in all 
regressions.   
6.5.2 Correlation analysis 
It is vital to check the correlation between research variables. Correlation analysis is usually 
used to check for a multi-collinearity problem. Table 6.5 presents Pearson’s correlation 
matrix for the main variables used in this study. Gujarati and Porter (2009) suggested that the 
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correlation variable between any independent variables should not exceed 80%. Overall, this 
study has no correlation between independent variables that exceeds 54%; therefore, multi-
collinearity is not a concern for this study. The highest correlation between any two 
independent variables is found between firm size (total sales) and board size (53.45%), 
indicating that the bigger the firm, the larger the board size.    
6.5.3 Variance inflation factors (VIFs) test 
Another test for multi-collinearity is to use variance inflation factors (VIFs). To eliminate or 
at least mitigate the multi-collinearity problem, Wooldridge (2016) has specified that the 
VIFs should not be more than 5 and that the tolerance factor (1/VIF) should be greater than 
0.10. Table 6.6 shows a VIFs test for the two models used in this study: the relationship 
between women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent 
voting (Panel A) and the relationship between women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees and CEO pay (Panel B). For women and foreign directors say-on-pay framework, 
the maximum VIF is 2.29 for total sales, and the mean VIF for this framework is 1.38, 
indicating no serious multi-collinearity problems in this model. In Panel B, the highest VIF 
was for total sales (2.2), and the average VIF for this model is 1.35; therefore, these numbers 
suggest that multi-collinearity is not a concern for this study.   
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Table 6.5 Correlation Matrix 
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Log dissent  1                      
Dissent >10% 0.8118* 1                    
Total CEO pay  0.1274* 0.1350* 1                  
CEO cash pay  0.1339* 0.1204* 0.5637* 1                
CEO equity pay  0.1251* 0.1380* 0.9862* 0.4382* 1              
CEO bonus pay  0.1244* 0.1132* 0.4875* 0.9347* 0.3824* 1            
Women % -0.0180 -0.0276 0.1058* 0.1024* 0.0811* 0.0483* 1          
Women = 1 0.0338 0.0074 0.0802* 0.0495* 0.0727* 0.0217 0.4916* 1        
Women ≥ 2 -0.0250 -0.0189 0.0993* 0.1373* 0.0685* 0.0837* 0.6312* -0.2710* 1      
Foreign directors % 0.1000* 0.0784* 0.2208* 0.2944* 0.2173* 0.2430* -0.01 -0.026 0.0415* 1    
Foreign director = 1 0.0298 0.0073 0.0213 0.0488* 0.0171 0.0660* 0.0267 0.0630* -0.0019 0.1176* 1  
Foreign directors ≥ 2 0.0781* 0.0673* 0.2323* 0.2720* 0.2172* 0.2017* 0.0209 -0.0162 0.1026* 0.8241* -0.3369* 1 
Institutional ownership % -0.0011 -0.013 -0.2328* -0.2976* -0.2333* -0.2527* 0.0038 0.0244 -0.0471* -0.2072* -0.0221 -0.1607* 
Board size 0.0455* 0.0269 0.3610* 0.4549* 0.3114* 0.3661* 0.0529* 0.0654* 0.0673* 0.2709* 0.0669* 0.2768* 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0203 0.0093 0.1646* 0.2222* 0.1123* 0.1420* 0.1428* 0.0930* 0.3142* 0.0641* 0.0530* 0.2357* 
Board independence % 0.0917* 0.0798* 0.2143* 0.2457* 0.1744* 0.1414* 0.2219* 0.1617* 0.1719* 0.2278* 0.0315 0.2431* 
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
-0.0089 0.0017 -0.0365* -0.0491* -0.0550* -0.0959* 0.0708* 0.0529* 0.0600* -0.0149 -0.0212 -0.0245 
CEO duality 0.0079 0.0348 -0.0810* -0.0831* -0.0272 -0.0471* -0.1063* -0.0955* -0.0476* -0.0102 0.0106 -0.0473* 
CEO tenure  -0.0261 -0.0267 0.0155 0.0817* 0.0154 0.0915* 0.0377* 0.0377* 0.0142 -0.0784* -0.0285 -0.0709* 
Log total sales 0.0583* 0.0291 0.3767* 0.4958* 0.3187* 0.3301* 0.1891* 0.1188* 0.1674* 0.2863* 0.0213 0.3045* 
Foreign sales %  0.0693* 0.0558* 0.1354* 0.2048* 0.1100* 0.1592* -0.1051* -0.0618* -0.034 0.4080* 0.0839* 0.3583* 
MBV 0.0210 0.035 0.0460* 0.0224 0.0493* 0.0289 0.0292 0.0153 0.0158 0.0403* 0.0103 0.0173 
Stock return % 0.0095 0.0105 0.0238 -0.0087 0.0333 0.0377 -0.0640* -0.0550* -0.0376* -0.0559* 0.0225 -0.0668* 
ROA % -0.0489* -0.0403* 0.1069* 0.0698* 0.1282* 0.1028* -0.0234 0.0067 -0.0143 -0.0328 -0.0275 -0.0259 
Leverage % -0.0171 -0.0175 0.0055 0.0322 -0.0227 -0.0042 0.0408* -0.0223 0.0584* 0.0518* -0.0044 0.0656* 
Price volatility % 0.0878* 0.0713* -0.2066* -0.2664* -0.1596* -0.2001* -0.1754* -0.1124* -0.1340* -0.0337 0.0632* -0.1010* 
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Table 6.5 Continued  
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Institutional ownership % 1               
Board size -0.3887* 1             
Remuneration committee 
size 
-0.0656* 0.2882* 1 
        
   
Board independence % -0.0219 0.0530* 0.2614* 1           
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
0.0273 -0.0685* -0.1011* 0.3698* 1 
          
CEO duality -0.0938* 0.0125 -0.1549* -0.2464* -0.0129 1          
CEO tenure  0.0581* 0.0237 -0.0448* -0.1123* 0.0032 0.0733* 1         
Log total sales 
-0.3918* 0.5345* 0.2771* 0.3414* 0.0288 
-
0.1247* 
-0.1539* 1 
       
Foreign sales %  -0.1211* 0.1686* 0.0869* 0.1579* -0.0046 0.0077 0.0152 0.1103* 1      
MBV -0.0112 0.0301 0.001 -0.0131 -0.0062 0.0135 -0.0018 -0.0169 -0.0316 1      
Stock return % 0.0093 -0.0706* -0.0680* -0.0660* 0.011 0.034 0.0428* -0.1073* -0.0042 0.0747* 1     
ROA  -0.0753* -0.006 -0.0031 -0.0348 0.0009 0.0258 0.0984* -0.0870* -0.0368 0.1390* 0.0694* 1    
Leverage % -0.0873* 0.1420* 0.0589* 0.0275 0.0014 -0.0088 -0.1005* 0.2014* 0.0232 0.0346 -0.1082* -0.2098* 1   
Price volatility % 0.2041* -0.2136* -0.1913* -0.1251* 0.0272 0.1272* -0.0237 -0.3213* 0.0702* -0.0371 0.1612* -0.1956* -0.1596* 1 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator 
of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women=1 is an indicator of 1 if a remuneration committee has 
one woman. Women≥2 is an indicator of 1 if a remuneration committee has two or more women. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural 
logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural logarithm of CEO’s salary, bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log 
CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. 
Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. CEO tenure is number of 
years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales 
that come from a foreign country’s operation. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the 
total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year.   
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Table 6.6 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) Test 
 VIF   1/VIF 
Panel A: Impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees on say-on-pay dissent voting 
Log total sales 2.29 0.435983 
Log CEO pay 1.91 0.522898 
Board size 1.87 0.534296 
Board independence % 1.74 0.573695 
Institutional ownership % 1.38 0.726944 
Price volatility % 1.3 0.770579 
Remuneration committee size 1.29 0.777128 
Foreign directors % 1.25 0.798133 
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
1.22 0.818266 
ROA % 1.22 0.820562 
Leverage % 1.18 0.85093 
CEO duality 1.13 0.88834 
Women % 1.12 0.894413 
Stock return % 1.09 0.914209 
Log CEO tenure  1.09 0.921391 
MB 1.03 0.970043 
Mean VIF 1.38  
Panel B: Impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees on CEO pay 
Log total sales 2.2 0.453524 
Board size 1.82 0.549224 
Board independence % 1.69 0.592231 
Foreign sales % 1.45 0.689119 
Institutional ownership % 1.41 0.707095 
Price volatility % 1.31 0.76199 
Remuneration committee size 1.31 0.765243 
Foreign directors % 1.3 0.769006 
ROA % 1.23 0.811743 
Leverage 1.2 0.830417 
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
1.19 0.840854 
Women % 1.15 0.869382 
CEO duality 1.13 0.888375 
Log CEO tenure 1.08 0.923734 
Stock return % 1.07 0.93789 
MB 1.03 0.967689 
Mean VIF 1.35  
 
Note that women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women=1 is an indicator 
of 1 if a remuneration committee has one woman. Women≥2 is an indicator of 1 if a remuneration committee 
has two or more women. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. Log CEO pay is 
sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. 
Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of 
firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in 
the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent 
nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the 
posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO 
serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that 
come from a foreign country’s operation. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided 
by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average 
annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year.   
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6.6 Empirical Regression Results 
This section reports this study’s empirical regression results. First, the relationship between 
the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and say-on-pay is 
estimated. Later, this section investigates whether the presence of women and foreign 
directors affects CEO pay. Additionally, this section includes an endogenous estimation for 
the relationship between the presence of women on remuneration committees and say-on-pay 
and CEO pay. The subsequent sub-sections reveal more details about this research’s findings. 
6.6.1 Women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and their impact on 
say-on-pay dissent voting 
Table 6.7 contains the results for the regression explaining the impact of women and foreign 
directors on remuneration committees on the shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay voting. 
Models (1) and (2) show there is a significant negative relationship between the presence of 
women directors on the remuneration committee and say-on-pay dissent voting for both the 
OLS model (β = -0.611, t = -3.31) and the logit model (β = -1.046, t = -2.82). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported, which confirms the study assumption that the presence of women 
directors on the remuneration committee helps to decrease the chances of extremely high 
CEO remuneration and aligns the remuneration with shareholders’ interests. Hence, 
shareholders are more likely to be satisfied.  
As for foreign directors on remuneration committees, the results in Table 6.7 for both the 
OLS and logit models (models 3 and 4, respectively) reveal that firms with more foreign 
directors on the remuneration committee receive more shareholder dissent on the directors’ 
remuneration report (β = 0.366, t = 2.50 and β = 0.510, t = 2.02, respectively). Hence, 
Hypothesis 5 is confirmed. This is justified because foreign directors may lack effective 
monitoring. Masulis et al. (2012) have also shown that the presence of foreign directors in the 
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firms of other countries may signal ineffective monitoring and can lead to higher CEO 
remuneration. 
In models (5) and (6), instead of year dummies, this study controls for different time events 
captured during the study period, including the financial crisis (2007), the Stewardship Code 
(2010), the Davies Report (2011) and the say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting (2013), 
for the estimation of women’s influence on say-on-pay. The results remain unchanged for 
both the OLS model (β = -0.665, t = -3.59) and the logit model (β = -1.068, t = -2.91), which 
confirms the previous finding in models (1) and (2) that the presence of women directors on 
remuneration committees leads to less shareholder dissent when voting on annual 
remuneration reports.  
Similarly, in models (7) and (8), different time-events dummies other than year dummies are 
included for the estimation of foreign directors’ influence on say-on-pay, such as the financial 
crisis (2007), the Stewardship Code (2010) and the say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting 
(2013). The results also remain unchanged for both the OLS model and the logit model, 
implying that the presence of foreign directors leads to more shareholder dissatisfaction when 
they vote on annual remuneration reports. 
Consistent with the results from previous studies (e.g. Alissa, 2015; Carter and Zamora; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2013; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014), shareholders’ 
dissent is significantly higher in firms with higher CEO remuneration under both the OLS 
model and the logit model (see for example in models 1 and 2; β = 0.590, t = 11.54 and β = 
0.531, t = 5.38, respectively). 
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Table 6.7 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 
Main variables         
Women directors  -0.611*** -1.046***   -0.665*** -1.068***   
 (-3.31) (-2.82)   (-3.59) (-2.91)   
Foreign directors    0.366** 0.510**   0.409*** 0.552** 
   (2.50) (2.02)   (2.80) (2.22) 
Control variables          
Log CEO pay 0.590*** 0.531*** 0.579*** 0.504*** 0.549*** 0.492*** 0.539*** 0.472*** 
 (11.54) (5.38) (11.16) (5.25) (10.86) (5.07) (10.50) (4.99) 
Institutional ownership 0.150 -0.00444 0.128 -0.114 0.0998 -0.0704 0.0966 -0.161 
 (0.79) (-0.01) (0.67) (-0.35) (0.52) (-0.21) (0.50) (-0.49) 
Board size 0.00497 -0.0321 0.000239 -0.0413 0.0106 -0.0293 0.00556 -0.0394 
 (0.29) (-0.96) (0.01) (-1.23) (0.62) (-0.88) (0.32) (-1.18) 
Remuneration committee size 0.0116 0.0187 0.0149 0.00767 0.0175 0.0283 0.0190 0.0146 
 (0.38) (0.29) (0.48) (0.12) (0.56) (0.44) (0.61) (0.24) 
Board independence 0.762** 1.228** 0.581* 1.023* 0.654** 1.107* 0.416 0.874 
 (2.33) (2.06) (1.74) (1.73) (1.98) (1.87) (1.24) (1.49) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.153 -0.0173 -0.108 0.00219 -0.0826 0.0240 -0.0482 0.0331 
(-0.54) (-0.03) (-0.38) (0.00) (-0.29) (0.05) (-0.17) (0.07) 
CEO duality 0.283*** 0.514*** 0.283*** 0.540*** 0.297*** 0.522*** 0.300*** 0.546*** 
 (2.66) (2.83) (2.62) (3.07) (2.79) (2.89) (2.78) (3.11) 
Log total sales 0.0384 -0.0846 0.0196 -0.0905 0.0460 -0.0758 0.0268 -0.0840 
 (1.16) (-1.41) (0.59) (-1.55) (1.37) (-1.28) (0.79) (-1.45) 
Stock return -0.153 -0.132 -0.140 -0.111 -0.0922 -0.114 -0.123 -0.148 
 (-1.62) (-0.78) (-1.47) (-0.69) (-1.11) (-0.79) (-1.47) (-1.06) 
ROA -0.645 -1.667** -0.681 -1.564** -0.887** -1.879*** -0.878** -1.710** 
 (-1.50) (-2.34) (-1.53) (-2.25) (-2.05) (-2.63) (-1.98) (-2.47) 
MBV 0.000726 0.00543 0.000253 0.00490 0.00149 0.00594 0.000966 0.00527 
 (0.26) (1.15) (0.09) (1.08) (0.52) (1.21) (0.35) (1.14) 
Leverage 0.425* 0.115 0.387* 0.0691 0.407* 0.118 0.358 0.0624 
 (1.92) (0.29) (1.72) (0.18) (1.82) (0.30) (1.57) (0.16) 
Price volatility  0.0138*** 0.0183** 0.0146*** 0.0210*** 0.0147*** 0.0192** 0.0167*** 0.0225*** 
 (2.90) (2.20) (3.02) (2.61) (3.08) (2.35) (3.45) (2.85) 
Post 2007     -0.0381 0.352** -0.0387 0.366** 
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Table 6.7 Continued  
     (-0.43) (2.30) (-0.43) (2.45) 
Post 2010     0.462*** 0.145 0.217** -0.00319 
     (3.88) (0.70) (2.39) (-0.02) 
Post 2011     -0.290** -0.126   
     (-2.37) (-0.56)   
Post_2013     0.0340 0.0766 -0.134 -0.0994 
     (0.32) (0.39) (-1.37) (-0.57) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.047*** -5.955*** -8.693*** -5.885*** -9.483*** -6.370*** -10.05*** -9.651*** 
 (-14.39) (-5.43) (-13.58) (-5.42) (-15.36) (-5.75) (-9.19) (-4.64) 
N 2435 2449 2435 2449 2435 2449 775 780 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.157 0.060 0.154 0.059 0.139 0.052 0.157 0.099 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). 
Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. 
Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, 
which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s 
equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration 
committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in 
remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is 
firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by 
total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for 
each year. Post 2007 to account for the impact of financial crisis. Post 2010 to account for the impact of Stewardship Code. Post 2011 to account for the impact of Davies 
Report (2011). Post 2013 account for the impact of say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Regarding control variables, the results reveal that institutional ownership, board size and 
remuneration committee size have mixed results in relation to dissent votes. CEO duality has 
a significant positive association with a higher number of shareholder dissent votes for both 
the OLS model and the logit model. Previous studies, such as Conyon (2016) and Sauerwald 
et al. (2016), have shown that CEO duality leads to more shareholders’ dissent. In addition, 
the log of net sales has mixed results with shareholders’ dissent votes. Firm performance (as 
measured by ROA) has a marginal significant negative relationship with higher dissent votes 
under the logit model but not under the OLS model. Firm risk (as measured by price 
volatility) is positively associated with higher dissent votes for both the OLS model and the 
logit model. 
6.6.2 Two or more women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and their 
impact on say-on-pay 
This study performs an additional test to measure the relationship between the presence of 
women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and shareholder dissent. 
Specifically, firms that have only one woman on their remuneration committees and firms 
that have two or more12 women on their remuneration committees (see Table 6.8 for a 
summary of the results) are differentiated to see whether the impact will change. Models (1) 
and (2) of Table 6.8 show that firms with only one woman on their remuneration committees 
have an insignificant relationship with shareholders’ dissent, whereas models (4) and (5) 
report that firms with two or more women have a significant negative relationship with 
shareholder dissent (β = -0.359, t = -4.08 and β = -0.581, t = -2.97, respectively). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported, which confirms the view that only one woman on a remuneration 
committee largely dominated by male directors has no impact on say-on-pay dissent voting, 
                                                          
12 Since no previous studies have used critical mass theory on board sub-committees, this research suggests 
that the critical mass (threshold) is 2 given size of the remuneration committee (mean of 4). 
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as she might be not trusted, may be marginalised or seen as a token. However, when multiple 
women (two or more) sit on the remuneration committee, they are more likely to improve 
remuneration policy and to reduce shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay. This is consistent 
with some prior studies that found only three or more women directors on corporate boards 
increases firm outcomes, as having only one or two is insufficient (e.g. Joecks et al., 2013; 
Liu et al., 2014; Torchia et al., 2011).  
An additional test is estimated to determine whether the prior findings will vary if firms that 
have only one foreign director on their remuneration committees and firms that have two or 
more foreign directors on their remuneration committees are separated (see Table 6.8 for a 
summary of the results). Models (1) and (2) of Table 6.8 show that firms with only one 
foreign director on their remuneration committees have no impact on shareholder dissent; 
however, firms with two or more foreign directors have a significant positive relationship 
with shareholder dissent for only the OLS mode (β = 0.168, t = 2.04). Thus, Hypothesis 7 is 
partially supported. 
6.6.3 Women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and their impact on 
CEO pay 
Furthermore, this research investigates whether the presence of women and foreign directors 
on remuneration committees affects CEO remuneration.  
Table 6.9 presents regression results for the impact of women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees and different types of CEO remunerations, including total CEO 
remuneration, CEO cash remuneration, CEO equity remuneration and CEO bonus 
remuneration.  
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Table 6.8 Two or More Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee and the Impact on Shareholders’ Dissent 
Voting 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 
Main variables         
Women = 1 0.0528 0.0701       
 (0.79) (0.59)       
Foreign directors = 1   0.0261 0.0463     
   (0.36) (0.37)     
Women  ≥  2     -0.359*** -0.581***   
     (-4.08) (-2.97)   
Foreign directors  ≥ 2       0.168** 0.221 
       (2.04) (1.54) 
Control variables         
Log total CEO pay 0.542*** 0.478*** 0.549*** 0.487*** 0.553*** 0.496*** 0.542*** 0.476*** 
 (10.74) (4.99) (10.73) (5.12) (10.96) (5.16) (10.55) (5.01) 
Institutional ownership 0.0386 -0.165 0.0776 -0.189 0.0439 -0.154 0.0819 -0.190 
 (0.20) (-0.49) (0.40) (-0.57) (0.23) (-0.46) (0.43) (-0.57) 
Board size 0.0125 -0.0261 0.0117 -0.0322 0.00729 -0.0337 0.00895 -0.0353 
 (0.73) (-0.79) (0.67) (-0.98) (0.42) (-1.01) (0.51) (-1.06) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0149 0.0201 0.0131 0.00589 0.0477 0.0739 0.00413 -0.00748 
(0.48) (0.32) (0.42) (0.10) (1.47) (1.13) (0.13) (-0.12) 
Board independence 0.590* 1.045* 0.576* 1.067* 0.564* 0.975 0.483 0.968* 
 (1.79) (1.77) (1.73) (1.85) (1.71) (1.64) (1.44) (1.66) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.115 -0.0671 -0.128 -0.0611 -0.0179 0.0923 -0.0876 -0.0173 
(-0.40) (-0.13) (-0.44) (-0.12) (-0.06) (0.18) (-0.30) (-0.03) 
CEO duality 0.298*** 0.525*** 0.301*** 0.540*** 0.314*** 0.552*** 0.298*** 0.540*** 
 (2.79) (2.92) (2.80) (3.08) (2.96) (3.08) (2.76) (3.08) 
Log total sales 0.0329 -0.0958 0.0354 -0.0723 0.0409 -0.0836 0.0299 -0.0800 
 (0.98) (-1.62) (1.05) (-1.25) (1.22) (-1.40) (0.88) (-1.37) 
Stock return -0.0838 -0.102 -0.126 -0.153 -0.0881 -0.105 -0.122 -0.146 
 (-1.01) (-0.71) (-1.51) (-1.10) (-1.06) (-0.73) (-1.46) (-1.05) 
ROA -0.878** -1.840*** -0.857* -1.672** -0.879** -1.847*** -0.882** -1.708** 
 (-2.02) (-2.64) (-1.93) (-2.43) (-2.05) (-2.61) (-1.98) (-2.46) 
MBV 0.00153 0.00630 0.00142 0.00598 0.00158 0.00611 0.00121 0.00562 
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Table 6.8 Continued 
 (0.54) (1.27) (0.51) (1.25) (0.56) (1.27) (0.43) (1.19) 
Leverage 0.413* 0.122 0.404* 0.124 0.424* 0.157 0.377* 0.0907 
 (1.84) (0.31) (1.78) (0.33) (1.90) (0.40) (1.66) (0.24) 
Price volatility  0.0156*** 0.0207** 0.0168*** 0.0223*** 0.0154*** 0.0207** 0.0170*** 0.0226*** 
 (3.27) (2.57) (3.49) (2.83) (3.25) (2.54) (3.51) (2.87) 
Post 2007 -0.0391 0.347** -0.0446 0.354** -0.0449 0.344** -0.0402 0.362** 
 (-0.44) (2.28) (-0.50) (2.37) (-0.51) (2.25) (-0.45) (2.42) 
Post 2010 0.452*** 0.132 0.224** 0.00360 0.461*** 0.144 0.226** 0.00937 
 (3.80) (0.64) (2.47) (0.02) (3.87) (0.70) (2.48) (0.06) 
Post 2011 -0.345*** -0.201   -0.307** -0.151   
 (-2.81) (-0.91)   (-2.51) (-0.68)   
Post 2013 -0.0152 -0.00647 -0.130 -0.0948 0.0333 0.0666 -0.131 -0.0980 
 (-0.14) (-0.03) (-1.33) (-0.55) (0.31) (0.34) (-1.34) (-0.57) 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.270*** -6.042*** -9.293*** -6.379*** -9.600*** -6.517*** -9.142*** -6.085*** 
 (-14.97) (-5.50) (-14.82) (-5.89) (-15.40) (-5.78) (-14.45) (-5.50) 
N 2435 2449 2435 2449 2435 2449 2435 2449 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.136 0.048 0.132 0.051 0.139 0.052 0.134 0.052 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln (dissent/(1-dissent)). 
Women = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one woman. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women. Foreign 
director = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one foreign director. Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or 
more foreign directors. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional 
ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. 
Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine 
the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns 
is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price 
volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year.  Post 2007 to account for the impact of financial crisis. Post 2010 to 
account for the impact of Stewardship Code. Post 2011 to account for the impact of Davies Report (2011). Post 2013 account for the impact of say-on-pay mandatory and 
binding voting. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 6.9 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variables         
Women directors  0.150* -0.102 0.338** -0.244**     
 (1.84) (-1.48) (2.20) (-2.09)     
Foreign directors      0.166*** 0.132*** 0.244** 0.297*** 
     (2.72) (2.72) (2.26) (3.67) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.0557 -0.0197 -0.171 -0.144 -0.0522 -0.0292 -0.174 -0.170 
 (-0.62) (-0.29) (-1.10) (-1.24) (-0.58) (-0.42) (-1.12) (-1.47) 
Board size 0.0751*** 0.0443*** 0.0647*** 0.0516*** 0.0726*** 0.0431*** 0.0600*** 0.0494*** 
 (8.48) (6.42) (4.03) (4.36) (8.22) (6.28) (3.75) (4.20) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.000662 0.00703 0.0431 -0.0230 0.00218 0.00803 0.0443* -0.0215 
(0.04) (0.66) (1.85) (-1.20) (0.14) (0.76) (1.88) (-1.14) 
Board independence 0.939*** 0.506*** 1.058*** 0.797*** 0.917*** 0.459*** 1.031*** 0.700*** 
 (6.69) (4.84) (4.56) (4.33) (6.53) (4.42) (4.43) (3.77) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.672*** -0.449*** -0.463 -0.751*** -0.636*** -0.438*** -0.400* -0.729*** 
(-5.44) (-4.17) (-1.90) (-3.62) (-5.23) (-4.15) (-1.66) (-3.61) 
CEO duality -0.305*** -0.0507 -0.382*** -0.0706 -0.305*** -0.0532 -0.383*** -0.0743 
 (-6.09) (-1.37) (-3.43) (-1.03) (-6.09) (-1.45) (-3.42) (-1.09) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0493** 0.110*** 0.00567 0.103*** 0.0514*** 0.110*** 0.00906 0.103*** 
 (3.28) (7.68) (0.25) (5.07) (3.44) (7.72) (0.40) (5.10) 
Log total sales 0.225*** 0.172*** 0.313*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.165*** 0.313*** 0.200*** 
 (17.42) (16.24) (13.04) (11.60) (17.07) (15.34) (12.91) (10.77) 
Stock return 0.308*** 0.127*** 0.543*** 0.298*** 0.309*** 0.130*** 0.541*** 0.304*** 
 (7.35) (3.62) (8.45) (5.20) (7.37) (3.71) (8.49) (5.35) 
ROA 0.894*** 0.622*** 0.801* 0.957*** 0.872*** 0.617*** 0.752** 0.956*** 
 (4.30) (4.07) (2.15) (3.31) (4.19) (4.07) (2.03) (3.34) 
MBV 0.00151 0.00110 0.00276 0.00195 0.00134 0.000936 0.00241 0.00163 
 (1.72) (1.23) (1.65) (1.07) (1.60) (1.09) (1.46) (0.93) 
Leverage 0.210* 0.0651 0.239 0.0277 0.188** 0.0571 0.198 0.00817 
 (2.31) (0.90) (1.43) (0.19) (2.07) (0.79) (1.20) (0.06) 
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Table 6.9 Continued 
Price volatility  -0.00837*** -0.00448** -0.00953* -0.00488 -0.00844*** -0.00435*** -0.00970** -0.00453* 
 (-4.23) (-2.96) (-2.51) (-1.87) (-4.25) (-2.87) (-2.57) (-1.74) 
Foreign sales 0.00180*** 0.00222*** 0.00251** 0.00298*** 0.00141*** 0.00199*** 0.00192** 0.00252*** 
 (4.32) (7.23) (3.13) (5.28) (3.35) (6.32) (2.33) (4.36) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.970*** 3.892*** 1.567** 3.008*** 3.990*** 3.980*** 1.580*** 3.138*** 
 (15.78) (18.35) (3.07) (7.99) (15.66) (18.68) (3.02) (8.35) 
N 2150 2150 1920 1742 2150 2150 1920 1742 
R2 0.548 0.484 0.422 0.404 0.549 0.485 0.422 0.406 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women directors is proportion of women directors from total 
remuneration committee size. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is proportion of 
ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and 
chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book 
value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. 
Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.10 Two or More Women Directors on the Remuneration Committee and the Impact on CEO Pay 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variables         
Women = 1 0.0803* 0.0187 0.0324 -0.00352     
 (1.99) (0.58) (0.46) (-0.06)     
Women  ≥  2     -0.0181 -0.0779*** 0.0658 -0.104** 
     (-0.68) (-3.79) (1.42) (-2.94) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.140 -0.134* -0.288 -0.358** -0.134 -0.117 -0.302* -0.339** 
 (-1.57) (-2.03) (-1.95) (-3.26) (-1.50) (-1.77) (-2.03) (-3.11) 
Board size 0.0863*** 0.0522*** 0.0805*** 0.0617*** 0.0853*** 0.0527*** 0.0794*** 0.0626*** 
 (10.34) (7.87) (5.24) (5.34) (10.25) (7.99) (5.17) (5.45) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0238 0.0170 0.0642** -0.0117 0.0291 0.0176 0.0673** -0.0117 
(1.58) (1.60) (2.77) (-0.62) (1.96) (1.72) (2.87) (-0.64) 
Board independence 1.270*** 0.786*** 1.562*** 1.344*** 1.270*** 0.813*** 1.535*** 1.381*** 
 (9.49) (7.90) (7.09) (7.50) (9.51) (8.15) (6.97) (7.73) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.460*** -0.376*** -0.342 -0.575** -0.456*** -0.371*** -0.343 -0.560** 
(-3.69) (-3.52) (-1.49) (-2.93) (-3.66) (-3.48) (-1.50) (-2.85) 
CEO duality -0.284*** -0.0992** -0.308** -0.0703 -0.282*** -0.103** -0.300** -0.0762 
 (-6.00) (-2.75) (-3.00) (-1.06) (-5.94) (-2.87) (-2.94) (-1.15) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0518*** 0.103*** 0.0138 0.104*** 0.0525*** 0.104*** 0.0130 0.105*** 
 (3.61) (7.82) (0.64) (5.32) (3.66) (7.93) (0.60) (5.42) 
Log total sales 0.194*** 0.148*** 0.282*** 0.175*** 0.196*** 0.150*** 0.281*** 0.178*** 
 (14.97) (14.29) (12.09) (9.59) (15.31) (14.70) (12.10) (9.85) 
Stock return 0.287*** 0.103*** 0.510*** 0.227*** 0.287*** 0.101*** 0.513*** 0.225*** 
 (8.45) (3.77) (9.45) (4.95) (8.45) (3.72) (9.54) (4.93) 
ROA 0.798** 0.567*** 0.942* 1.087*** 0.796** 0.570*** 0.939* 1.095*** 
 (3.17) (4.07) (2.18) (4.08) (3.16) (4.04) (2.16) (4.09) 
MBV 0.00274 0.00125 0.00452 0.00214 0.00276 0.00122 0.00457 0.00206 
 (1.77) (1.49) (1.79) (1.25) (1.79) (1.45) (1.81) (1.21) 
Leverage 0.0867 -0.0325 0.0858 -0.128 0.0894 -0.0427 0.0970 -0.145 
 (0.92) (-0.45) (0.53) (-0.92) (0.95) (-0.59) (0.60) (-1.04) 
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Table 6.10 Continued 
Price volatility  -0.00970*** -0.00553*** -0.00715* -0.00510* -0.00980*** -0.00582*** -0.00698 -0.00550* 
 (-4.65) (-3.61) (-1.96) (-1.99) (-4.68) (-3.80) (-1.92) (-2.14) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.761*** 3.907*** 0.857* 2.374*** 3.720*** 3.876*** 0.868* 2.324*** 
 (14.55) (18.56) (2.06) (7.10) (14.49) (18.60) (2.08) (7.03) 
N 2423 2423 2136 1958 2423 2423 2136 1958 
R2 0.502 0.442 0.381 0.356 0.502 0.446 0.381 0.358 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee 
has one woman. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by 
institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent 
nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. 
Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of 
equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.11 Two or More Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee and the Impact on CEO Pay 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variables         
Foreign = 1 -0.00369 -0.0278 -0.0166 0.00792     
 (-0.11) (-1.13) (-0.29) (0.19)     
Foreign  ≥  2     0.0661* 0.0687** 0.144*** 0.152*** 
     (1.85) (2.56) (2.68) (3.39) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.0954 -0.0643 -0.264* -0.214* -0.0973 -0.0672 -0.277* -0.225** 
 (-1.05) (-0.94) (-1.74) (-1.92) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.83) (-2.03) 
Board size 0.0755*** 0.0424*** 0.0645*** 0.0461*** 0.0746*** 0.0413*** 0.0622*** 0.0440*** 
 (8.67) (6.19) (4.13) (3.98) (8.62) (6.03) (3.99) (3.80) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0273 0.0212* 0.0676** -0.00816 0.0231 0.0165 0.0573* -0.0175 
(1.80) (2.02) (2.93) (-0.44) (1.51) (1.56) (2.47) (-0.93) 
Board independence 1.035*** 0.532*** 1.229*** 0.876*** 1.007*** 0.507*** 1.173*** 0.813*** 
 (7.30) (5.11) (5.37) (4.85) (7.06) (4.86) (5.08) (4.49) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.474*** -0.420*** -0.349 -0.643*** -0.461*** -0.403*** -0.319 -0.615*** 
(-3.73) (-3.94) (-1.44) (-3.18) (-3.60) (-3.78) (-1.32) (-3.04) 
CEO duality -0.279*** -0.0889* -0.330** -0.0602 -0.279*** -0.0886** -0.330*** -0.0612 
 (-5.81) (-2.35) (-3.21) (-0.88) (-5.83) (-2.37) (-3.21) (-0.90) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0491*** 0.100*** 0.0177 0.104*** 0.0497*** 0.101*** 0.0188 0.106*** 
 (3.31) (7.22) (0.81) (5.22) (3.34) (7.28) (0.86) (5.34) 
Log total sales 0.200*** 0.156*** 0.290*** 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.153*** 0.283*** 0.187*** 
 (15.14) (14.85) (11.96) (10.72) (14.65) (14.38) (11.77) (10.28) 
Stock return 0.286*** 0.1000*** 0.504*** 0.215*** 0.287*** 0.101*** 0.504*** 0.217*** 
 (8.13) (3.56) (9.13) (4.63) (8.19) (3.59) (9.15) (4.72) 
ROA 0.768*** 0.648*** 0.751 1.096*** 0.759*** 0.644*** 0.739 1.082*** 
 (3.46) (4.40) (1.94) (3.98) (3.45) (4.39) (1.93) (3.99) 
MBV 0.00166 0.00122 0.00290 0.00193 0.00157 0.00115 0.00258 0.00170 
 (1.83) (1.34) (1.75) (1.04) (1.76) (1.28) (1.57) (0.92) 
Leverage 0.0827 -0.0346 0.109 -0.0835 0.0758 -0.0422 0.0889 -0.101 
 (0.86) (-0.46) (0.65) (-0.58) (0.79) (-0.56) (0.53) (-0.70) 
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Table 6.11 Continued 
Price volatility  -0.0111*** -0.00583*** -0.00971** -0.00668** -0.0110*** -0.00578*** -0.00936* -0.00616* 
 (-5.27) (-3.68) (-2.67) (-2.60) (-5.19) (-3.60) (-2.55) (-2.41) 
Foreign sales 0.00212*** 0.00231*** 0.00297*** 0.00355*** 0.00194*** 0.00209*** 0.00257** 0.00321*** 
 (4.98) (7.54) (3.67) (6.26) (4.54) (6.66) (3.18) (5.59) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.973*** 4.041*** 1.110* 2.463*** 4.027*** 4.097*** 1.282** 2.863*** 
 (16.03) (19.08) (2.57) (7.38) (16.08) (19.32) (2.96) (7.98) 
N 2274 2274 2006 1836 2274 2274 2006 1836 
R2 0.514 0.455 0.397 0.375 0.514 0.456 0.399 0.379 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Foreign = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee 
has one foreign. Foreign ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more foreign directors. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold 
by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent 
nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. 
Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of 
equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign 
sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.12 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration committee on CEO Pay using Indicators Variables 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variables         
Women dummy 0.0487* -0.0652** 0.132* -0.0877**     
 (1.65) (-2.82) (2.36) (-2.29)     
Foreign directors dummy     0.0618** 0.0350 0.110* 0.145*** 
     (2.04) (1.48) (1.93) (3.55) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.136 -0.0698 -0.331** -0.235** -0.131 -0.0857 -0.320** -0.263** 
 (-1.50) (-1.03) (-2.18) (-2.13) (-1.44) (-1.25) (-2.11) (-2.37) 
Board size 0.0756*** 0.0419*** 0.0656*** 0.0464*** 0.0741*** 0.0415*** 0.0627*** 0.0441*** 
 (8.76) (6.15) (4.20) (4.04) (8.56) (6.08) (4.03) (3.88) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0207 0.0248*** 0.0534*** -0.00228 0.0201 0.0165 0.0550*** -0.0205 
 (1.34) (2.30) (2.32) (-0.12) (1.29) (1.54) (2.29) (-1.07) 
Board independence 0.938*** 0.500*** 1.052*** 0.807*** 0.937*** 0.468*** 1.064*** 0.739*** 
 (6.66) (4.80) (4.56) (4.48) (6.64) (4.51) (4.64) (4.10) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.465*** -0.395*** -0.309 -0.598*** -0.438*** -0.394*** -0.269 -0.572*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.73) (-1.26) (-2.96) (-3.53) (-3.80) (-1.10) (-2.93) 
CEO duality -0.272*** -0.0810*** -0.316*** -0.0449 -0.271*** -0.0813*** -0.314*** -0.0451 
 (-5.68) (-2.15) (-3.08) (-0.66) (-5.66) (-2.16) (-3.04) (-0.67) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0440*** 0.1000*** 0.00667 0.103*** 0.0461*** 0.0989*** 0.0115 0.103*** 
 (2.94) (7.18) (0.30) (5.22) (3.11) (7.12) (0.52) (5.19) 
Log total sales 0.197*** 0.159*** 0.282*** 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.154*** 0.283*** 0.185*** 
 (14.88) (15.30) (11.58) (10.99) (14.70) (14.58) (11.27) (10.23) 
Stock return 0.310*** 0.123*** 0.506*** 0.280*** 0.308*** 0.127*** 0.497*** 0.284*** 
 (7.36) (3.59) (7.91) (5.02) (7.30) (3.69) (7.81) (5.09) 
ROA 0.643** 0.565*** 0.577 0.884** 0.647*** 0.563*** 0.578 0.898** 
 (2.91) (3.70) (1.52) (3.20) (2.92) (3.73) (1.52) (3.27) 
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Table 6.12 Continued 
MBV 0.00185** 0.00141 0.00308* 0.00215 0.00182** 0.00138 0.00293* 0.00208 
 (2.01) (1.57) (1.84) (1.17) (2.05) (1.54) (1.76) (1.15) 
Leverage 0.0968 -0.0324 0.130 -0.0824 0.0851 -0.0302 0.105 -0.0863 
 (1.02) (-0.44) (0.78) (-0.58) (0.90) (-0.41) (0.64) (-0.61) 
Price volatility  -0.0107*** -0.0058*** -0.00876** -0.00650** -0.0108*** -0.00558*** -0.00895** -0.00619** 
 (-5.09) (-3.66) (-2.42) (-2.55) (-5.14) (-3.54) (-2.48) (-2.45) 
Foreign sales 0.00211*** 0.00220*** 0.00300*** 0.00346*** 0.00182*** 0.00211*** 0.00245*** 0.00296*** 
 (5.01) (7.22) (3.74) (6.11) (4.27) (6.81) (2.86) (5.19) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.756*** 4.006*** 0.985** 2.887*** 3.783*** 4.106*** 0.991** 3.088*** 
 (15.86) (19.78) (2.20) (8.30) (15.78) (19.92) (2.16) (8.87) 
N 2270 2270 2002 1833 2270 2270 2002 1833 
R2 0.521 0.463 0.406 0.392 0.522 0.462 0.406 0.395 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the 
natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked 
remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women dummy is an indicator 
of 1 if firm has at least one woman director on its remuneration committees, 0 otherwise. Foreign directors is dummy is an indicator of 1 if firm has at least one foreign 
director on its remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s 
equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration 
committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in 
remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of 
years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock 
price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a 
stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s 
operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Model (1) reveals there is a marginal significant positive relationship between women 
directors on remuneration committees and total CEO remuneration (β = 0.150, t = 1.84). 
Model (2) repeats the same regression but with CEO cash remuneration. The results in model 
(2) show there is a negative association (but not significant) between the presence of women 
directors on remuneration committees and CEO cash pay. However, there is a significant 
negative relationship between women directors on remuneration committees and CEO bonus 
remuneration (β = -0.244, t = -2.09; see model [4]). CEO equity remuneration has a 
significant positive relationship with women directors on remuneration committees (β = 
0.338, t = 2.20).   
Contrary to Hypothesis 2’s predictions, results from Table 6.9 show that the relationship 
between women directors on remuneration committees and different types of CEO 
remunerations are mixed. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially rejected. Overall, women 
directors on remuneration committees lead to fewer CEO cash incentives in terms of bonuses; 
however, their presence on remuneration committees leads to more CEO equity-based 
incentives. This implies that firms with more women directors on remuneration committees 
prefer long-term incentive plans, such as equity remuneration. Previous studies based on the 
agent-based model found that the increased use of equity remuneration has strengthened the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and firm performance (e.g, Main et al., 1996; 
Murphy, 1999).  
The results in Table 6.9, model (5), show a significant positive effect of foreign directors on 
total CEO pay (β = 0.166, t = 2.72), suggesting that foreign directors are less effective 
monitors and can lead to higher CEO remuneration (Masulis et al., 2012). Thus, Hypothesis 6 
is supported. Additionally, the same regression in model 1 is repeated but with different 
measures of CEO remuneration, including CEO cash pay, CEO equity pay and CEO bonus 
pay. The results of these regressions (models 6-8) confirm the previous findings in model (1) 
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[β = 0.132, t = 2.72, β = 0.244, t = 2.26 and β = 0.297, t = 3.68], indicating the presence of 
foreign directors on remuneration committees can lead to higher CEO remuneration. 
As for other corporate governance control variables, board size has a significant positive 
association with total CEO remunerations. This is consistent with previous studies, such as 
Core et al. (1999), Ozkan (2007) and van Essen et al. (2015). This suggests that larger boards 
lead to miscommunication and a lack of organisation among directors, which means they are 
more likely to provide infective monitoring (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Similarly, and 
consistent with Core et al. (1999), Ozkan (2007) and van Essen et al. (2015), Table 6.9 shows 
that a higher proportion of non-executive independent directors leads to higher total CEO 
remuneration. In contrast, remuneration committee independence is found to be effective and 
significant in reducing CEO remuneration. As for CEO duality, the results in Table 6.9 reveal 
the relationship between CEO duality and CEO remuneration is mixed. This is consistent 
with some previous UK studies, such as Conyon (1997) and Conyon and Peck (1998). In 
contrast, CEO tenure is found to be significantly and positively associated with more total 
CEO remuneration.  
As for firm characteristics, firm size, as measured by total sales, has a significant and positive 
relationship with total CEO remuneration, implying that larger firms tend to distribute more 
CEO remuneration. This result confirms some previous studies, such as Tosi et al. (2000) and 
van Essen et al. (2015). Similarly, a higher proportion of foreign sales leads to more CEO 
remuneration. Masulis et al. (2012) have argued that firms with international operations, 
require experienced CEOs, and ultimately, experienced CEOs require higher remuneration. 
Table 6.9 also reports that firms with higher firm performance, as measured by both stock 
return and ROA, tend to have higher CEO remuneration. Unpredictably, results show that 
firms with more stock price volatility have less CEO remuneration.     
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6.6.4 Two or more women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and their 
impact on CEO pay 
This study also tests whether two or more women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees affects CEO remuneration. 
Tables 10 and 11 show the results for the impact of two or more women and foreign directors 
on remuneration committees and CEO pays (including total CEO remuneration, CEO cash 
remuneration, CEO equity remuneration and CEO bonus remuneration).  
Model (1) of Table 10 shows that remuneration committees with only one woman can lead to 
more CEO remuneration (β = 0.803, t = 1.99). Although, model (5) shows there is no 
significant relationship between two women and more directors on remuneration committees 
and total CEO remuneration, models 6 and 8 show a significant relationship between two 
women and more directors on remuneration committees and, CEO cash remuneration and 
CEO bonus remuneration (β = -0.0779, t = -3.79; β = -0.104, t = -2.94, respectively). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 is partially supported, which may indicate that only one woman on a 
remuneration committee largely dominated by male directors has no impact on reducing CEO 
pay, as they might be not trusted and seen as a token. However, when two or more women sit 
on the remuneration committee, they are more likely to reduce CEO cash payments. This is 
consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Torchia et al., 
2011).    
For foreign directors, models (1-4) of Table 6.11 reveal that firms with only one foreign 
director on their remuneration committees have no impact on CEO remuneration; however, 
firms with two or more foreign directors have a significant positive relationship with all types 
of CEO remunerations, including total CEO remuneration, CEO cash remuneration, CEO 
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equity remuneration and CEO bonus remuneration (β = 0.066, t = 1.85, β = 0.068, t = 2.56, β 
= 0.144, t = 2.68 and β = 0.150, t = 3.39, respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 8 is supported. 
6.6.5 Women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and their impact on 
CEO pay: further test 
In this sub-section, further analysis is performed to test the relationship between the presence 
of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and CEO remuneration; 
however, this time indicator variables (instead of continuous variables) are used to measure 
women and foreign directors, following Bugeja et al. (2015) and Masulis et al. (2012). 
Hence, women directors are measured as an indicator variable if firms have at least one 
woman director on their remuneration committees (women dummy). Similarly, foreign 
directors are measured as an indicator variable if firms have at least one foreign director on 
their remuneration committees (foreign directors dummy). 
Table 6.12 reveals the results of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees 
and their influence on CEO pay using indicator variables. For women directors, results 
remain relatively unchanged, except that in model (2), women directors have a more 
significant negative impact on CEO cash remuneration. As for foreign directors, the results 
remain consistent with the previous results in Table 6.9, except that foreign directors become 
less effective on CEO cash remuneration but still have a positive significant relationship in 
total CEO remuneration, CEO equity remuneration and CEO bonus remuneration.  
6.6.6 Endogenous estimations  
To ensure the robustness of the relationship between the presence of women and foreign 
directors on remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent voting, this research uses 
propensity score matching, following Bugeja et al. (2015) and Stathopoulos and Voulgaris 
(2016); whereas, the impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees on 
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CEO pay is also estimated using propensity score matching, following Armstrong and Ittner 
(2012), Bugeja et al. (2015) and Conyon et al. (2016), and the two-system generalised 
method of moments estimation (GMM), following Gregory-Smith (2012) and Lucas-Pérez et 
al. (2015).  
i. Propensity score matching 
First, this study runs propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to control for 
the self-selection bias and causality that may exist between women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent voting. Firms with and without women or 
foreign directors on their remuneration committees are matched using a nearest-neighbour 
algorithm with a calliper (and with no replacement)13. Following Bugeja et al. (2015), this 
study runs different matches based on different criteria. The first matching is based on the 
probability that a firm has at least one female on the remuneration committee (treatment 
variable) and is contingent upon firm size, board size, the percentage of women on the board 
and all other control variables (covariates variables). The second matching is based on the 
likelihood that a firm has at least one foreign director on the remuneration committee 
(treatment variable), depending upon firm size, board size, the percentage of foreign on the 
board and other control variables (covariates variables). The inclusion of these covariates is 
justified, as large firms or large boards tend to include more women (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Carter et al., 2003), and firms with more women on the board might have more women 
on the remuneration committee (Bugeja et al., 2015).  
Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics of matched firms with and without women and 
foreign directors on their remuneration committees. Somers’ D non-parametric test in Table 
6.11 shows that firm size, board size and women and foreign directors on the board are not 
                                                          
13 This study uses the psmatch2 command in Stata to estimate propensity matching. 
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significant, indicating that self-selection bias is becoming less of a concern. Remarkably, 
board size is negatively significant with firms that have women on their remuneration 
committees, indicating the presence of women on remuneration committees is not a result of 
a larger board size.  
Similar regressions to those in Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 are estimated after matching. Table 
6.13 shows the results are similar to the previous findings in Table 6.7, suggesting that 
women directors are negatively associated with shareholders’ dissent voting for both the OLS 
model and the logit model (β = -1.147, t = -3.52 and β = -1.640, t = -2.37, respectively). The 
results in Table 6.14 also confirm the previous findings in that foreign directors are positively 
driving shareholder dissent voting (β = 0.0339, t = 2.71 and β = 0.752, t = 1.92, respectively).  
Propensity score matching is also used for the second test of two or more women and two or 
more foreign directors on remuneration committees and their impact on shareholders’ dissent. 
Table 6.15 reports that firms with two or more women on remuneration committees have a 
significant negative impact on shareholders’ dissent for the OLS model (β = -0.543, t = -4.27) 
and for the logit model (β = -0.789, t = -2.92), while firms with only one woman on their 
remuneration committees have no impact. These results are consistent with the previous 
findings in Table 6.8. Similarly, firms with only two or more foreign directors have a 
significant positive influence on shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay for both the OLS 
model and the logit model (β = 0.017, t = 2.42 and β = 0.397, t = 1.87, respectively). These 
results are also consistent with the previous findings in Table 6.8.  
Furthermore, propensity score matching is used for the relationship between women and 
foreign directors on remuneration committees and CEO pay. Table 6.16 shows there is no 
impact between women on remuneration committees and total CEO remuneration. However, 
there is a negative significant relationship between women directors on remuneration 
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committees and CEO cash remuneration (β = -0.302, t = -2.96) and CEO bonus cash 
remuneration (β = -0.471, t = -2.65); this is relatively consistent with the previous findings in 
Table 6.9. Also, consistent with the prior results in Table 6.9, firms with more women on 
their remuneration committees are more likely to prefer equity-based remuneration for CEOs 
(β = 1.454, t = 2.93). Table 6.16 confirms that foreign directors on remuneration committees 
have a significant positive relationship with total CEO remuneration (β = 0.176, t = 2.02). 
Furthermore, the presence of foreign directors on remuneration committees was positively 
related to CEO equity (β = 0.279, t = 1.71) and bonus remuneration (β = 0.229, t = 1.97). 
However, after propensity score matching, no impact was found between foreign directors on 
remuneration committees and CEO cash pay.   
Consistent with the previous results in Table 10, Table 6.17 shows that there is a significant 
relationship between two or more women on remuneration committees and, CEO cash 
remuneration and CEO bonus remuneration after running propensity score matching (β = -
0.073, t = -2.71 and β = -0.098, t = -2.54, respectively). Similar to previous results in Table 
11, Table 6.18 reveals that only presence of two or more foreign directors on remuneration 
committees have impact on CEO remuneration; this include CEO total remuneration (β = 
0.179, t = 1.80), CEO cash remuneration (β = 0.230, t = 3.14) and CEO bonus remuneration 
(β = 0.359, t = 2.72).  
ii. Two-system GMM 
The two-system GMM is ideal when the dependent variable is dynamic (high movement) and 
when independent variables rarely change over time (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Gregory-
Smith (2012) argued that board size and other board characteristics have little movement over 
time. Furthermore, two-system GMM is an ideal control for autocorrelation of errors over 
time and heteroscedasticity between firms (Lucas-Pérez et al., 2015). 
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Table 6.19 presents the impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees 
regarding CEO remuneration using two-system GMM14. The findings in Table 6.19 are 
extremely similar to Table 6.9, suggesting the presence of women directors on remuneration 
committees leads to less cash remuneration in terms of bonuses (β = -0.239, t = -1.89) and to 
more equity-based CEO remuneration (β = 0.282, t = 1.68). This confirms the previous 
results in Table 6.9, which showed the presence of foreign directors on remuneration 
committees was significant and positively related to total CEO pay (β = 0.193, t = 2.36), CEO 
cash pay (β = 0.110, t = 1.66), CEO equity pay (β = 0.361, t = 1.84) and CEO bonus pay (β = 
0.316, t = 2.94).    
Tables 6.20 and 6.21 show the impact of two or more women on remuneration committees on 
CEO pay using two-system GMM. The results in Table 6.20 are similar to Table 6.10, 
revealing that only presence of two or more women on remuneration committees can lead to 
less CEO cash remuneration (β = -0.072, t = -2.87) and less CEO bonus remuneration (β = -
0.074, t = -1.83). Also, Table 6.21 shows similar results to Table 6.11, suggesting that only 
firms with two or more foreign directors on their remuneration committees have significant 
and positively impact on total CEO remuneration (β = 0.115, t = 2.13), CEO cash 
remuneration (β = 0.079, t = 2.03), CEO equity remuneration (β = 0.137, t = 1.99) and CEO 
bonus remuneration (β = 0.291, t = 3.89).    
                                                          
14 This study uses the xtabond2 command in Stata to estimate two-system GMM. 
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Table 6.13 Descriptive Statistics of Matched Firms with and without Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee 
 Mean Median Mean Median z P>|z| 
Panel A Firms with only male on remuneration 
committee 
Firms with gender-diverse remuneration 
committee 
Somers’D non-parametric test 
Log dissent  7.50 4.1 6.15 2.45 -3.41*** 0.001 
Dissent > 10% 0.255 0.00 0.173 0.00 -1.7* 0.090 
Women % 0.00 0.00 30.82 25.00 7.78*** 0.000 
Women = 1  0.00 0.00 0.754 1.00 27.53*** 0.000 
Women ≥ 2  0.00 0.00 0.235 0.00 15.00*** 0.000 
Women on board % 18.30 16.70 18.00 16.70 -1.45 0.145 
Log CEO pay 7.77 7.69 7.63 7.64 -2.40** 0.016 
Log CEO cash pay 7.07 7.08 6.82 6.82 -3.48*** 0.000 
Log CEO equity pay 6.82 7.14 7.05 7.12 -1.11 0.268 
Log CEO bonus pay 6.30 6.38 6.02 6.10 -3.37*** 0.001 
Institutional ownership % 30.80 28.40 35.60 33.70 2.01** 0.045 
Board size 10.22 10.00 9.32 9.77 -3.45*** 0.001 
Remuneration committee size 3.66 4.00 4.24 4.00 4.70*** 0.000 
Board independence % 58.80 60.00 59.80 60.00 -1.91* 0.056 
Remuneration committee independence % 94.60 100 95.10 100 -1.49 0.136 
CEO duality 0.112 0.00 0.079 0.00 -0.38 0.706 
Log CEO tenure 1.23 1.38 1.19 1.36 -0.31 0.754 
Log total sales 14.79 14.56 14.55 14.42 -1.55 0.120 
MBV 2.37 2.71 4.05 2.75 0.87 0.387 
Stock return % 15.50 9.80 12.20 9.30 -0.95 0.344 
ROA % 6.60 5.82 6.40 5.70 -0.37 0.709 
Leverage % 24.30 22.70 23.50 22.90 0.12 0.901 
Price volatility % 25.62 25.85 25.83 24.54 0.37 0.711 
Foreign sales % 47.98 56.61 46.21 50.17 -1.05 0.293 
Panel B Firms without foreign directors on 
remuneration committee 
Firms with foreign directors on remuneration 
committee 
 
Log dissent  5.11 2.30 7.10 3.05 0.63 0.531 
Dissent  > 10% 0.17 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.56 0.574 
Foreign directors % 0.00 0.00 43.00 33.33 7.78*** 0.000 
Foreign director = 1  0.00 0.00 0.52 1.00 24.40*** 0.000 
Foreign directors ≥ 2  0.00 0.00 0.480 0.00 22.88*** 0.000 
Foreign directors on board % 36.4 36.4 37.03 36.40 0.03 0.976 
Log CEO pay 7.63 7.70 7.70 7.70 1.68* 0.092 
Log CEO cash pay 7.00 7.08 6.90 6.90 0.82 0.415 
 
 
180 
 
Table 6.13 Continued 
Log CEO equity pay 6.88 7.05 7.14 7.21 1.65* 0.100 
Log CEO bonus pay 6.17 6.14 6.14 6.23 1.87* 0.062 
Institutional ownership % 26.32 22.65 31.32 27.91 2.16** 0.031 
Board size 10.19 10.00 9.34 9.00 -1.62 0.11 
Remuneration committee size 3.59 4.00 4.16 4.00 4.90*** 0.000 
Board independence % 54.65 54.54 59.31 60.00 1.99 0.046 
Remuneration committee independence % 94.10 100 94.32 100 0.25 0.802 
CEO duality 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.04 0.300 
Log CEO tenure 1.27 1.33 1.07 1.22 -0.07 0.98 
Log total sales 14.76 14.86 14.63 14.47 -0.30 0.765 
MBV 1.88 1.94 3.95 2.65 1.00 0.316 
Stock return % 5.33 6.06 14.17 10.00 1.86* 0.062 
ROA % 3.74 4.92 5.87 5.75 3.39 0.001 
Leverage % 25.62 26.86 24.15 23.85 -0.69 0.490 
Price volatility % 30.00 27.34 27.23 25.60 -2.43** 0.015 
Foreign sales % 69.47 82.73 62.37 70.6 -0.65 0.517 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent. Dissent > 10% is an 
indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women=1 is an indicator of 1 of a 
remuneration committee has one woman. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women. Women on board is proportion of women from total board 
size. Women dummy an indicator variable if firms have at least one woman director on their remuneration committees. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from total 
remuneration committee size. Foreign director = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one foreign director. Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration 
committee has two or more foreign directors. Foreign directors on board is proportion of foreign directors from total board size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total 
remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural logarithm of CEO’s salary, bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log CEO equity is 
the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. 
Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration 
committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 
otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total 
assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign 
country’s operation.  
 ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.14 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting for the Post-Match 
Sample 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)  Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 
Main variables          
Women directors  -1.150*** -1.799**   -1.230*** -1.862**   
 (-3.01) (-2.45)   (-2.76) (-2.44)   
Foreign directors    0.0379*** 0.750*   0.0396*** 0.823** 
   (3.00) (1.84)   (3.06) (2.01) 
Control variables          
Log CEO pay 0.497*** 0.536*** 0.0148*** 0.412* 0.453*** 0.427** 0.0130*** 0.393 
 (5.26) (2.57) (3.05) (1.78) (5.18) (2.49) (2.58) (1.60) 
Institutional ownership 0.647* 1.876*** 0.0191 0.0369 0.350 1.152* 0.0227 0.150 
 (1.66) (2.64) (0.98) (0.06) (0.84) (1.74) (1.15) (0.24) 
Board size 0.0459 0.0170 0.00207 0.0414 0.0529 0.0261 0.00242 0.0425 
 (1.25) (0.26) (1.05) (0.57) (1.14) (0.32) (0.99) (0.51) 
Remuneration committee size 0.134 0.692 0.00182 0.0940 -0.197 0.225 -0.0142 -0.403 
 (0.19) (0.53) (0.06) (0.07) (-0.24) (0.16) (-0.43) (-0.31) 
Board independence 0.117** 0.165 0.00000315 0.0799 0.117* 0.156 0.000932 0.112 
 (1.97) (1.21) (0.00) (0.73) (1.77) (1.10) (0.32) (0.96) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
0.582 1.745 0.0568** 2.380*** 0.788 1.965 0.0605** 2.598*** 
 (1.08) (1.31) (2.39) (2.60) (1.42) (1.42) (2.32) (2.58) 
CEO duality 0.558*** 1.540*** 0.0154 0.734** 0.629*** 1.520*** 0.0118 0.615 
 (2.66) (4.18) (1.30) (2.13) (2.96) (4.14) (0.90) (1.42) 
Log total sales -0.0255 -0.136 -0.00182 -0.153 -0.0589 -0.190 -0.00134 -0.141 
 (-0.41) (-1.17) (-0.59) (-1.57) (-0.70) (-1.31) (-0.41) (-1.45) 
Stock return -0.00646 0.000120 0.000328 0.0200* -0.0102 -0.00539 0.000368 0.0203* 
 (-1.20) (0.02) (0.95) (1.66) (-1.39) (-0.83) (1.03) (1.70) 
ROA 0.0564 0.113 0.00388 -0.162 -0.195 -0.232 -0.000275 -0.130 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.45) (-0.55) (-1.24) (-0.75) (-0.03) (-0.41) 
MBV -0.998 -2.544* -0.0658 -3.640** -1.179 -2.161 -0.0640 -3.726** 
 (-1.38) (-1.87) (-1.60) (-2.45) (-1.43) (-1.57) (-1.63) (-2.36) 
Leverage -0.400 -1.000 0.0144 0.0260 -0.548 -1.085 0.0103 -0.120 
 (-1.12) (-1.33) (0.65) (0.04) (-1.40) (-1.48) (0.44) (-0.16) 
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Table 6.14 Continued 
Price volatility  0.00772 0.0252 0.000926* 0.0104 0.0111 0.0327* 0.00113** 0.0156 
 (0.77) (1.39) (1.80) (0.73) (1.00) (1.81) (2.23) (1.08) 
Post 2007     0.213 0.710* 0.0257*** 0.912*** 
     (0.96) (1.72) (3.14) (2.65) 
Post 2010     0.162 -0.175 0.00512 0.0776 
     (0.68) (-0.43) (0.49) (0.23) 
Post 2011     0.0990 0.450 -0.0158* -0.458 
     (0.38) (0.91) (-1.65) (-1.56) 
Post_2013     -0.326 -0.585 0.0130*** 0.393 
     (-1.31) (-1.36) (2.58) (1.60) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -8.441*** -7.505*** -0.181*** -6.905*** -8.595*** -6.619** -0.177*** -7.647*** 
 (-5.85) (-3.02) (-2.67) (-3.55) (-5.91) (-2.35) (-2.64) (-3.67) 
N 1024 1024 1240 1240 1024 1024 1240 1240 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.188 0.140 0.112 0.113 0.161 0.125 0.089 0.091 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). 
Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Foreign 
directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include 
cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is 
total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of 
directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO 
duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is 
the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Post 2007 to account for the 
impact of financial crisis. Post 2010 to account for the impact of Stewardship Code. Post 2011 to account for the impact of Davies Report (2011). Post 2013 account for the 
impact of say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.15 Two or More Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee and the Impact on Shareholders’ Dissent 
Voting for the Post-Match Sample 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10  Log dissent Dissent>10  Log dissent Dissent>10  Log dissent Dissent>10 % 
Main variables         
Women = 1 -0.130 -0.134       
 (-1.01) (-0.62)       
Foreign directors = 1   -0.164 0.0440     
   (-1.63) (0.22)     
Women ≥ 2     -0.485*** -0.789***   
     (-3.05) (-2.90)   
Foreign directors  ≥  2       0.203* 0.421* 
       (1.90) (1.73) 
Control variables         
Log total CEO pay 0.531*** 0.554*** 0.444*** 0.415* 0.555*** 0.591*** 0.434*** 0.393 
 (6.17) (3.48) (4.76) (1.66) (6.62) (3.63) (4.65) (1.60) 
Institutional ownership 0.468 0.983 -0.115 0.110 0.434 0.927 -0.109 0.110 
 (1.21) (1.53) (-0.37) (0.18) (1.12) (1.47) (-0.35) (0.18) 
Board size 0.0649* 0.0724 0.0266 0.0240 0.0565 0.0593 0.0342 0.0317 
 (1.69) (1.13) (0.82) (0.29) (1.43) (0.89) (1.06) (0.37) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.327 1.188 -0.0794 -0.280 0.189 0.955 -0.0909 -0.450 
(0.43) (0.92) (-0.14) (-0.22) (0.25) (0.73) (-0.16) (-0.35) 
Board independence 0.0663 0.144 0.00924 0.108 0.116* 0.225* -0.00344 0.0745 
 (1.23) (1.29) (0.18) (0.91) (1.90) (1.84) (-0.07) (0.60) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
0.385 0.395 0.961** 2.695** 0.558 0.654 0.937** 2.661*** 
(0.70) (0.34) (2.47) (2.54) (0.99) (0.55) (2.44) (2.61) 
CEO duality 0.536*** 1.334*** 0.318* 0.665 0.581*** 1.419*** 0.287 0.621 
 (2.96) (3.96) (1.68) (1.47) (3.20) (4.16) (1.54) (1.41) 
Log total sales -0.0437 -0.254** 0.0143 -0.118 -0.0352 -0.244** 0.00691 -0.136 
 (-0.67) (-2.15) (0.27) (-1.17) (-0.53) (-2.00) (0.13) (-1.37) 
Stock return -0.134 -0.211 -0.0669 -0.107 -0.145 -0.233 -0.0801 -0.121 
 (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.50) (-0.34) (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.60) (-0.39) 
ROA -1.381* -2.353* -1.452** -3.495** -1.414* -2.532** -1.487** -3.665** 
 (-1.83) (-1.87) (-2.04) (-2.22) (-1.91) (-2.00) (-2.08) (-2.33) 
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Table 6.15 Continued 
MBV -0.00933 -0.00426 0.00581 0.0231* -0.00917 -0.00413 0.00545 0.0218* 
 (-1.25) (-0.66) (1.37) (1.88) (-1.26) (-0.65) (1.34) (1.79) 
Leverage -0.589* -0.948 0.522 -0.110 -0.539 -0.854 0.550 -0.152 
 (-1.65) (-1.35) (1.40) (-0.14) (-1.50) (-1.20) (1.47) (-0.20) 
Price volatility  0.0144 0.0388** 0.00460 0.0123 0.0158 0.0420** 0.00568 0.0145 
 (1.32) (2.40) (0.59) (0.87) (1.47) (2.56) (0.73) (1.02) 
Post 2007 0.0361 0.577 0.243 0.854** 0.0237 0.561 0.266* 0.890** 
 (0.20) (1.60) (1.62) (2.42) (0.13) (1.56) (1.78) (2.54) 
Post 2010 0.398* -0.0232 0.181 0.0960 0.404* -0.0188 0.172 0.0953 
 (1.73) (-0.05) (1.30) (0.28) (1.74) (-0.04) (1.23) (0.28) 
Post 2011 0.00791 0.509   0.0460 0.568   
 (0.03) (1.06)   (0.18) (1.17)   
Post 2013 -0.358 -0.739** -0.263* -0.413 -0.310 -0.682* -0.287** -0.450 
 (-1.54) (-2.02) (-1.89) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.89) (-2.06) (-1.53) 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.272*** -6.001*** -9.201*** -7.941*** -9.968*** -6.898*** -9.123*** -7.365*** 
 (-8.30) (-2.88) (-10.23) (-3.69) (-7.66) (-2.90) (-9.91) (-3.43) 
N 1564 1564 1235 1240 1586 1586 1235 1240 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.146 0.117 0.176 0.086 0.145 0.105 0.177 0.089 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). 
Women = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one woman. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women. Foreign 
director = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one foreign director. Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more 
foreign directors. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is 
proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration 
committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO 
and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price 
appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's 
average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year.  Post 2007 to account for the impact of financial crisis. Post 2010 to account for the 
impact of Stewardship Code. Post 2011 to account for the impact of Davies Report (2011). Post 2013 account for the impact of say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.16 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay for the Post-Match Sample 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Main variables         
Women directors  0.0957 -0.302** 1.454** -0.471**     
 (0.73) (-2.96) (2.93) (-2.65)     
Foreign directors      0.176** 0.0473 0.279* 0.229** 
     (2.02) (0.75) (1.71) (1.97) 
Control variables         
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.396* -0.0960 -0.648 -0.144 -0.362*** -0.288*** -0.620*** -0.438** 
 (-2.39) (-0.75) (-1.47) (-0.66) (-2.79) (-2.70) (-3.03) (-2.45) 
Board size 0.0541*** 0.0348** 0.0346 0.0652** 0.0631*** 0.0450*** 0.0746*** 0.0374*** 
 (3.51) (2.78) (0.79) (3.15) (5.34) (5.92) (4.50) (2.72) 
Remuneration 
committee size 
0.0152 0.00489 0.0586 0.0127 0.0480** 0.0243* 0.0392 -0.000683 
 (0.63) (0.28) (0.76) (0.41) (2.19) (1.79) (1.43) (-0.03) 
Board independence 0.103 0.217 -1.303* 0.130 0.486 0.322** 0.938*** 0.287 
 (0.43) (1.19) (-1.99) (0.37) (1.58) (2.02) (2.64) (0.94) 
Remuneration 
committee 
independence 
-0.387 -0.281 -0.322 -0.473 -0.619*** -0.359*** -0.437* -0.376 
 (-1.69) (-1.32) (-0.74) (-1.30) (-4.21) (-3.17) (-1.84) (-1.37) 
CEO duality -0.306** 0.122 -1.532*** 0.201 -0.475*** -0.102* -0.535*** -0.271** 
 (-2.94) (1.45) (-4.69) (1.41) (-6.41) (-1.67) (-4.74) (-2.34) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0430 0.0965*** -0.130 0.0323 0.0664** 0.137*** 0.0644* 0.138*** 
 (1.54) (4.40) (-1.88) (0.83) (2.52) (6.67) (1.92) (4.50) 
Log total sales 0.213*** 0.148*** 0.308*** 0.147*** 0.208*** 0.152*** 0.299*** 0.204*** 
 (8.74) (7.81) (4.90) (4.49) (11.60) (9.99) (10.20) (7.41) 
Stock return 0.325*** 0.179*** 0.449** 0.257*** 0.295*** 0.111** 0.433*** 0.239*** 
 (4.84) (3.57) (2.98) (3.80) (4.80) (2.06) (4.74) (2.66) 
ROA 1.099*** 0.488* 2.692** 0.326 0.369 0.301 -0.338 0.291 
 (3.47) (2.06) (2.92) (0.79) (1.16) (1.06) (-0.77) (0.64) 
MBV 0.00184 -0.00141 0.00413 -0.00440 0.000751 0.000469 -0.000166 0.00122 
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 (1.38) (-1.15) (1.26) (-1.47) (0.65) (0.35) (-0.09) (0.54) 
Leverage -0.168 -0.254 0.549 -0.725** 0.443*** 0.395*** 0.263 0.399* 
 (-0.91) (-1.84) (1.36) (-2.60) (3.07) (3.48) (1.28) (1.91) 
Price volatility  -0.0147*** -0.0130*** -0.00965 -0.0231*** -0.00485 -0.00128 -0.00588 -0.00244 
 (-4.68) (-4.93) (-0.86) (-4.18) (-1.63) (-0.50) (-1.00) (-0.62) 
Foreign sales 0.00397*** 0.00279*** 0.00986*** 0.00465*** 0.00133* 0.00250*** 0.00226** 0.00357*** 
 (5.08) (4.89) (3.65) (3.96) (1.84) (4.87) (2.15) (3.75) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.729*** 4.710*** 2.272 3.469*** 3.489*** 3.600*** 0.805 2.884*** 
 (8.30) (10.69) (1.44) (5.28) (10.02) (11.78) (1.28) (5.40) 
N 942 942 853 730 1437 1437 1307 1144 
R2 0.581 0.525 0.483 0.438 0.606 0.578 0.500 0.500 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total 
remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted 
and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women directors is proportion of women directors from total remuneration 
committee size. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by 
institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent 
nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log 
CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the 
total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total 
sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.17 Two or More Women Directors on the Remuneration Committee and Impact on CEO Pay for the Post-Match Sample 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Main variables         
Women = 1 0.117*** 0.00609 0.167* -0.0117     
 (2.66) (0.17) (1.73) (-0.18)     
Women ≥ 2     0.0208 -0.0731*** 0.172** -0.0982** 
     (0.63) (-2.71) (2.49) (-2.54) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.261** -0.0482 -0.599*** -0.298* -0.260** -0.0507 -0.596*** -0.310* 
 (-2.22) (-0.40) (-2.72) (-1.86) (-2.21) (-0.42) (-2.70) (-1.95) 
Board size 0.0843*** 0.0524*** 0.0776** 0.0498*** 0.0828*** 0.0531*** 0.0739** 0.0509*** 
 (7.71) (6.33) (2.56) (4.48) (7.59) (6.53) (2.48) (4.64) 
Remuneration 
committee size 
0.0181 0.0304** 0.0227 0.0197 0.0254 0.0278** 0.0402 0.0154 
 (0.97) (2.34) (0.55) (0.83) (1.35) (2.16) (1.00) (0.68) 
Board independence 1.245*** 0.840*** 1.410*** 1.440*** 1.225*** 0.840*** 1.378*** 1.440*** 
 (6.21) (6.13) (3.74) (6.99) (6.08) (6.05) (3.64) (7.01) 
Remuneration 
committee 
independence 
-0.411*** -0.271** -0.605** -0.332* -0.403*** -0.260** -0.608** -0.309* 
 (-2.98) (-2.54) (-2.20) (-1.79) (-2.95) (-2.44) (-2.24) (-1.65) 
CEO duality -0.310*** -0.0954* -0.596** 0.0670 -0.302*** -0.0994* -0.565** 0.0606 
 (-4.05) (-1.75) (-2.18) (0.79) (-3.93) (-1.81) (-2.11) (0.72) 
Log total sales 0.171*** 0.149*** 0.233*** 0.191*** 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.242*** 0.186*** 
 (8.37) (9.52) (5.92) (9.31) (8.55) (9.11) (6.25) (9.21) 
Stock return 0.403*** 0.262*** 0.544*** 0.403*** 0.406*** 0.261*** 0.556*** 0.401*** 
 (7.74) (4.97) (5.35) (6.28) (7.82) (4.92) (5.53) (6.31) 
ROA 1.102*** 0.655*** 1.387** 0.843** 1.094*** 0.657*** 1.368** 0.851** 
 (3.39) (2.93) (2.31) (2.45) (3.36) (2.92) (2.28) (2.45) 
MBV 0.00359* 0.000664 0.00590* 0.00268* 0.00359* 0.000647 0.00596* 0.00268* 
 (1.84) (0.73) (1.69) (1.74) (1.85) (0.72) (1.72) (1.76) 
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Table 6.17 Continued 
         
Leverage -0.0789 -0.165* 0.222 -0.356** -0.0601 -0.168* 0.250 -0.362** 
 (-0.65) (-1.77) (0.89) (-2.17) (-0.49) (-1.78) (1.00) (-2.20) 
Price volatility  -0.0125*** -0.0106*** -0.00982 -0.0139*** -0.0124*** -0.0109*** -0.00922 -0.0143*** 
 (-4.47) (-5.09) (-1.35) (-4.07) (-4.41) (-5.20) (-1.27) (-4.19) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.933*** 3.816*** 2.169** 2.835*** 3.862*** 3.897*** 1.890** 2.955*** 
 (11.92) (11.40) (2.33) (6.01) (11.74) (11.27) (2.05) (6.26) 
N 1975 1975 1756 1586 1975 1975 1756 1586 
R2 0.495 0.439 0.327 0.423 0.493 0.442 0.330 0.426 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total 
remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted 
and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has one 
woman. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional 
investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive 
directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is 
natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is 
average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a 
high and low from a mean price for each year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.18 Two or More Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee and Impact on CEO Pay for the Post-Match Sample 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Main variables         
Foreign directors = 1 0.0457 -0.0129 -0.0756 0.0246     
 (0.45) (-0.17) (-0.41) (0.15)     
Foreign directors  ≥  2     0.179* 0.230*** 0.163 0.359*** 
     (1.80) (3.14) (0.97) (2.72) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership 0.161 -0.0717 -0.392 -0.574 0.149 -0.0858 -0.415 -0.583* 
 (0.52) (-0.36) (-0.84) (-1.65) (0.49) (-0.44) (-0.89) (-1.71) 
Board size 0.113*** 0.0561*** 0.0558 0.0774*** 0.110*** 0.0537*** 0.0556 0.0769*** 
 (3.71) (3.14) (1.06) (2.74) (3.61) (3.08) (1.09) (2.68) 
Remuneration 
committee size 
-0.0496 -0.0229 0.00626 -0.101 -0.0598 -0.0356 -0.00599 -0.119 
 (-0.98) (-0.65) (0.08) (-1.32) (-1.16) (-1.01) (-0.07) (-1.58) 
Board independence 0.801* 0.148 1.218 1.192* 0.738* 0.0705 1.180 1.139* 
 (1.80) (0.52) (1.43) (1.76) (1.68) (0.25) (1.42) (1.72) 
Remuneration 
committee 
independence 
-0.314 -0.417 0.172 -1.092** -0.334 -0.428 0.161 -1.145** 
 (-0.73) (-1.40) (0.24) (-2.06) (-0.78) (-1.48) (0.22) (-2.25) 
CEO duality -0.241* -0.0657 0.00382 -0.208 -0.243* -0.0631 0.00338 -0.208 
 (-1.68) (-0.64) (0.01) (-0.83) (-1.68) (-0.64) (0.01) (-0.83) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0287 0.0731** 0.00558 0.179*** 0.0305 0.0727** 0.00454 0.179*** 
 (0.69) (2.28) (0.08) (2.94) (0.73) (2.35) (0.07) (3.00) 
Log total sales 0.206*** 0.145*** 0.284*** 0.0535 0.199*** 0.140*** 0.282*** 0.0462 
 (4.02) (4.32) (3.25) (0.80) (3.99) (4.29) (3.18) (0.72) 
Stock return 0.352*** 0.180** 0.480*** 0.347*** 0.344*** 0.170** 0.471*** 0.336*** 
 (3.91) (2.13) (3.34) (2.66) (3.76) (2.07) (3.20) (2.71) 
ROA 0.983 0.871* 0.883 1.569** 0.880 0.765 0.832 1.414* 
 (1.63) (1.77) (0.98) (2.15) (1.47) (1.63) (0.96) (1.96) 
MBV -0.00247 -0.000686 -0.00276 0.00549 -0.00198 -0.0000652 -0.00244 0.00644 
 (-0.99) (-0.32) (-0.44) (1.24) (-0.78) (-0.03) (-0.38) (1.38) 
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Table 6.18 Continued 
         
Leverage 0.0568 0.228 -0.350 -0.00160 0.0263 0.200 -0.380 -0.110 
 (0.19) (0.97) (-0.70) (-0.00) (0.09) (0.86) (-0.76) (-0.29) 
Price volatility  -0.00602 -0.000150 -0.0115 0.0134* -0.00721 -0.00108 -0.0118 0.0113 
 (-0.97) (-0.03) (-1.31) (1.84) (-1.18) (-0.23) (-1.41) (1.56) 
Foreign sales 0.00148 0.00263** 0.00271 0.00123 0.000981 0.00206** 0.00247 0.000441 
 (0.85) (2.42) (0.92) (0.55) (0.58) (1.98) (0.83) (0.20) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.933*** 3.816*** 2.169** 2.835*** 3.862*** 3.897*** 1.890** 2.955*** 
 (11.92) (11.40) (2.33) (6.01) (11.74) (11.27) (2.05) (6.26) 
N 1975 1975 1756 1586 1975 1975 1756 1586 
R2 0.495 0.439 0.327 0.423 0.493 0.442 0.330 0.426 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total 
remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted 
and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Foreign director = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has 
one foreign director. Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more foreign directors. Institutional ownership is proportion of 
ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 
0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of 
equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales 
is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.19 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay using Two-Steps GMM 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Lagged dependent variables         
Log total CEO pay t-1 0.0963    0.405*    
 (1.90)    (1.67)    
Log CEO cash pay t-1  0.325    0.338**   
  (1.93)    (2.22)   
Log CEO equity pay t-1   0.151    -0.350***  
   (0.67)    (-9.18)  
Log CEO bonus pay t-1    0.457**    0.422*** 
    (3.12)    (2.84) 
Main independent variables         
Women directors  0.172 -0.0956 0.282* -0.239*     
 (1.61) (-1.32) (1.68) (-1.89)     
Foreign directors      0.193** 0.110* 0.361* 0.316*** 
     (2.36) (1.66) (1.84) (2.94) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.0879 -0.0557 -0.00298 -0.204 -0.0957 -0.0452 -0.460* -0.242* 
 (-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.02) (-1.54) (-0.97) (-0.57) (-1.65) (-1.79) 
Board size 0.0649*** 0.0213* 0.0447* 0.0283 0.0335** 0.0208** 0.0695*** 0.0275* 
 (6.17) (2.53) (2.53) (1.68) (2.49) (2.43) (2.91) (1.67) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
-0.0194 0.00794 0.0151 -0.00777 -0.00592 0.00751 -0.00592 -0.0266 
 (-0.85) (0.59) (0.54) (-0.35) (-0.28) (0.52) (-0.12) (-1.22) 
Board independence 0.700** 0.291 0.769* 0.278 0.408 0.170 1.394** 0.166 
 (3.21) (1.93) (2.03) (1.15) (1.42) (1.15) (2.42) (0.64) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.531* -0.157 -0.235 -0.412 -0.224 -0.162 -0.833 -0.618* 
 (-2.43) (-1.13) (-0.70) (-1.17) (-1.04) (-1.12) (-1.49) (-1.77) 
CEO duality -0.282*** -0.0735 -0.183 -0.0156 -0.285*** -0.0906 -0.300 -0.0322 
 (-3.93) (-1.36) (-1.58) (-0.17) (-3.31) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-0.37) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0590*** 0.124*** 0.0311 0.121*** 0.0619*** 0.112*** 0.0551* 0.112*** 
 (3.40) (8.00) (1.31) (4.94) (3.41) (7.22) (1.80) (4.55) 
Log total sales 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.271** 0.0976** 0.128* 0.122*** 0.442*** 0.0880** 
 (8.61) (3.58) (3.28) (2.62) (1.88) (3.75) (9.30) (2.40) 
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Table 6.19 Continued 
Stock return 0.314*** 0.153*** 0.577*** 0.379*** 0.392*** 0.159*** 0.487*** 0.364*** 
 (12.17) (3.80) (8.42) (6.81) (7.94) (4.48) (8.02) (6.57) 
ROA 0.190 0.303 0.00646 0.0289 0.195 0.325* 0.971 0.207 
 (0.79) (1.62) (0.01) (0.08) (0.70) (1.78) (1.63) (0.57) 
MBV 0.00132 0.000571 0.00301 0.00138 0.00150 0.000453 0.00212 0.00144 
 (1.53) (1.00) (1.64) (1.01) (1.61) (0.71) (1.22) (0.96) 
Leverage 0.0420 0.0812 0.0215 0.0144 0.106 0.112 0.00888 -0.0115 
 (0.31) (0.86) (0.11) (0.09) (0.93) (1.11) (0.03) (-0.07) 
Price volatility  -0.00904*** -0.00154 -0.0108* -0.00224 -0.00543** -0.00186 -0.0140 -0.00238 
 (-3.31) (-0.73) (-2.47) (-0.76) (-2.16) (-0.88) (-1.60) (-0.71) 
Foreign sales 0.00153* 0.00130** 0.00204* 0.000749 0.000725 0.00106** 0.00243 -0.000022 
 (2.40) (2.81) (2.02) (0.98) (1.23) (2.30) (1.61) (-0.03) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant  3.424*** 2.457*** 1.363* 2.093** 2.382*** 2.426*** 2.536*** 2.762*** 
 (7.73) (3.44) (2.01) (2.67) (2.83) (3.62) (2.58) (3.32) 
N 1973 1974 1648 1435 1973 1974 1648 1435 
chi2 1301.3 1379.2 796.5 814.0 1789.9 1267.3 533.3 816.4 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted 
stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women directors is proportion of women directors 
from total remuneration committee size. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is 
proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if 
CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of 
firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average 
equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a 
high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.20 Two or More Women Directors on the Remuneration Committee and Impact on CEO Pay using Two-Steps GMM 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Lagged dependent variables         
Log total CEO pay t-1 0.0826    0.111*    
 (1.36)    (1.73)    
Log CEO cash pay t-1  0.148***    0.135***   
  (2.91)    (2.99)   
Log CEO equity pay t-1   0.0640    0.0581  
   (0.99)    (0.73)  
Log CEO bonus pay t-1    0.283***    0.293*** 
    (4.63)    (4.42) 
Main independent variables         
Women = 1 0.117** 0.0875** 0.138** 0.100     
 (2.15) (2.10) (2.28) (1.20)     
Women ≥ 2     -0.0270 -0.0722*** 0.0156 -0.0743* 
     (-0.83) (-2.87) (0.30) (-1.88) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.145 -0.0746 -0.132 -0.178 -0.185 -0.118 -0.120 -0.211 
 (-1.10) (-0.78) (-0.63) (-1.26) (-1.49) (-1.34) (-0.57) (-1.41) 
Board size 0.0620*** 0.0280** 0.0487*** 0.0334* 0.0629*** 0.0257** 0.0508*** 0.0323 
 (4.67) (2.40) (2.91) (1.82) (4.70) (2.29) (3.04) (1.64) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.0134 0.00824 0.00906 -0.0222 0.00189 0.0240 0.0250 -0.00696 
 (0.55) (0.46) (0.29) (-0.83) (0.08) (1.40) (0.74) (-0.26) 
Board independence 0.618** 0.257* 1.067*** 0.485* 0.923*** 0.378** 1.004** 0.443 
 (2.56) (1.66) (2.82) (1.74) (3.68) (2.40) (2.29) (1.64) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.371 -0.222 -0.434 -0.499 -0.555** -0.224 -0.192 -0.429 
 (-1.60) (-1.16) (-1.11) (-1.58) (-2.39) (-1.17) (-0.47) (-1.20) 
CEO duality -0.332*** -0.0731 -0.217* -0.0369 -0.288*** -0.0976 -0.217 0.00890 
 (-4.00) (-1.03) (-1.70) (-0.32) (-3.65) (-1.52) (-1.55) (0.08) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0623*** 0.113*** 0.0351 0.117*** 0.0617*** 0.112*** 0.0238 0.113*** 
 (3.46) (6.66) (1.62) (5.06) (3.29) (6.90) (0.97) (4.23) 
Log total sales 0.196*** 0.144*** 0.295*** 0.138*** 0.182*** 0.141*** 0.309*** 0.141*** 
 (8.15) (7.48) (7.70) (4.16) (7.12) (7.28) (6.96) (4.03) 
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Table 6.20 Continued 
Stock return 0.369*** 0.135*** 0.589*** 0.334*** 0.347*** 0.140*** 0.552*** 0.335*** 
 0.341*** 0.126*** 0.591*** 0.330*** 0.342*** 0.121*** 0.565*** 0.284*** 
ROA (8.17) (3.26) (13.79) (4.56) (9.97) (3.99) (11.31) (4.23) 
 0.251 0.410** 0.362 0.450 0.157 0.404** 0.183 0.393 
MBV (0.84) (2.26) (0.84) (1.41) (0.53) (2.38) (0.39) (1.27) 
 0.00164* 0.000407 0.00209 0.00154 0.00209* 0.000736 0.00210 0.00177 
Leverage (1.68) (0.64) (1.57) (1.32) (1.96) (0.97) (1.53) (1.42) 
 -0.0127 -0.0449 -0.0377 -0.101 -0.0175 -0.0700 0.0541 -0.128 
Price volatility  (-0.09) (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.59) (-0.11) (-0.62) (0.25) (-0.69) 
 -0.00954*** -0.00463* -0.0138** -0.00651* -0.0113*** -0.00416* -0.0111* -0.00403 
Foreign sales (-2.87) (-1.92) (-2.52) (-1.76) (-3.39) (-1.76) (-1.95) (-1.10) 
 0.00193*** 0.00177*** 0.00284*** 0.00163* 0.00163** 0.00170*** 0.00253** 0.00188* 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant  3.622*** 3.405*** 1.363* 2.303*** 3.749*** 3.507*** 0.839 2.087*** 
 (7.79) (8.66) (2.01) (3.59) (7.79) (9.19) (1.15) (3.02) 
N 2086 2087 1713 1514 2086 2087 1713 1514 
chi2 952.44 909.15 44224 627.17 996.61 874.41 503.88 525.65 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted 
stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Woman = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration 
committee has one woman director. Women ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more women directors. Institutional ownership is 
proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if 
CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of 
firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average 
equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a 
high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.21 Two or More Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee and Impact on CEO Pay using Two-Steps GMM 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 Log total 
CEO pay 
Log CEO 
cash pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Lagged dependent variables       
Log total CEO pay t-1 0.436***    0.509***    
 (3.51)    (3.59)    
Log CEO cash pay t-1  0.614***    0.126***   
  (5.74)    (3.94)   
Log CEO equity pay t-1   0.0151    0.127  
   (0.16)    (1.03)  
Log CEO bonus pay t-1    0.486***    0.101 
    (4.51)    (1.02) 
Main independent variables      
Foreign directors = 1 0.0364 -0.00620 0.0272 0.0175     
 (1.08) (-0.25) (0.54) (0.42)     
Foreign directors  ≥  2     0.115** 0.0791** 0.137** 0.291*** 
     (2.13) (2.03) (1.99) (3.89) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.156 0.425*** -0.450 -0.341 -0.199 -0.171 -0.664** -1.017*** 
 (-0.58) (2.67) (-1.51) (-1.09) (-0.89) (-1.18) (-2.26) (-3.56) 
Board size 0.0356** -0.00212 0.0596*** 0.0186 0.0331** 0.0281*** 0.0657*** 0.0490*** 
 (2.59) (-0.25) (3.58) (1.22) (2.52) (3.30) (3.68) (2.91) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.00293 0.0501*** 0.0112 -0.00951 -0.0176 0.000172 -0.0403 -0.0612** 
 (0.11) (2.99) (0.32) (-0.35) (-0.64) (0.01) (-1.09) (-2.02) 
Board independence 0.353 0.108 0.772 0.192 0.119 0.389*** 0.797 0.689* 
 (1.19) (0.45) (1.53) (0.57) (0.41) (2.80) (1.62) (1.85) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.226 0.763** -0.492 -0.393 -0.0277 -0.446* -1.105* -1.774*** 
 (-0.51) (2.21) (-0.87) (-0.75) (-0.07) (-1.75) (-1.79) (-3.52) 
CEO duality -0.196** -0.0370 -0.192 -0.0331 -0.205** -0.131** -0.232* -0.109 
 (-2.13) (-0.67) (-1.41) (-0.38) (-2.22) (-2.28) (-1.67) (-0.91) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0485** 0.130*** 0.0180 0.117*** 0.0424* 0.105*** -0.0127 0.0945*** 
 (2.09) (7.38) (0.59) (3.80) (1.91) (6.44) (-0.46) (2.73) 
Log total sales 0.129 0.219*** 0.265*** 0.0694 0.0793 0.100** 0.141 -0.0790 
 (1.56) (4.22) (2.73) (0.83) (1.22) (2.42) (1.51) (-0.99) 
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Table 6.21 Continued 
Stock return 0.355*** 0.181*** 0.558*** 0.353*** 0.323*** 0.130*** 0.563*** 0.266*** 
 (7.44) (4.43) (9.98) (6.07) (6.17) (4.60) (9.15) (4.93) 
ROA 0.0395 0.635*** 0.0493 0.0736 -0.122 0.369** -0.359 -0.174 
 (0.11) (2.82) (0.09) (0.17) (-0.39) (2.14) (-0.73) (-0.37) 
MBV 0.000971 0.0000535 0.00298* 0.00169 0.00116 0.000299 0.00240 0.00128 
 (0.80) (0.09) (1.81) (1.37) (0.97) (0.53) (1.39) (1.03) 
Leverage 0.0550 0.0866 0.0548 -0.0304 0.0968 -0.0305 -0.0544 -0.0945 
 (0.49) (1.04) (0.29) (-0.19) (0.76) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.41) 
Price volatility  -0.00477 0.0102** -0.0158** -0.00401 -0.00351 -0.00743** -0.0191*** -0.0196*** 
 (-0.76) (2.47) (-2.40) (-0.55) (-0.62) (-2.12) (-2.70) (-2.60) 
Foreign sales 0.00121** 0.00124*** 0.00234** 0.00185*** 0.000427 0.00145*** 0.00131 0.000909 
 (2.18) (3.30) (2.55) (2.70) (0.73) (2.94) (1.54) (0.93) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant  3.424*** 2.457*** 1.363* 2.093** 2.382*** 2.426*** 2.536*** 2.762*** 
 (7.73) (3.44) (2.01) (2.67) (2.83) (3.62) (2.58) (3.32) 
N 2086 2087 1713 1514 2086 2087 1713 1514 
chi2 1301.3 1379.2 796.5 814.0 1789.9 1267.3 533.3 816.4 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO 
total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted 
stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Foreign director = 1 is an indicator of 1 of a 
remuneration committee has one foreign director. Foreign directors ≥ 2 is an indicator of 1 of a remuneration committee has two or more foreign directors. 
Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the 
board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the 
remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an 
indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales 
is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. 
MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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6.6.7 Additional tests 
This study employs different additional tests on the relationship between presence of women 
and foreign directors on remuneration committees and, say-on-pay and CEO pay. This sub-
section discusses three additional tests. The first test investigates the reverse causality 
problem, whereas the second test examines the impact of women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees on say-on-pay and CEO pay pre- and post the 2007 financial crisis. 
The third test addresses the impact of British and non-British women on say-on-pay and CEO 
pay.  
i. Does shareholder dissent voting and CEO pay affect the appointment of women and 
foreign directors on remuneration committees? Reverse causality test  
The main assumption of this study is that women are effective monitors and hence 
shareholders are more likely to be satisfied with remuneration package if there are women 
directors on the remuneration committee. Similarly, this study assumes that foreign directors 
may be less effective monitors and may lead higher CEO remuneration and hence 
shareholders are more likely to vote against remuneration package. An alternative 
explanation would be that women tend to join (or may self-select into) the remuneration 
committees of firms that receive lower dissent voting and that foreign directors tend to join 
(or may self-select into) the remuneration committees that receive higher dissent voting. 
Therefore, this study runs an addition test to check reverse causality.  
Table 6.22 presents results of the additional test. In model (1), the dependent variable is 
women appointment, whereas in models (2), the dependent variable is foreign directors 
appointment. Results in table 6.22 show no evidence that women and foreign directors tend to 
join the remuneration committees of firms that receive lower or higher dissent voting or firms 
that distribute higher or lower CEO remuneration. Thus, the reverse causality problem is less 
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of concern in this study. Results in Table 6.22 also reveal the main factors that lead to higher 
appointment of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees are higher with 
firms that have higher percentages of women and foreign directors on their boards, firms that 
have higher percentage of institutional ownership and firms that have larger remuneration 
committees.  
ii. Impact of women and foreign directors on say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO pay: 
Pre- and post the 2007 financial crisis  
After the financial crisis of 2007, the UK reformed its corporate governance framework, 
setting new polices for gender diversity (Davies Report, 2011), engaging shareholders in their 
corporate boards (Stewardship Code, 2010) and establishing external board evaluation 
(Walker Review, 2009). Accordingly, this section examines the impact of women and foreign 
directors on remuneration committees regarding CEO pay and say-on-pay dissent voting 
before and after the recent financial crisis. 
Table 6.23 shows the impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees on 
say-on-pay dissent voting before and after the 2007 financial crisis. Although results remain 
unchanged under the OLS model but not the logit model, prior to 2007, the presence of 
women on remuneration committees exerted a more significant negative impact on 
shareholders’ dissent voting than after the 2007 financial crisis, indicating that the Davies 
Report (2011) reform was useful and effective. The results reveal that the Davies Report 
(2011) has increased the representation of women on UK corporate boards (see section 6.3 of 
this chapter). In contrast, the presence of foreign directors on remuneration committees 
reveals a more significant negative effect on say-on-pay dissent voting before the 2007 
financial crisis. 
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Tables 6.24 and 6.25 present the findings of whether women and foreign directors have an 
influence on CEO remuneration, and it shows that, overall, women directors on remuneration 
committees have no impact on CEO remuneration, whereas foreign directors appear to have a 
significant positive influence on CEO remuneration before and after the 2007 financial crisis 
(particularly with equity and bonus remuneration). 
iii. Impact of British and non-British women on say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO pay 
The second additional test investigates the impact of British and non-British women on 
remuneration committees on say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO pay. Similar to foreign 
directors, non-British women may also are less effective monitor, therefore they may lead to 
higher dissent voting and CEO pay. 
Table 6.26 presents results of the effect of British and non-British women on say-on-pay 
dissent voting. It is obvious that only British women lead to less shareholder dissent voting, 
whereas non-British women are either have no impact on say-on-pay dissent voting under 
OLS model or they may lead to higher shareholder dissent voting under logit model. Table 
6.27 shows results of the relationship between British and non-British women on 
remuneration committees and CEO pay. Firms with more British women on their 
remuneration committees tend to have lower CEO cash remuneration and higher CEO equity 
remuneration; however, firms with more non-British women on their remuneration 
committees tend to have no influence on CEO pay.  
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Table 6.22 Impact of Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting and CEO pay on Women and Foreign 
Directors on the Remuneration Committee 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Logit Logit 
 Women appointment Foreign director appointment 
Log dissent  -0.0614 -0.0551 
 (-1.55) (-1.47) 
Log CEO pay 0.167 0.0796 
 (1.61) (0.76) 
Women on board 25.89***  
 (16.97)  
Foreign directors on board  1.058*** 
  (12.12) 
Institutional ownership 0.756** 1.042*** 
 (2.05) (2.81) 
Board size -0.0897** -0.200*** 
 (-2.42) (-4.22) 
Remuneration committee size 0.680*** 0.774*** 
 (9.26) (10.19) 
Board independence -1.357* 0.357 
 (-1.83) (0.50) 
Remuneration committee independence 1.032* 0.193 
 (1.86) (0.29) 
CEO duality 0.154 0.182 
 (0.80) (0.90) 
Log total sales 0.0659 0.175*** 
 (1.02) (2.59) 
Stock return -0.490** -0.0175 
 (-2.56) (-0.10) 
ROA -1.107 0.364 
 (-1.17) (0.42) 
MBV 0.000561 0.00259 
 (0.08) (0.43) 
Leverage -0.657 0.757 
 (-1.36) (1.64) 
Price volatility  -0.00230 0.00844 
 (-0.23) (0.94) 
Foreign sales -0.00488** 0.00587*** 
 (-2.30) (2.65) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -7.370*** -8.329*** 
 (-5.94) (-6.10) 
N 2286 2162 
Pseudo R2 0.509 0.447 
 
Note that women appointment is an indicator variable of 1 if the appointed director on remuneration committee is women. 
Foreign director appointment is an indicator variable of 1 if the appointed director on remuneration committee is foreign. 
Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using 
logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which 
include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. Foreign 
directors on board is proportion of foreign directors from total board size. Institutional ownership is proportion of 
ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in 
the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee 
size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts 
of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value 
divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual 
price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come 
from a foreign country’s operation.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.23 Impact of Women and Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting Pre- and Post- 
Financial Crisis of 2007 
 Pre-financial crisis of 2007 Post-financial crisis of 2007 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (3)  Model (4) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 
Main variables          
Women directors  -0.724*** -0.926   -0.518*** -1.007***   
 (-2.24) (-1.22)   (-2.36) (-2.55)   
Foreign directors    0.660*** 1.570***   0.363*** 0.318 
   (2.31) (3.37)   (2.17) (1.10) 
Control variables          
Log CEO pay 0.464*** 0.254 0.437*** 0.182 0.614*** 0.641*** 0.602*** 0.619*** 
 (5.10) (1.51) (4.78) (1.09) (9.94) (5.10) (9.72) (5.00) 
Institutional ownership -0.272 -0.657 -0.316 -0.670 0.366 0.0875 0.366 0.0622 
 (-0.86) (-1.12) (-1.03) (-1.18) (1.49) (0.21) (1.49) (0.15) 
Board size 0.0402 -0.00967 0.0296 -0.0444 -0.0125 -0.0511 -0.0154 -0.0498 
 (1.51) (-0.18) (1.10) (-0.79) (-0.55) (-1.20) (-0.67) (-1.16) 
Remuneration committee size 0.0431 -0.122 0.0583 -0.0652 0.0182 0.0948 0.0181 0.0867 
 (0.88) (-0.95) (1.22) (-0.52) (0.45) (1.28) (0.45) (1.19) 
Board independence 0.171 1.251 -0.176 0.528 0.934* 1.190 0.724 0.994 
 (0.31) (1.12) (-0.32) (0.45) (2.30) (1.70) (1.76) (1.40) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.728 -1.126 -0.531 -0.733 0.259 0.595 0.296 0.553 
 (-1.47) (-1.19) (-1.08) (-0.78) (0.75) (0.98) (0.85) (0.91) 
CEO duality 0.00808 0.238 -0.0368 0.179 0.570*** 0.790*** 0.591*** 0.806*** 
 (0.05) (0.81) (-0.23) (0.60) (3.97) (3.43) (4.15) (3.52) 
Log total sales -0.0161 -0.128 -0.0474 -0.181 0.0956* -0.00192 0.0827 -0.0198 
 (-0.30) (-1.23) (-0.89) (-1.73) (2.21) (-0.03) (1.91) (-0.28) 
Stock return -0.00836 -0.0321 0.00454 -0.00734 -0.178 -0.226 -0.171 -0.212 
 (-0.06) (-0.12) (0.03) (-0.03) (-1.77) (-1.34) (-1.71) (-1.27) 
ROA -1.193 -1.160 -1.165 -1.264 -0.397 -2.249* -0.405 -2.157* 
 (-1.67) (-0.74) (-1.62) (-0.79) (-0.71) (-2.52) (-0.72) (-2.45) 
MBV 0.00444 0.0122 0.00311 0.00931 -0.000786 0.000477 -0.00118 0.000103 
 (1.00) (1.43) (0.72) (1.18) (-0.21) (0.08) (-0.33) (0.02) 
Leverage -0.0723 -0.622 -0.0835 -0.862 0.548 0.327 0.494 0.277 
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Table 6.23 Continued 
 (-0.19) (-0.84) (-0.22) (-1.06) (1.91) (0.69) (1.73) (0.59) 
Price volatility  0.00999 -0.000318 0.00742 -0.00889 0.0181** 0.0346*** 0.0207*** 0.0388*** 
 (1.20) (-0.02) (0.90) (-0.55) (3.04) (3.57) (3.53) (4.16) 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -7.275*** -0.601 -6.824*** 0.687 -11.13*** -8.962*** -10.97*** -8.651*** 
 (-7.42) (-0.37) (-6.83) (0.41) (-14.21) (-6.53) (-13.96) (-6.29) 
N 857 814 857 814 1578 1585 1578 1585 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.128 0.036 0.130 0.051 0.146 0.066 0.145 0.063 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). 
Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Foreign 
directors is proportion of foreign directors from total remuneration committee size Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include 
cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is 
total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of 
directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO 
duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is 
the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.24 Impact of Women on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay Pre- and Post- Financial Crisis of 2007 
 Pre-financial crisis of 2007 Post-financial crisis of 2007 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity pay Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash pay Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variable         
Women directors  0.0644 -0.139 -0.0667 -0.215 0.286*** -0.0667 0.609*** -0.106 
 (0.48) (-1.27) (-0.26) (-1.09) (2.81) (-0.78) (3.19) (-0.75) 
Control variables         
         
Institutional ownership -0.314** -0.124 -0.333 -0.279 -0.0529 -0.0774 -0.296 -0.256 
 (-2.64) (-1.53) (-1.41) (-1.80) (-0.43) (-0.81) (-1.47) (-1.61) 
Board size 0.0733*** 0.0480*** 0.0229 0.0648** 0.0771*** 0.0373*** 0.0864*** 0.0295* 
 (6.20) (4.74) (0.79) (3.24) (6.62) (4.17) (4.77) (2.21) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.000263 0.0111 0.0222 -0.0469 0.0256 0.0207 0.0762** 0.00721 
 (0.01) (0.72) (0.54) (-1.54) (1.30) (1.47) (2.78) (0.29) 
Board independence 1.293*** 0.638*** 1.416*** 0.963*** 0.772*** 0.465*** 0.873** 0.845*** 
 (5.71) (4.03) (3.37) (3.51) (4.37) (3.36) (3.16) (3.51) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.789*** -0.693*** -0.129 -0.901* -0.418** -0.300* -0.539* -0.508* 
 (-3.66) (-4.16) (-0.24) (-2.53) (-2.67) (-2.22) (-2.24) (-2.15) 
CEO duality -0.190** -0.0916 -0.134 -0.0615 -0.319*** -0.0562 -0.467** 0.0346 
 (-3.20) (-1.94) (-1.08) (-0.66) (-4.34) (-0.96) (-2.78) (0.34) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0408 0.108*** 0.0464 0.116*** 0.0382 0.0932*** -0.0185 0.0962*** 
 (1.86) (4.51) (1.19) (3.97) (1.95) (5.46) (-0.68) (3.58) 
Log total sales 0.257*** 0.205*** 0.398*** 0.240*** 0.163*** 0.130*** 0.224*** 0.169*** 
 (12.95) (13.51) (8.79) (8.22) (9.31) (9.14) (7.72) (7.19) 
Stock return 0.208*** 0.0795 0.450*** 0.223** 0.350*** 0.156*** 0.499*** 0.330*** 
 (3.43) (1.80) (4.20) (2.85) (6.30) (3.40) (6.40) (4.25) 
ROA 0.399 0.607** -0.387 0.908* 0.736* 0.470* 1.042* 0.659 
 (1.51) (2.77) (-0.65) (2.23) (2.37) (2.32) (2.02) (1.73) 
MBV 0.00223 0.00213* 0.00304 0.00293 0.00132 0.000453 0.00433* 0.000814 
 (1.93) (1.99) (0.93) (1.48) (1.12) (0.47) (2.32) (0.32) 
Leverage -0.0227 0.113 -0.352 0.225 0.166 -0.107 0.402* -0.299 
 (-0.17) (1.07) (-1.10) (0.92) (1.32) (-1.09) (2.13) (-1.67) 
Price volatility  -0.00487 0.000838 -0.0138* 0.00159 -0.0144*** -0.0097*** -0.00628 -0.0119*** 
 (-1.60) (0.42) (-2.06) (0.39) (-5.16) (-4.58) (-1.54) (-3.69) 
Foreign sales 0.00291*** 0.00217*** 0.00466** 0.00404*** 0.00181*** 0.00223*** 0.00234* 0.00318*** 
 (3.94) (4.40) (3.11) (4.52) (3.56) (5.89) (2.48) (4.39) 
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Table 6.24 Continued 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.056*** 2.982*** 0.265 1.905*** 4.364*** 4.535*** 2.200*** 3.530*** 
 (8.22) (9.46) (0.32) (3.60) (13.56) (15.74) (4.23) (7.29) 
N 788 788 693 707 1482 1482 1309 1126 
R2 0.623 0.606 0.445 0.481 0.451 0.368 0.371 0.309 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which 
include cash, and equity linked remuneration.  Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the 
natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women directors is proportion of women directors from total remuneration committee size. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign directors from 
total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in 
the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. 
Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and 
chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total 
debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a 
foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.25 Impact of Foreign Directors on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay Pre- and Post- Financial Crisis of 2007 
 Pre-financial crisis of 2007 Post-financial crisis of 2007 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash pay Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Main variable         
Foreign directors  0.179* 0.141* 0.436** 0.279** 0.0199 0.140** 0.0899 0.437*** 
 (1.72) (1.95) (2.34) (2.12) (0.26) (2.19) (0.67) (4.41) 
Control variables         
Institutional ownership -0.314** -0.138 -0.372 -0.307* -0.0358 -0.0793 -0.274 -0.271 
 (-2.65) (-1.72) (-1.56) (-2.00) (-0.29) (-0.82) (-1.37) (-1.72) 
Board size 0.0698*** 0.0461*** 0.0156 0.0605** 0.0767*** 0.0364*** 0.0846*** 0.0266* 
 (5.87) (4.56) (0.55) (3.06) (6.61) (4.06) (4.65) (2.00) 
Remuneration committee 
size 
0.00482 0.0142 0.0297 -0.0410 0.0273 0.0208 0.0785** 0.00788 
 (0.21) (0.94) (0.72) (-1.36) (1.37) (1.49) (2.79) (0.33) 
Board independence 1.236*** 0.565*** 1.249** 0.823** 0.792*** 0.431** 0.897** 0.759** 
 (5.46) (3.59) (3.04) (2.96) (4.45) (3.09) (3.22) (3.14) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.757*** -0.662*** -0.0480 -0.838* -0.372* -0.289* -0.444 -0.474* 
 (-3.52) (-4.06) (-0.09) (-2.36) (-2.38) (-2.16) (-1.86) (-2.06) 
CEO duality -0.194** -0.102* -0.149 -0.0767 -0.320*** -0.0498 -0.465** 0.0516 
 (-3.27) (-2.21) (-1.21) (-0.82) (-4.35) (-0.86) (-2.72) (0.51) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0427 0.108*** 0.0477 0.115*** 0.0400* 0.0938*** -0.0155 0.101*** 
 (1.96) (4.54) (1.27) (3.92) (2.05) (5.53) (-0.57) (3.77) 
Log total sales 0.252*** 0.196*** 0.380*** 0.224*** 0.167*** 0.125*** 0.232*** 0.155*** 
 (12.53) (13.61) (8.16) (7.98) (9.37) (8.59) (8.03) (6.61) 
Stock return 0.207*** 0.0824 0.450*** 0.229** 0.347*** 0.159*** 0.493*** 0.334*** 
 (3.41) (1.86) (4.21) (2.95) (6.25) (3.47) (6.42) (4.35) 
ROA 0.370 0.604** -0.408 0.932* 0.731* 0.456* 0.983 0.629 
 (1.42) (2.86) (-0.69) (2.36) (2.34) (2.26) (1.91) (1.67) 
MBV 0.00185 0.00181 0.00209 0.00231 0.00139 0.000360 0.00459* 0.000713 
 (1.70) (1.73) (0.66) (1.22) (1.18) (0.37) (2.46) (0.28) 
Leverage -0.0429 0.118 -0.392 0.228 0.172 -0.123 0.406* -0.333 
 (-0.32) (1.14) (-1.27) (0.96) (1.36) (-1.24) (2.15) (-1.87) 
Price volatility  -0.00525 0.000353 -0.0146* 0.000733 -0.0148*** -0.0092*** -0.00714 -0.00995** 
 (-1.74) (0.18) (-2.20) (0.18) (-5.24) (-4.28) (-1.76) (-3.08) 
Foreign sales 0.00249*** 0.00195*** 0.00385* 0.00358*** 0.00173*** 0.00197*** 0.00204* 0.00245*** 
 (3.40) (3.92) (2.53) (3.90) (3.36) (5.14) (2.03) (3.39) 
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Table 6.25 Continued 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.099*** 3.078*** 0.479 2.050*** 4.298*** 4.608*** 2.088*** 3.668*** 
 (8.34) (10.18) (0.57) (3.94) (13.22) (15.81) (4.00) (7.69) 
N 788 788 693 707 1482 1482 1309 1126 
R2 0.625 0.606 0.449 0.483 0.448 0.370 0.366 0.319 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural logarithm of CEO’s salary, 
bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is 
the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. Women directors is proportion of women directors from total remuneration committee size. Foreign directors is proportion of foreign 
directors from total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total 
number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the 
remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO 
combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price 
appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.26 Impact of British and non-British Women on the Remuneration Committee 
on Say-on-Pay Dissent Voting 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 Log dissent Dissent  > 10 
Main variables      
British women  -0.718*** -1.608***   
 (-3.72) (-4.18)   
Non-British women    0.164 1.010 
   (0.56) (1.91)* 
Control variables      
Log CEO pay 0.590*** 0.527*** 0.583*** 0.511*** 
 (11.44) (5.42) (11.37) (5.32) 
Institutional ownership 0.161 -0.0283 0.105 -0.144 
 (0.84) (-0.09) (0.55) (-0.43) 
Board size 0.00198 -0.0417 0.00688 -0.0360 
 (0.11) (-1.26) (0.40) (-1.08) 
Remuneration committee size 0.00888 0.00466 0.00763 -0.00663 
 (0.29) (0.07) (0.25) (-0.11) 
Board independence 0.703** 1.107* 0.711** 1.110* 
 (2.13) (1.92) (2.16) (1.92) 
Remuneration committee independence -0.126 0.111 -0.174 -0.0524 
 (-0.44) (0.22) (-0.62) (-0.10) 
CEO duality 0.286*** 0.537*** 0.279*** 0.532*** 
 (2.66) (3.02) (2.62) (3.03) 
Log total sales 0.0379 -0.0585 0.0269 -0.0839 
 (1.13) (-1.00) (0.81) (-1.44) 
Stock return -0.150 -0.127 -0.147 -0.116 
 (-1.57) (-0.77) (-1.55) (-0.72) 
ROA -0.738* -1.727** -0.646 -1.623** 
 (-1.68) (-2.39) (-1.48) (-2.33) 
MBV 0.000595 0.00522 0.000723 0.00558 
 (0.21) (1.12) (0.26) (1.19) 
Leverage 0.387* 0.0294 0.414* 0.0539 
 (1.73) (0.08) (1.86) (0.14) 
Price volatility  0.0143*** 0.0200** 0.0144*** 0.0212*** 
 (2.97) (2.46) (3.04) (2.66) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -8.951*** -6.183*** -8.835*** -6.029*** 
 (-14.12) (-5.68) (-13.97) (-5.58) 
N 2435 2449 2435 2449 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.156 0.065 0.154 0.059 
 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using 
logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. 
British women is proportion of British women from total remuneration committee size. Non-British women is proportion of non-
British women from total remuneration committee size. Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, 
which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional 
investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is 
proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the 
remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in 
remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log sales is 
natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock 
price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total 
debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6.27 Impact of British and non-British Women on the Remuneration Committee on CEO Pay  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO equity 
pay 
Log CEO bonus 
pay 
Log total CEO 
pay 
Log CEO cash 
pay 
Log CEO 
equity pay 
Log CEO 
bonus pay 
Main variables         
British women  0.0949 -0.130* 0.320** -0.406***     
 (1.16) (-1.90) (2.19) (-3.27)     
Non-British women      0.183 0.0668 0.104 0.444** 
     (1.17) (0.55) (0.37) (2.43) 
Control variables         
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0516 -0.0195 -0.167 -0.137 -0.0493 -0.0260 -0.158 -0.152 
 (-0.58) (-0.28) (-1.08) (-1.19) (-0.55) (-0.38) (-1.02) (-1.31) 
Board size 0.0749*** 0.0442*** 0.0644*** 0.0510*** 0.0746*** 0.0447*** 0.0632*** 0.0528*** 
 (8.46) (6.40) (4.01) (4.31) (8.42) (6.46) (3.92) (4.45) 
Remuneration 
committee size 
0.00123 0.00634 0.0452 -0.0253 -0.000202 0.00656 0.0426* -0.0262 
 (0.08) (0.60) (1.91) (-1.32) (-0.01) (0.61) (1.80) (-1.37) 
Board independence 0.953*** 0.501*** 1.083*** 0.785*** 0.947*** 0.488*** 1.091*** 0.732*** 
 (6.75) (4.81) (4.66) (4.29) (6.81) (4.70) (4.74) (4.00) 
Remuneration 
committee 
independence 
-0.671*** -0.442*** -0.474* -0.729*** -0.653*** -0.455*** -0.430* -0.753*** 
 (-5.44) (-4.13) (-1.94) (-3.53) (-5.38) (-4.26) (-1.78) (-3.68) 
CEO duality -0.305*** -0.0498 -0.383*** -0.0665 -0.303*** -0.0516 -0.377*** -0.0710 
 (-6.08) (-1.35) (-3.44) (-0.97) (-6.03) (-1.40) (-3.37) (-1.03) 
Log CEO tenure 0.0499*** 0.110*** 0.00646 0.102*** 0.0499*** 0.109*** 0.00819 0.0986*** 
 (3.34) (7.70) (0.28) (5.06) (3.33) (7.64) (0.36) (4.86) 
Log total sales 0.227*** 0.172*** 0.316*** 0.218*** 0.228*** 0.169*** 0.321*** 0.208*** 
 (17.66) (16.14) (13.30) (11.75) (17.65) (16.05) (13.32) (11.31) 
Stock return 0.307*** 0.127*** 0.542*** 0.297*** 0.307*** 0.129*** 0.540*** 0.302*** 
 (7.32) (3.62) (8.46) (5.18) (7.32) (3.66) (8.46) (5.31) 
ROA 0.900*** 0.607*** 0.837* 0.908** 0.866*** 0.621*** 0.756** 0.925*** 
 (4.31) (3.95) (2.24) (3.11) (4.16) (4.07) (2.04) (3.21) 
MBV 0.00152* 0.00109 0.00282* 0.00193 0.00151* 0.00108 0.00283* 0.00192 
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Table 6.27 Continued 
 0.212** 0.0586 0.255 0.00617 0.196** 0.0669 0.221 0.0308 
Leverage (2.31) (0.80) (1.52) (0.04) (2.14) (0.92) (1.34) (0.21) 
 -0.00846*** -0.00444*** -0.00964** -0.00476* -0.00842*** -0.00436*** -0.00979** -0.00454* 
Price volatility  (-4.27) (-2.94) (-2.56) (-1.83) (-4.25) (-2.88) (-2.59) (-1.76) 
 0.00182*** 0.00216*** 0.00262*** 0.00278*** 0.00168*** 0.00223*** 0.00236*** 0.00292*** 
Foreign sales (4.32) (6.99) (3.21) (4.86) (4.00) (7.23) (2.93) (5.05) 
 0.212** 0.0586 0.255 0.00617 0.196** 0.0669 0.221 0.0308 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  3.941*** 3.897*** 1.525*** 2.995*** 3.941*** 3.932*** 1.471*** 3.022*** 
 (15.80) (18.41) (2.99) (7.94) (15.58) (18.65) (2.84) (8.08) 
N 2150 2150 1920 1742 2150 2150 1920 1742 
R2 0.548 0.484 0.422 0.406 0.548 0.483 0.421 0.404 
 
Note that Log CEO pay is sum of the natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Log CEO cash is the natural 
logarithm of CEO’s salary, bonus and other annual cash compensation. Log CEO equity is the natural logarithm of CEO’s equity linked remuneration (restricted stock 
granted and options granted). Log CEO bonus pay is the natural logarithm of CEO’s bonus remuneration. British women is proportion of British women directors from total 
remuneration committee size. Non-British women is proportion of non-British women from total remuneration committee size.  Institutional ownership is proportion of 
ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality is an indicator of 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 
0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of 
equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Foreign sales 
is percentage of total sales that come from a foreign country’s operation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the research findings and discussed the empirical study of the 
relationship between the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees regarding say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO pay. However, before analysing 
the empirical study, the chapter started with a presentation of the descriptive statistics and 
figures related to the evolution of UK boards’ characteristics, including board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and board diversity. The analysis of the descriptive statistics and 
figures regarding the evolution of UK corporate boards revealed important observations.  
First, the board size of UK non-financial boards was somewhat stable over the study but with 
a noticeable drop during the 2007 financial crisis. Overall, UK boards have an average of 
9.06 board of directors. Second, the number of executive directors has seen a significant drop 
from 42% in 2003 to only 28.6% in 2015, whereas the number of non-executive independent 
directors has increased dramatically over the period of 2003-2015 (from 48% in 2003 to 62% 
by 2015). This is in line with the UK corporate governance codes that recommend most board 
of directors should be non-executive independent directors. Additionally, CEO duality has 
also seen a dramatic decrease from 21% in 2003 to almost 7% in 2015. This also reflects the 
UK corporate governance’s approach to separate the roles of chairman and CEO. Another 
important observation regarding the evolution of UK boards is that the number of women on 
corporate boards sharply increased over the study period, particularly after the publication of 
the Davies Report (2011). Moreover, remuneration committee size and remuneration 
committee independence were somewhat stable over the period of 2003-2015; however 
proportion of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees continued to increase 
overtime and increased more dramatically after the financial crisis of 2007.  
  
 
211 
 
Furthermore, this chapter discussed the descriptive statistics and trends of CEO remuneration 
and say-on-pay for the FTSE 350 non-financial firms from 2003 to 2015. Despite public and 
media critics, CEO remuneration has continued to climb throughout the study period, 
increasing from about £1.8 million in 2003 to £2.9 million in 2015 (almost a 38% increase). 
However, say-on-pay dissent voting was fairly stable from 2003 to 2015 (an average of 6%), 
except for the period after the financial crisis, when it rose above the 6% average (climbed to 
7.32% during the period of 2009-2011).  
The results from the relationship between women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees reveal that firms with more women directors on their remuneration committees 
have a significant negative relationship with say-on-pay dissent voting, implying that women 
directors help in aligning shareholders’ interests with those of the management. However, 
firms with more foreign directors on their remuneration committees are more likely to get 
higher shareholder dissent voting on their annual remuneration reports. This suggests that 
shareholders may perceive foreign directors as ineffective monitors. The impact of women 
and foreign directors on remuneration committees on say-on-pay has been estimated using 
the OLS with log-transferred dependent variables, and it was also estimated using the logit 
model. Furthermore, the relationship between women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees and say-on-pay is estimated using propensity score matching to control for the 
possibility of causality and self-selection bias. Regression results show that the previous 
findings remain unchanged.    
The second empirical study of whether the presence of women and foreign directors affects 
CEO pay shows that firms with more women directors on their remuneration committees 
prefer non-cash remuneration in forms of equity-based remuneration to compensate their 
CEOs. Furthermore, the increased presence of women on remuneration committees leads to 
less CEO bonus remuneration. However, firms with an increased presence of foreign 
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directors on their remuneration committees tend to have higher CEO remuneration, including 
direct cash remuneration and equity-based remuneration. The next chapter addresses the 
study’s conclusion and the empirical and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
The UK has witnessed many corporate governance reforms since the publication of the 
Cadbury Report (1992). Some of these reforms targeted board independence, institutional 
investors’ engagement, directors’ remuneration and board diversity. This study highlights the 
evolution of the board of directors in the UK’s FTSE 350 firms over the period 2003-2015. 
Furthermore, it examines whether the presence of women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees is related to the say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO remuneration. 
To the author’s best knowledge, none of the previous studies on say-on-pay and board 
diversity have investigated the relationship between women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent voting. Additionally, no attempt has been 
made in the UK to address whether the presence of women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees influences CEO pay. Therefore, this chapter aims, first, to present a 
summary of the research findings; second, to discuss the empirical and policy implications of 
the research; and third, to report the limitations and potential opportunities for future 
research. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 presents a summary of the key research 
findings; Sections 7.3 and 7.4 discuss the empirical and policy implications of the current 
study, respectively; Section 7.5 reports the study’s limitations and future research 
opportunities; and Section 7.6 concludes the chapter.  
7.2 Key Research Findings 
This section reports the study’s key research findings. The first sub-section discusses 
corporate governance’s descriptive statistics regarding say-on-pay voting and CEO pay in the 
UK context, and the second sub-section presents the empirical study’s results regarding the 
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relationship between the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration 
committees and say-on-pay dissent voting and CEO remuneration.  
7.2.1 Summary of the evolution of UK corporate governance, say-on-pay voting and 
CEO pay 
This study’s first objective is to address the evolution of corporate governance, say-on-pay 
voting and CEO remuneration for FTSE 350 non-financial firms over the period 2003-2015. 
Board size across FTSE 350 non-financial firms dropped over the study period, from 9.33 
directors in 2003 to about 9.05 directors in 2015. The decrease in board size was more 
noticeable after the financial crisis, particularly the period between 2007 and 2011. The 
proportion of executive directors across all FTSE 350 non-financial firms steadily decreased 
from 2003-2015, from 42% in 2003 to 28.6% in 2015, whereas the percentage of non-
executive independent directors consistently increased over the same time, from about 48% 
in 2003 to approximately 62% in 2015. Additionally, the proportion of non-executive non-
independent directors remained fairly constant over the study period (9.51% in 2003 and 
9.48% in 2015). CEO duality among FTSE 350 non-financial companies witnessed a 
dramatic drop over the 2003-2015 period, from 21.3% in 2003 to 7.08% in 2015. Women 
directors’ representation on FTSE 350 non-financial firms saw a sharp increase over the time 
of this study, from only 5% to more than 20% in 2015. The increase of women directors was 
more remarkable after the financial crisis and the publication of the Davies Report (2011). 
The proportion of foreign directors on UK FTSE 350 non-financial firms saw a remarkable 
increase over the study period, from about 19% in 2003 to nearly 27% in 2015. Say-on-pay 
dissent voting across all FTSE 350 non-financial companies remained low over the study 
period, showing an average of 6%. The percentage of say-on-pay dissent voting, however, 
increased dramatically after the financial crisis, reaching the peak point of 7.1% in 2011. 
CEO pay across all FTSE 350 non-financial firms continued to increase over the 2003-2015 
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period, from about £1.82 million in 2003 to £3.18 and £2.9 million in 2013 and 2015, 
respectively. Also, over the time of the study, all FTSE 350 non-financial firms tended to 
prefer equity-based remuneration than cash remuneration to pay their CEOs.    
7.2.2 Summary of the study’s key empirical findings 
This study’s second objective is to examine whether firms with more women and foreign 
directors on their remuneration committees have less or more say-on-pay dissent voting and 
whether the same firms also have less or more CEO pay (see table 7.1 for the summary of the 
results). In addition, this study has investigated the critical mass theory within the context of 
whether firms with only one woman or one foreign director on their remuneration committees 
have the same influence on say-on-pay dissent voting as firms with two or more women or 
foreign directors on their remuneration committees. Furthermore, this research has estimated 
the impact of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees on say-on-pay 
dissent voting using propensity score matching to control for endogeneity problems. Also, 
this study uses two-system GMM to estimate the relationship between CEO pay and the 
presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees.  Women directors on 
remuneration committees are found to negatively impact shareholder dissent voting via say-
on-pay. This result remains unchanged even after using propensity score matching to control 
for endogeneity. Two or more women directors on firms’ remuneration committees tend to 
have a more significant negative impact on say-on-pay dissent voting than firms with only 
one woman on their remuneration committees. The sub-period analysis reveals that the 
negative impact of women on remuneration committees regarding say-on-pay dissent voting 
was more remarkable and significant after the 2007 financial crisis. Firms with more women 
on their remuneration committees are less likely to distribute cash remuneration in terms of 
bonuses to their CEOs. However, the same firms are more likely to rely on equity-based 
remuneration to pay their CEOs.  
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Table 7.1 Summary of The Results 
Research Question Theory 
Used 
Hypothesis Expected 
Sign 
Result Result After 
Endogeneity 
Estimation  
      
Does a higher proportion of female 
directors on firms’ remuneration 
committees have an impact on 
shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay 
voting? 
 
Agency 
theory 
H 1. The greater the 
presence of women on the 
remuneration committee, 
the lower the proportion of 
shareholder dissent votes 
via say-on-pay. 
 
(-) Support H1: negative relationship 
between women on remuneration 
committees and shareholders’ dissent 
voting.  
Remain 
unchanged 
Does a higher proportion of female 
directors on firms’ remuneration 
committees have an impact on CEO 
remuneration? 
 
Agency 
theory 
H2. The greater the 
presence of women on the 
remuneration committee, 
the lower the CEO pay. 
 
(-) Partially support H2: negative 
relationship between women on 
remuneration committees and CEO cash 
and bonus remuneration, however they 
have positive impact on CEO equity 
remuneration.  
Remain 
unchanged  
      
Do firms with only two or more 
women on their remuneration 
committees have an impact on 
shareholder dissent votes via say-on-
pay? 
 
Critical 
mass 
theory 
H3. Firms with two or more 
women on their 
remuneration committees 
have a negative impact on 
shareholder dissent votes 
via say-on-pay. 
 
(-) Support H3: firms with only two or 
more women on their remuneration 
committees have a negative impact on 
Remain 
unchanged 
Do firms with only two or more 
women on their remuneration 
committees have an impact on CEO 
Pay? 
 
Critical 
mass 
theory 
H4. Firms with two or more 
women on their 
remuneration committees 
have a negative impact on 
CEO pay. 
(-) Partially support H4: firms with only 
two or more women on their 
remuneration committees have a 
negative impact on CEO cash and bonus 
remuneration. 
Remain 
unchanged 
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  Table 7.1 Continued 
      
Does a higher proportion of foreign 
directors on firms’ remuneration 
committees have an impact on 
shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay 
voting? 
 
Agency 
theory 
H5. The greater the 
presence of foreign directors 
on UK remuneration 
committees, the higher the 
proportion of shareholder 
dissent votes via say-on-
pay. 
 
(+) Support H5: positive relationship 
between presence of foreign directors 
on remuneration committees and 
shareholders’ dissent voting. 
Remain 
unchanged 
Does a higher proportion of foreign 
directors on firms’ remuneration 
committees have an impact on CEO 
remuneration? 
 
Agency 
theory 
H6. The greater the 
presence of foreign directors 
on UK remuneration 
committees, the higher the 
CEO pay. 
 
(+) Support H6: positive relationship 
between presence of foreign directors 
on UK remuneration committees and 
CEO pay (cash, bonus and equity 
remunerations) 
Remain 
unchanged 
Do firms with only two or more 
foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees have an 
impact on shareholder dissent votes 
via say-on-pay? 
 
Critical 
mass 
theory 
H7. Firms with two or more 
foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees 
are associated with higher 
shareholder dissent votes 
via say-on-pay. 
 
(+) Support H7: firms with only two or 
more foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees have a 
positive impact on shareholders’ dissent 
voting. 
Remain 
unchanged 
Do firms with only two or more 
foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees have an 
impact on CEO Pay? 
 
Critical 
mass 
theory 
H8. Firms with two or more 
foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees 
are associated with higher 
CEO pay. 
 
(+) Support H8: firms with only two or 
more foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees have a 
positive impact on CEO pay. 
Remain 
unchanged 
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These results remain unchanged after using propensity score matching and two-system 
GMM. Foreign directors on UK remuneration committees are found to have a significant 
positive relationship with shareholder dissent voting via say-on-pay. This result is also robust 
when propensity score matching estimation is used. Firms with two or more foreign directors 
on their remuneration committees are more likely to have a significant positive effect on say-
on-pay dissent voting than firms with only one foreign director on their remuneration 
committees. The sub-period analysis reports that the positive impact of foreign directors on 
remuneration committees on say-on-pay dissent voting was more significant before the 2007 
financial crisis. Firms with more foreign directors on their remuneration committees tend to 
have more CEO remuneration (including cash remuneration and equity-based remuneration). 
These findings remain robust even after using propensity score matching and two-system 
GMM. 
7.3 Theoretical and Academic Implications  
Previous literature has addressed the impact of some board characteristics (such as board size, 
board independence and CEO duality) and say-on-pay dissent voting (e.g. Conyon, 2016). 
However, as noted earlier, none of prior studies on say-on-pay and board diversity examined 
the association between women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and say-
on-pay dissent voting. Furthermore, none of previous UK studies have investigated the 
association between CEO remuneration and the presence of women and foreign directors on 
remuneration committees. Bugeja et al. (2015) found that US firms with more women on 
their remuneration committees have less CEO pay, and Masulis et al. (2012) found that US 
firms with more foreign directors on their remuneration committees are more likely to have 
greater CEO remuneration.  This study’s results provide empirical evidence that the gender 
diversity of directors on remuneration committees plays a significant role in determining say-
on-pay dissent voting and CEO remuneration. This research also provides empirical support 
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for prior studies that suggested women directors are more effective monitors (e.g. Adams and 
Ferreira, 2004 and 2009; Carter et al., 2003). In addition, this study complements the prior 
study by Bugeja et al. (2015), finding that UK firms with more women on their remuneration 
committees have less cash remuneration. For the relationship between the presence of foreign 
directors on UK remuneration committees, this study provides empirical support for prior 
studies that found foreign directors are less effective monitors and lead to higher CEO 
remuneration (Masulis et al., 2012). Furthermore, this study provides empirical support to the 
critical mass studies that found minorities may have no impact on group decision making, as 
they may be marginalised or seen as tokens (e.g. Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). The 
present study found that only in firms with two or more women and foreign directors on their 
remuneration committees do women and foreign directors have negative and positive impacts 
on say-on-pay dissent voting, respectively.  
7.4 Practitioner and Policy Implications 
In addition to the theoretical and academic implications, this study also provide different 
practitioner and policy implications; This study has practical implications in that it shows the 
recent efforts to have more women on UK boards, such as the Davies Reports (2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015), have been useful and effective. In addition, this study supports the 
recent recommendations by Hampton-Alexander (2016) for more representation of women on 
firms’ executive committees and board sub-committees, such as remuneration and 
nomination committees. Furthermore, this study’s results suggest that caution is needed when 
proposing an increase in foreign directors on board sub-committees, as their insufficient 
oversight can significantly exacerbate agency conflicts rather than resolve them, for example, 
by leading to higher CEO remuneration and the consequent increase in shareholders’ dissent 
on directors’ remuneration reports. To enhance shareholders’ engagement on their investee 
firms and to limit the increasing CEO remuneration, this research supports the BEIS (2016), 
  
 
220 
 
which recommends that shareholders should be given a binding vote on directors’ 
remuneration reports, should establish a shareholder committee or should appoint individual 
directors to represent shareholder interests on investee boards. To mitigate the increasing 
level of executive remuneration, this study also supports the BEIS (2016) that states there is a 
need to disclose executive directors’ pay-out ratio. 
7.5 Limitations of the Study and Future Research  
This study may suffers from some limitations but at the same time these limitations may 
provide potential future research. First, this study relies on a quantitative research 
methodology and uses secondary data. Although this study covered most of the 
characteristics related to gender diversity, nationality diversity, say-on-pay and CEO 
remuneration, this methodology and this type of data cannot capture and measure all relevant 
aspects related to these characteristics. Therefore, future research can use an alternative 
methodology, such as a qualitative approach, for instance, interviewing some of the major 
shareholders and asking them what factors influence their voting behaviour on directors’ 
remuneration reports and whether they are happy to see more or fewer women or foreign 
directors on their investee firms’ remuneration committees.  
Second, this study uses aggregated shareholders’ voting data instead of individual 
shareholders’ voting data due to the lack of data availability. Investigating shareholder 
heterogeneity may explain differences in voting decisions, for example, the differences in 
voting decisions between pension funds and hedge funds. Therefore, future studies could 
examine whether the relationship between say-on-pay dissent voting and women and foreign 
directors on remuneration committees will change depending on the type of investor. 
Furthermore, this study is limited to the UK. However, other countries may have different 
corporate governance characteristics; therefore, it is important to understand the relationship 
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between the presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and how 
the effects of shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting and CEO pay impacts other countries. 
This study has examined the determinants of say-on-pay dissent voting when women and 
foreign directors are present on remuneration committees. Future studies could also 
investigate the response of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees 
following high shareholders’ dissent voting and whether their response leads to changes in 
CEO remuneration. Although this study has included several control variables for the 
relationship between women and foreign directors and say-on-pay and CEO pay, this study 
did not control for the remuneration committees’ number of meetings and the meetings’ 
attendance due to the unavailability of these data for the entire study period. Controlling for 
meeting attendance and meeting frequency may assess the monitoring function of women and 
foreign directors on remuneration committees and its impact on say-on-pay and CEO pay.   
The gender pay gap is often included in discussions about gender equality. This research 
therefore recommend future research to investigate whether the gender pay gap can influence 
why women may be more likely than men to make a say-on-voting. Future studies could 
conduct cross-sectional analysis that decomposes firms into groups with high and low CEO 
remuneration. Future research might also consider examining different remuneration 
characteristics as shareholders may not be concerned about the level of total pay but may be 
concerned about the composition or the form of payment (e.g., the proportion of stock-based 
remuneration and the pay gap between the CEO and other executives).   
Finally, this study uses two main theories (agency theory and critical mass theory) to address 
relationship between presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees 
and say-on-pay voting and CEO pay. Future studies could also investigate the relationship 
between presence of women and foreign directors on remuneration committees and say-on-
pay voting and CEO pay using social related theories. For example, Boulouta and Pitelis 
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(2014) have used social role theory and found that board gender diversity affects corporate 
social performance. This might also explain why women directors are more caring about fair 
remuneration than male directors and therefore, shareholders may prefer to see more women 
directors on remuneration committees.      
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter reported the research’s conclusion and implications. After a brief introduction, 
this chapter discussed the key research findings in regards to the results related to the time 
series descriptive statistics analysis and the results related to the empirical study. Second, this 
chapter presented the theoretical and academic implications of this study. In addition, this 
chapter discussed the study’s practitioner and policy implications. Finally, this chapter 
reported the study’s potential limitations and also suggested some future research ideas.  
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